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# ***JPRS Report***

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10 JULY 1987

## EAST ASIA

## KOREA

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# SLOOC, GREECE SIGN ON 1988 OLYMPIC FLAME RELAY

Seoul NEWSREVIEW in English 23 May 87 p 21

## [Text]

The Seoul Olympic Organizing Committee (SLOOC) and the Hellenic Olympic Committee (HOC) last week signed an agreement on cooperation for relay of the sacred flame for the 1988 Seoul Olympics.

Under the agreement, the HOC will extend all possible assistance to the SLOOC in collecting the sacred flame and relaying it on Greek soil, a SLOOC spokesman said last week in Seoul.

The signing took place at the HOC office in Athens at 7 p.m. (KST) between the SLOOC President Park Se-hjik and the HOC President Charalam-bos Nikolaou, he said.

The Olympic flame will be ignited in a traditional ceremony at the Hera Temple in Olympia at 11 a.m. on Aug. 23, 1988, (Athens Time). Its relay will start at noon from the ancient temple stadium.

The HOC will be responsible for all matters related to the staging of all Olympic flame relay ceremonies and festivities in Greece.

The flame will be relayed to Athens by Greek athletes over three days and two nights. It will be handed over to SLOOC representatives in a grand

ceremony at the Pan-Athenian Stadium.

The torch then will be motorcaded to Athens International Airport where it will start a 29-hour, 12,273km air journey to Korea's southern island of Cheju-do.

The HOC will provide torch relay runners and their escorts as well as automobiles necessary for its relay from Olympiad to Athens via Iliada, Patra, Korinthos and Megara. Each torch-relay runner will cover 1,000 meters, according to the agreement.

The torch transfer ceremony at the Pan-Athenian Stadium will be attended by some 50,000 people, including Greek government dignitaries and Olympic officials, and the SLOOC delegates.

The Olympic flame is to arrive at Cheju Airport at 11 a.m. on Aug. 17, 21 days before the Games' opening, aboard a chartered Korean Air (KAL) plane.

The flame will be shipped to the southern port of Pusan after an over-night stay on the island and then will be relayed to Seoul on a zig-zag course which will include the nation's 60 major cities.

The flame will arrive in Seoul on Sept. 16 on the eve of the Olympics' opening.

A rehearsal for the sacred flame's ignition will take place at the Hera Temple on Aug. 23, exactly one year before the real torch-lighting ritual.

The SLOOC plans to hold a Korean folk festival in both Olympia and Athens in July this year to promote the Games among Greeks and heighten the festive mood for the Olympics.

The HOC will also provide all necessary assistance to Korean TV crew members covering the Olympic flame's relay in Greece, the SLOOC spokesman said.

A HOC representative will accompany the Olympic flame's relay in Korea, he said. The HOC will host a major reception in Olympia to celebrate the flame's kindling and a larger one in Athens after its arrival in the Greek capital city.■

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CSO: 4100/234

## OLYMPICS

### REPORT ON KWANGBOK CONSTRUCTION, OTHER FACILITIES

SK200822 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 2100 GMT 19 Jun 87

[Text] Kwangbok Street and other construction sites in the capital, where grand monumental creatures of the Workers' Party era are being built up on a large scale, are seething with tireless labor struggle of construction workers and Korean People's Army [KPA] soldiers.

By moving quickly to constantly create new construction speeds during the last nine months or so, construction workers and KPA soldiers, who have vigorously risen up to uphold our party's great plan for construction in the capital, have attained the proud achievements of erecting and assembling large-sized buildings at some 50 construction sites.

During that time, they proudly built the Angol Stadium, which has 50,000 seats; small and medium-sized sports halls for handball, basketball, volleyball, badminton, weight-lifting, table tennis, and swimming; and a 30-story building housing such facilities as the Angol Hotel, a youth hotel, an international movie theater, the Pyongyang International Literary Hall, a broadcasting hall, a night market, a resting room for athletes, and a restaurant for athletes. They also assembled more than 3,100 high-rising dwelling houses.

Furthermore, on a 15-ri section prepared after levelling nearly 20 hills, they laid down 35,000 meters of wide roads, including the 100-meter-wide main road of Kwangbok Street. They built a 1,100-meter-long railway roadbed; built up 410 bridge piers after completing construction on bridge structures for 10 bridges, including Kwangbok bridges No. 1 and No. 2 and carried out a 166,000-meter underground installation work concerning heating equipment, a water-supply and sewage system, and communication.

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CSO: 4110/184

## OLYMPICS

KCNA: 'ARROGANT' JAPANESE VIEWS ON HOSTING OF OLYMPICS

SK191010 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1001 GMT 19 Jun 87

["Impudent Behavior of Japanese Reactionaries"]

[Text] Pyongyang 19 June (KCNA)--Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Kitamura flew into Seoul and met with the puppet foreign minister on 17 June, according to a report.

There he briefed the puppet foreign minister on the outcome of the recent summit of seven Western industrialized nations and said that the Japanese Government "stressed the importance of the '88 Olympic Games and the need for all countries in the world to participate in the games."

At the Venice Summit Nakasone unbecomingly stressed that the Western countries should "take joint action" for the "successful holding of the Seoul Olympic Games."

Lately the Japanese reactionaries dare wag their tongues about the Korean question and clamour about the "successful holding of the Seoul Olympic Games." This is an impudent behavior of those who are indiscreet, not knowing their position.

The arrogant utterances of Kitamura following Nakasone are insolent ones trying to scuttle the realisation of the joint hosting of the Olympic Games and throwing a cold blanket over it and seeking a sinister political aim to create an "international environment" for the creation of "two Koreas" by realising the "single-handed hosting of the Olympic Games in Seoul."

The Japanese reactionaries must look squarely at the will of the Korean people for national reunification and the trend of the times moving toward independence and sovereignty, renounce their wrong policy in obstructing the peaceful reunification of Korea and encouraging the South Korean puppets and act with discretion.

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CSO: 4100/246

SEOUL DAILY SEES UNREST AS THREAT TO OLYMPIC GAMES

SK191140 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean 18 Jun 87 p 1

[Editorial: "Let Us Bridge This Impasse--We Urge the Resumption of Debate on Constitutional Revision Through Negotiations Between Politicians"]

[Text] 1. It is wondered if we are aboard a ship which has deviated from its regular route and has run aground while drifting due to engine trouble, and if passengers and crewmen have given up their won efforts for rescue, only blaming each other for the distress and exchanging disputes over who was right and who was wrong. Is it too much to compare our situation to a ship in distress in which no one is trying to patch up this dispute, no one wants to stop it, and we are passively counting down to the moment of sinking?

At this juncture, we intend to clarify our views for the sake of the country by again flashing distress signals in desperation.

A possibility for the normal operation of the extraordinary Assembly session, on which we have pinned our expectations, is limping, and efforts to redirect the political situation upward, such as substantial talks between power-holders No Tae-u and Kim Yong-sam and talks among the heads of the four political parties, have been deadlocked or thwarted. This is the situation facing us.

The feasibility of political leaders getting together to resolve the difficult situation is gloomy because of knotty preconditions prior to their get-together.

Furthermore, difficulties are added to this because of their insistence on giving precedence to their prestige and on attaching a cause to their talks. The people see clearly that no one has removed greed for power from his mind. Anxiously and deplorable, no middle ground is seen despite the situation in which the two opposite sides find themselves: one side calls for pushing over the other side until it falls down without missing the favorable chance, and the the side is determined not to be pushed over at any cost.

Moves on campus--an irregular substantial force in the Korean political arena and a big variable capable of affecting it--are becoming more unusual with each passing day. These days, the demonstrations, which were once waged mostly on campuses and were confined to confrontation with the police near

campus gates, have now moved to the streets and have been augmented on a nationwide scale and are now assuming such features as putting a halt to and destroying the order of normalcy--this is different from the characteristics of past demonstrations. The phenomenon of resorting to violence in the course of exchanging offensives and defenses at demonstration sites is ever escalating a sense of unrest and tension. Diverse slogans have been concentrated into two slogans--"Abolish the Shelving of Constitutional Reform" and "Down With Dictatorship"--which are identical to the slogans upheld by the pan-dissident circles. Surprise attacks, midnight demonstrations, and sit-in demonstrations have become new types of struggle. Also, they are likely to develop into demonstrations which are staged on a daily and long-term basis.

It is true that history repeats itself, but it does not reproduce with the same features. It is bound to vary in accordance with accumulated experiences and historical circumstances. Therefore, the 19 April, the 16 May, the 26 October, and the 17 May incidents will not be duplicated exactly. This is why it is feared more that, rather than the incident in Manila in February last year, an incident such as the tragedy of Saigon in April 1975 will recur in Seoul. We have learned the lesson from history that democratization is not accomplished only through demonstration and bloody resistance.

We keenly awaken ourselves to crises by perceiving the present reality as well as the past history in an open-minded manner--genuinely by emptying our minds. Foreign correspondents have described the current Korean situation as a "state of civil war." There is no need to recall that during the confrontation between the North and South in the midst of division the North would engineer maneuvers for the South's self-ruin.

Apparently, we cannot profess that there is no indication that the anti-system forces, who deny the free democratic system and are trying to topple the order of capitalism, are maneuvering to capitalize on the anti-government demonstration or to take initiative in it. At this very moment, malicious rumors and agitative slogans are spreading contagiously and ringing wildly throughout the country at the same time as teargas is covering downtown areas.

There is a saying about burning down the barn to get rid of mice. In a word, what would be a wise way to counter this situation so as not to lose everything while gaining what we want?

If we are obsessed with nothing other than the perception that no one can enjoy civil rights or achieve a transfer of power without resorting to a forcible push-over, not by way of voting, this will lead us to the road of precipitating our doom. This logic is also applicable to the miscalculation that power cannot be sustained without depending on bayonets or teargas canisters.

Indeed, only the Pyongyang side genuinely hopes that the clash between upward roaring outcries for democracy and public power coping with crises will bring about damage to each other, and a people's revolution or a military coup d'etat will occur.



2. Just as the incident at the Myondong Cathedral was settled in a democratic and nonviolent way while impairing no one's dignity and honor, we are not exactly in a blind alley if we counter this impasse with reasoning and flexibility. Our society is never a sheer undimensional society that functions only in accordance with polarized actions and counteractions following only the logic of black and white. It is a diverse and multidimensional society where the other side enjoys baseball games between professionals, lights remain turned on in libraries, and fun fairs overflow with picnickers while one side stages a demonstration. Therefore, the all-people totalitarianism, in which all people are subject to the leadership of one man or one faction, cannot exist and be conceived. The harmony of being faithful to one's own role while honoring those of others constitutes the structure of our society--a society with undisturbed harmony in coexistence.

In reality, it is time that we begin to seek not the politics of the-ruler-and-the-ruled relations bound by authoritarianism and by the practice of cleaving to nominal causes, but politics oriented in practical interests and rationalism. Politicians are now obliged to accept and put into practice the people's consensus that there must be something different from what we have if this consensus has been made. The aftermath of demonstrations still remains, and the present knotty situation has been created because there has existed only the single-track rule, which has failed to correctly comprehend public sentiments, and there has echoed another uncompromising outcry demanding complete victory.

Furthermore, now is the time for politicians, students, and people to stop getting overheated and going at overdrive and to restore cool reasoning with a view to preventing the tragedy of self-ruin from recurring in this land. Also, the politicians are responsible for carrying out this work. Only those politicians who discard self-interest and selfish greed and party interests and artifices and who sacrifice themselves for national interests and welfare should be allowed to remain in the political arena. Those politicians who committed gross mistakes in the past or who blindly obey their superiors without faith must retire completely from the political stage. Only then can a new political order free from the stereotyped practice be established.

Under this presupposition, those conscientious politicians with substantial power, who will truly take responsibility for the future political situation, should unreservedly meet without any precondition and discuss present and future national affairs. It is believed that they should commence realistic political negotiations with the attitude of clinging to or confining themselves to ideals or nominal causes. Since political negotiations are not a showdown, they are carried out with enough time, with unfettered minds, and on the basis of give and take. Repeating these courses are the essence of politics. We expect that this type of negotiation will begin first by realizing talks between substantial power-holders--No Tae-u and Kim Yong-sam. In other words, we expect them to resume wide-scope debate over constitutional revision--also the desire of the people--and to reach a compromise. It is believed that the people, to say nothing of the hard-liners on each side, should watch with self-restraint and patience as the two camps realize talks between substantial power-holders and bear fruition in these talks. The people will anxiously wait for this result with unquenchable thirst.

Of course, the focal points of negotiations are the timing of constitutional revision and subsequent political schedules. Frankly, the question of accomplishing democratization is not necessarily linked to the system of power--the presidential system or the cabinet system. On the contrary, the people are more interested in who takes power, how long he rules, and how he rules the country. This is also the key content and core of politics. Therefore, the government and the ruling party should clarify, through commitment, when and in what form they will revise the Constitution and what political schedules they conceive so that the people can be convinced of this commitment, are not suspicious of a possibility for its fulfillment, and are not restless. This is the way to open the bright and broad path of politics and to follow the aspirations of the people.

President Chon Tu-hwan on many occasions has promised his honorable resignation next February and the people support and believe the fulfillment of this promise. The smooth holding of the Seoul Olympics that he earnestly asked for is the aspiration of all mankind, except for the Pyongyang side, as well as of our people. Our people take an ever-higher pride in hosting mankind's common festival--a sports function, but the symbol of freedom and peace. Also, preparations for the Olympic Games--almost perfect preparations--are being made smoothly. If we fail to hold the Olympics or if we host crippled games because of our political situation as well as the subversive maneuvers of the Pyongyang side, we will be branded as a disable people in the international community. We must not spoil the Olympics due to political schedules nor must we drag democratization and deal lightly with political negotiations.

Even though we bring the rose of democracy into full blossom in the land of "primitive politics" which does not hold the Olympics, violating our promise and failing in its obligation before the world, will not earn us anyone's praise and this dishonor will never be erased. It is our prayer that in this era of the global village, nothing will ever happen to defame the people because of the greed, dignity, and obstinacy of some people or a group. All the people should tide over this difficult situation with self-restraint, patience, and single-hearted patriotism.

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## ROK DAILY NOTES CONCERN OVER SEOUL OLYMPIAD

SK220355 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean 21 Jun 87 p 2

[Editorial: "It Is Possible To Hold the Olympic Games"]

[Text] Concern is growing over the Seoul Olympic Games. What makes us uncomfortable are voices of concern from overseas. The Soviet TV has reportedly said that the Seoul Olympic Games would be impossible, and even among Americans, when we trust the most, skepticism has reportedly begun to arise over the Seoul Olympic Games. Bradley, mayor of Los Angeles, where the 23d Olympic Games were held in 1984, reportedly put forth an idea of changing the venue of the 1988 Olympiad. If we consider our own ugliness being exposed these days, we have nothing to say, no matter what other people may say about us. Before a crumbling dam, instead of making efforts to sustain it, we are continuing the shirk responsibility onto another. This is indeed deplorable. So, even if other people say that "the party cannot be held there," indeed, we have no grounds to rebut it. But, still we believe that our nation has the ability to astonish the outside world, which makes rash judgments over our superficially ugly look. This is not braggadocio. We have many reasons to believe in our capabilities.

For our young ones, it may be a too worn-out story, if we cite the economic development achieved on the ravages of the Korean War. However, our 17 million economic people, who have grown up in the course of such economic development, are the backbone of our country. There are reportedly 100,000 business firms in which these people are conducting economic activities.

In addition, from overseas, we hear that a Korean student set the best academic record in the 200-year history of the New York State University in 1984, and that Korean minds are among the most brilliant in the world. As if to prove this, we hear that our technology has reached a level to launch an earth satellite in the 1990's.

This notwithstanding, a foreign reporter has told us that the world's image of us are only negative ones, such as the Korean War and demonstrations. In this connection, he reportedly said that the Seoul Olympiad will indeed provide the only opportunity to create positive images of Korea by eliminating the negative ones. At the same time, a Japanese reporter reportedly said that we will be blessed by our neighbors, if we smoothly host the Olympic Games through negotiation.

With all these encouraging words, will we still be unable to host the 1988 Olympic Games? Of course there is no need to be too pessimistic to think that the Olympic Games will decide the destiny of our nation. The Olympiad is not the only thing that will glorify the 5,000-year history of the Korean nation. However, if we unite as one, we will be respected and blessed by other people. History and reality forbid us to indiscreetly abandon such a precious opportunity.

We still have sufficient time. If anyone or any group leave the present political crisis to continue more than 400 days, he must be an idiot, and this group must be a group of idiots. Our history and reality clearly show that our nation is not a group of such idiots. Unless this soil turns into a battle ground, there is no reason to give up the Olympic Games. At the same time, there is no such precedent. Political turbulence and the Olympic Games are two different things. Of course, disturbances must not reach such a level where teargas bombs are exploded around stadiums, and the present turbulence will not continue until that time. The Olympic Games will be hosted as scheduled. This is because the Olympic Games, which we have pledged to host to the world, are much more important than the political schedule on which someone else insists.

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CSO: 4107/204

ROK DAILY ON SEOUL OLYMPIAD, DEMOCRATIZATION

SK230839 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean 22 Jun 87 p 2

[Editorial: "At Least, We Must Rescue the Seoul Olympic Games---International Pledge Must Be Fulfilled by Concentrating the Strength of the Nation"]

[Text] In the wake of the furious demonstrations which have continued to expand following the 10 June demonstration, the Korean political situation has fallen into an unprecedented crisis.

The throwing of rocks and Molotov cocktails at the riot police by students and some citizens and the firing of teargas canisters by riot police are reminiscent of street battles. This, along with the feud between the ruling and opposition camps on the question of constitutional amendment and the stalemate in the political situation, may appear as a state of a rebellion in the eyes of foreigners.

If the present political crisis is not overcome at an early date based on the people's opinion, the chaotic state will continue and, in this case, the Seoul Olympiad will be endangered most. Concern has already been expressed in foreign countries. Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley has proposed holding the 1988 Olympiad in Los Angeles, in case it is impossible for Seoul to host the games due to an unstable political situation, and Hansen, chairman of the German Sports Federation, remarked that the Games can be held in Berlin if the Seoul Olympiad is impossible.

Meanwhile, Reverend Jesse Jackson, civil rights activist for the American blacks, said that the United States must boycott the Seoul Olympic Games unless remarkable improvement is made in the human rights situation in Korea. Even Soviet TV commented that the Seoul Olympiad will be impossible if the political unrest continues. With regard to this, the IOC members remarked they are convinced that the Korean Government and people will overcome the political crisis before the Seoul Olympic Games, and that accordingly they had no plan to change the venue of the Olympic Games. The flat IOC refusal of the plan to change the venue of the Olympic Games is entirely natural. But, for the Koreans, who will host the Games, the foreigners' debates on the change of the venue of the Olympiad themselves are very displeasing. The cause of their displeasure and its meaning are complicated. On one hand, we regret our inability to settle our internal affairs, and the fact that we have thus made

foreigners think of hosting the 1988 Olympic Games. On the other hand, we are concerned that we may truly lose the opportunity to host the Olympic Games if the present situation continues.

As Cardinal Kim Su-hwan has remarked, no matter who has accepted the Olympic Games, we must make efforts to host the games, because hosting the games is our pledge to the international community.

Democratization cannot be victimized because of the Olympic Games. At the same time, because of the bigotry of the two sides on the question of democratization, we must never be made to be a fool who will miss the peerless opportunity to host the Olympic Games, through which our nation can indeed make giant strides. No doubt, this is the earnest desire of all people. Both the ruling and opposition camps, on the pretext of such desire of the people, must not try to make a pawn of the Olympic Games.

Except for the swimming pool, the construction of facilities are 100 percent complete for the Seoul Olympic Games, which will open on 17 September 1988. At the same time, complete preparations have been finished on signing contracts for foreign broadcasting, security, and the procedures of events. The only problem is our internal political situation. If the Seoul Olympic Games cannot be held because of our internal political issue, we will be unable to show our faces before the human family around the globe.

It can be said that we are indeed in a grave situation in which not only the politicians of the ruling and opposition camps but also patriotic students and citizens must seriously think of our common destiny by moving a step backward.

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CSO: 4107/204

## OLYMPICS

### BRIEFS

FINNISH PAPER EXPRESSES CONCERN--Pyongyang 24 June (KCNA)--The Finnish paper HOLCINGIN SANOMAT on 19 June ran an editorial headlined "'Seoul Olympics' in danger." It notes that serious difficulties have been created since the designation of Seoul as the Olympic venue and they have increased owing to the strained situation on the Korean peninsula and the unstable situation within South Korea. It said: The International Olympic Committee could hardly imagine such change in South Korea when it chose the venue. But it must be clear that the Olympic Games, a sports meet of the world people, cannot be held at a place where the Army is going to specially guarantee the "safety" of the sportsmen by suppressing its people, if necessary, with teargas and arms. If IOC held the Olympic Games in Seoul as planned, that would be a bankrupt Olympics and, therefore, the world opinion will no doubt be oriented towards the cancellation of Seoul as Olympic venue. According to a radio of Norway, the chairman of the Norwegian Olympic Committee, when he was interviewed by a reporter on 19 June, expressed deep concern over the South Korean situation and said it was not safe to send Norwegian sportsmen to Seoul. [Text] [Pyongyang KCNA in English 0448 GMT 24 Jun 87 SK] /12913

PROSPECTS AT 50 PERCENT--Pyongyang 20 June (KCNA)--Bob Paul, special assistant of the U.S. Olympic Committee, on 17 June intimated his view that the prospect of holding the "Seoul Olympics" is no more than 50 percent owing to the instability of the South Korean political situation, according to a report. He intimated this view, expressing apprehensions about the impact of the fierce anti-"government" demonstrations in South Korea on the "Seoul Olympics" at the U.S. Olympic Academy which will discuss the matter of the "Seoul Olympic Games." [Text] [Pyongyang KCNA in English 0441 GMT 20 Jun 87 SK] /12913

OLYMPICS 'IMPOSSIBLE' WITHOUT DEMOCRACY--Pyongyang 23 June (KCNA)--Kim Yong-sam, president of the Opposition Reunification democratic Party in South Korea, contended on 22 June that democratization must be carried out by February next year, according to a report. Speaking at an enlarged caucus meeting of the party, he said democracy must be achieved by the efforts of the people. "The opening of the Olympic Games will be impossible, if democratization is not carried out," he declared. Talking with Cardinal Kim Su-hwan at the Myongdong Cathedral Monday he held that the Chon Tu-hwan group must withdraw the "13 April Measure" without delay and accept a constitutional amendment for direct "presidential" election. [Text] [Pyongyang KCNA in English 0435 GMT 23 Jun 87 SK]/12913

COMMITTEE PRESIDENT ON OLYMPICS--On 17 June Robert Helmick, president of the U.S. Olympic Committee who is now on a visit to South Korea, said that he would absolutely not send American athletes to a dangerous place. Saying that the U.S. Olympic Committee has been attentively watching every day and every month the situation developing in South Korea, the president of the U.S. Olympic Committee said: We will analyze the situation in August and September 1988. He further said: Although we support participation in any type of sporting events, we will absolutely not send our athletic team to such a place where participating athletes may be endangered. We are ready to cancel our trip if security of our team confronts any types of problems. This includes security problems from airport-to-hotel and from hotel-to-stadium. Even while refusing to comment on the question raised by reporters, "Are the '88 Seoul Olympics threatened because of the anti-U.S. and anti-government demonstrations being staged in South Korea?", Helmick and Dennis, president and vice president of the U.S. Olympic Committee, said: We will not participate in sporting events being where the air is filled with teargas. [Text] [(Clandestine) Voice of National Salvation in Korean to South Korea 0200 GMT 19 Jun 87 SK] /12913

CSO: 4110/184

## GOVERNMENT SENDS U.S. CONGRESS LETTER ON OMNIBUS TRADE BILL

SK180918 Seoul YONHAP in English 0902 GMT 18 Jun 87

[Text] Seoul, 18 June (YONHAP)--South Korea has sent to the U.S. Congress a letter specifying its position on the Omnibus Trade Bill now pending on the U.S. Legislature, the Foreign Ministry said Thursday.

In the letter, the Government expressed its "deep concern" over the proposed legislation saying that "certain elements are potentially dangerous for the future of Korea-U.S. trade relations as well as the development of world trade."

The letter cited the provisions on worker's rights, exchange rate issue and retaliation on the basis of an "excessive" trade surplus as potentially dangerous, and urged that the U.S. Congress members take Korea's efforts and concern into consideration during the Senate's deliberation of the bill.

The Senate's deliberation of the Omnibus Trade Bill is scheduled to begin next week.

The letter, under the name of the Korean ambassador to the United States, was delivered to all the Senate members and some leading House members, the Ministry said.

"It is regrettable that these elements apply indiscriminately to all trading nations, regardless of each nation's distinct macroeconomic condition," it said. "The provision on worker's rights, a concept not well defined internationally, will only prove counter-productive to progress made in this area. Working conditions and wage levels in Korea have improved dramatically through the expansion of trade, among other things," it said.

The letter said application of the provision (on worker's rights) would hinder, rather than enhance these strides and the very workers whom such legislation proposes to protect would, in effect, be victimized by reduced employment and benefits.

"Retaliation on the basis of an 'excessive' trade surplus would severely undermine Korea's ability to meet its huge foreign debt servicing and annual defense burden."

The Korean ambassador's letter also said exchange rate issues should be addressed through multilateral discussions rather than through unilateral legislation. It pointed to the fact that the value of the Korean won has risen 5.2 percent against the U.S. dollar in the first five months of this year.

Noting that Korea has substantially accelerated its market opening policy, the letter said the proposed legislation would encumber the Korean Government's ability to implement liberalization policies.

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## U.S. ROLE IN CURRENT, FUTURE POLITICAL SITUATION

Seoul SIN TONG-A in Korean Apr 87 pp 126-143

[A roundtable conference by political specialists chaired by Yonsei University Professor An Pyong-yong: "The Political Situation in 1988, Democratization and the United States"]

[Text] Moderator: Looking at the time period for the transfer of power scheduled for late February 1988 from this end, it looks as if it will be difficult for political compromise between the government and opposition parties to be delayed much beyond the middle of this year. However, the government and opposition have not made any steps toward progress on a compromise constitutional revision, and the people of the country seem to be rather frustrated. Recently there has been an increase in skepticism as to whether the government and opposition are even truly interested in agreeing on constitutional revision at all. People seem to be especially frustrated due to the sense that the 1987 political situation is a major turning point that will determine the country's fate in terms of our national development as well. Today I would like us to analyze this situation and to discuss the possibilities for getting through this complicated political situation. Also, since the visit to Korea of U.S. Secretary of State Shultz there has been a diversity of views concerning the appropriate role that might be played by the United States in Korea's democratization, and I hope we will have some discussion of the 1988 political situation and Korean-U.S. relations as well. First, Professor Han [Chong-il], would you please give an analysis of the current political situation? Since you have some direct experience of the Kon'guk University incident, I'm sure that you have a more realistic appreciation of the situation. (laughter)

Han Chong-il: You said to analyze the general situation, but I am really not sure where to begin. First, it seems that there has been, throughout, a lot of discussion over the questions of whether the ruling party really wants constitutional revision and if so, what kind of revised constitution it would be. Also, the term democratization has been heard frequently, but it seems that the time has passed for discussion of that in the textbook sense. Nonetheless, it seems that confusion stemming from inability to present more clearly the subject of constitutional revision--beginning with an agenda for democratization--and to set that agenda has put the people in a state of considerable confusion. In a polarized situation where the ruling party

supports a cabinet system and the opposition party supports a directly elected presidential system, the two sides assert and emphasize their views to each other in the discussion, but since there actually is no forward movement, this just seems to be dividing the people's minds over and over again. Moreover, of late there seems to be confusion within the opposition party itself, and that too seems to exert a not inconsiderable influence on the current situation.

The opposition party publicly promised constitutional revision during the February 1985 general elections, and they have clearly come forward for constitutional revision, having said they would certainly implement this promise. The ruling government party has changed its initial attitude, which was that "revision of the constitution is absolutely impossible," to one of willingness to revise the constitution, which might be said to have given considerable possibility to political progress. However, although they shifted in formal terms from maintaining the existing constitution to constitutional revision, in actuality they did not yield even a single step and from the people's perspective, there was a sense of frustration and doubts as to what politics is, after all. At any rate, if we take at face value the slogan of the ruling government party that they will turn over the reins of government by February 1988, even though time is running very short even with clear proposals for the requisite preparation and agenda, the view that they can by no means bring about an agreement on specifics, it seems that both the limits of leadership and the inadequacy of political power have become revealed.

#### Fight Between Conservative and Reform Groups Continues Amid Confrontation Between Left and Right

Yi Ho-chae: I've been thinking about the current political crisis, which is centered on discussion of constitutional revision, in its historical context. When there was confrontation between left and right over politics and foreign relations after liberation, the left fought internally for the initiative, and the right also fought internally in its own way for the advantage. Of course international relations must have been somewhat influential, but in the end the country was divided and the situation even developed to the point where a war broke out. In other words, divisions and struggles for power among domestic politicians became in the end a cause of national tragedy, and there is concern that this could occur again. Even after the fall of the Rhee government in the 19 April [1960] incident it was the same thing. What with confrontation between reform forces and conservative forces, the fighting for power within the conservative forces, and fights over the power of the president and the power of the cabinet...in this way in the end the country underwent the 16 May military coup and suffered a severe setback politically. Moreover, from the standpoint of our people's historical development, this caused a very retrogressive result. In the past several years and looking forward to 1988, one sees these historical failures repeating themselves.

In the situation just after liberation, negotiations and power struggles among political parties had a large ideological dimension in addition to a power

dimension, so it was very difficult to reach compromise. Now, examining the political situation unfolding currently, or looking at negotiations between political forces, the ideological elements are not so prominent, and in a sense things still remain at a stage of deciding which among conservative forces will hold power, it seems to me. Accordingly, there actually should be greater leeway for compromise, since ideological elements are weak, but current reality doesn't seem to be that way.

If we can't reach compromise on these problems soon, ideological problems may reemerge at the next stage. Then it truly will become extremely difficult for leaders or political forces to reach agreement. To this extent, the fact that current political forces must reach at least some agreement in order to realize expectations, whatever they are, for the next stage, is what makes everyone keep repeating the incantations "agreement" and "compromise."

Chong Chong-uk: There is no doubt that there needs to be agreement on constitutional revision and some major progress in taking steps toward peaceful transfer of power and democratization before February 1988. However, as to why agreement on constitutional revision has currently reached such a statement, and why there is more pessimism than last year, it is unmistakably due to an unbridgeable difference in the standpoint of the government and opposition parties. A more important issue is that there doesn't seem to be any apparent political force that can play the role of mediating this very profound difference between the two political forces. I believe this is the core of the dilemma we face today. However, the basic thing is not, after all, just a matter of ruling and opposition parties looking at these serious political problems from a power perspective. To go a step further, they must deeply reflect on the fact that in resolving problems it will be helpful for them to adopt the posture of accepting each other's position, I believe.

#### Earnest Desire for Peaceful Transfer of Power

Moderator: In any case, the external focal point of the constitutional revision issue seems to be the structure of power. On the one side, they raise high the banner of the directly elected presidential system, and on the other side, that of the cabinet responsibility system, without yielding a bit, and it looks like they will not yield even a little in the future either. Talk of a directly elected presidential system has the feel of giving emphasis to conceptualizing political power. When they talk of the cabinet responsibility system like this, it seems to place greater emphasis on a kind of political management aspect. From the perspective of the opposition parties, it seems that the source of contention over the legitimacy of our country's politics often begins with the process through which political power is created, and so they continue to emphasize a president selected by the people, or in other words, a directly elected presidential system. On the ruling party side, one gets the feeling that they are striving to show rather that management of a cabinet responsibility system can be a success. When the two positions confront each other so strongly in this way, should not the ruling and opposition sides each try to have a viewpoint that looks at the problems from the other side's perspective? Should not, so to speak, the

ruling party and opposition party each develop a strategy for constitutional revision that gives some slight possibility, or, depending on circumstances, even the illusion that the other side might be able to attain political power? At present, it seems the problem is becoming increasingly more severe, because the ruling and opposition parties just continue to conduct a confrontational struggle that completely excludes the possibility of accepting the other side's proposals.

Yi Ho-chae: The demand by the people of the country for constitutional revision since the Yusin system and down through the Fifth Republic may be said to be a demand, in a sense, for transfer of political power. Should not they try creating some kind of constitution that allows for the possibility of a transfer of power and just have a transfer, rather than [debating] whether it should be a cabinet system or direct election system?

Since this is proposing that we build the kind of framework within which power can change hands and fair play can be introduced, if that cannot be done, none of the political problems we seek to solve will be solved. Therefore, I believe that in discussing constitutional revision we must devote a little more concern to constructing a system that can fairly provide opportunity--before worrying about the problem of the structure of power--then the true meaning of constitutional revision will be found.

Han Chong-il: Actually, since the Yusin Constitution, we have continually had indirect elections. So when the people of the country thought about it superficially, the dominant opinion was that "I must choose the president with my own hands (personally)," and the government, of course, did not respond. I do not know in detail what percentage desire this system, but in any case we can say the only thing that is clear is there is a strong bent in this direction. In that sense the intent to revise the existing constitution gives considerable legitimacy to the arguments made by the opposition party for direct elections.

The government ruling party does not use the term we are using right now, transfer of power, but instead uses the term transfer of government. It does not need to be said twice that the people who are the actors who can "transfer power" are the citizens. The people transfer power through the ballot, and do not use the word "transfer of power" but to say instead transfer of government makes one suspect that they intend not to relinquish power but to continue to hold on to it. It does not have to be said a second time that in a democratic country, the question of creating power must naturally be given to the people of the country. But there are signs that are evident in various ways that seem to indicate that (the government party) is not taking this seriously. Even while they always emphasize that they will "transfer government" in 1988, they do not present an agenda for that and it remains lacking in detail, so if that is the case, the suspicion as to where in the world they are headed lingers as an element of unease. Considering the international situation we are facing, politicians must know that we cannot go on as at present. Even though the people should know it and the politicians should be well aware of it, I believe the continuous yearning for power is a problem. In other words,

if they continue to hold power during the process of reorganizing, and only the form will change, then what I am saying is: how far, after all, can they go in preparing a starting point for persuasive dialogue?

#### What If the Second Republic Constitution Is Chosen?

Chong Chong-uk: The reason that the president chosen under the Yusin system failed to gain legitimacy is not because it was an indirect election system, but because the nature of that indirect election system was intended to extend the political power of one person. The problem was due to the fact that it was set up as a tool for one person, or for one party, to hold power for a long period of time. In theoretical terms, I believe if a president is chosen by a presidential electoral college, that is chosen in a fair election, then that president, though elected indirectly, will have legitimacy.

The cabinet responsibility system now being advocated by the ruling party is a model where, once the people elect national assembly members, the national assembly members meet to select a cabinet head. In other words, the people are in a situation where they vote for an individual or a party, without knowing which of the several parties will emerge as the head of the cabinet, and so this is somewhat different from the spirit of a cabinet responsibility system, I believe.

Accordingly, if from the ruling party standpoint one advocates a cabinet responsibility system, and if one selects a cabinet responsibility system with a procedure that says that so-and-so is the candidate for chief of the next cabinet, for example setting up a candidate like a Democratic Justice Party council member or the party president, and that asks for the trust of the people concerning that person, then I do not believe the people will object to that. If an agreed-upon constitutional revision moves in the direction of a cabinet responsibility system, and afterward the election law is revised, there is clearly concern that the ruling party will use the advantages of power to create an election law that is advantageous to the ruling party.

However, from the standpoint of our people's sensitivity, there are limits to ruling party revision of the election law using the advantages of power, I believe. Therefore, I also believe that it is taboo for the ruling party to be excessively self-confident concerning its political power, and the opposition party, on its part, should not feel ill at ease, or be lacking in self-confidence concerning a particular system.

The people are actually their political masters; but currently it is just the political forces that are talking and asserting themselves among themselves, and all along there has been no expression at all as to what the people are thinking. In my own view, if an election were held, there is considerable likelihood that the thinking of the people would be expressed in a direction quite different from the thinking of the ruling or opposition parties.

Yi Ho-chae: I have a thought for a proposal to make it possible quickly to advance the lagging constitutional revision negotiations. That is to try to

use the constitution of the Second Republic. The constitution of the Second Republic was drafted in the very democratic situation at that time, and moreover was a democratic law created by political forces having no relationship to the current ruling or opposition parties. Thus if it were accepted as a proposal to solve the current problems, it would have the significance of returning to the time before that constitution was interrupted by the [revolution of] 16 May [1961]. Also, at the detailed level, it is replete with provisions for a form of government, election law, and local autonomy system, so it may have possibilities for overcoming the difficulties currently being encountered in the negotiations. The constitution of the Second Republic provides for a cabinet responsibility system in terms of the structure of power, but did it not have a one-person one-district electoral system? A one-person one-district election law satisfies the demands of the opposition party, and also corresponds with the cabinet responsibility system desired by the ruling party. Moreover, looking at the local autonomy law aspect, it would have the effect of quickly and thoroughly satisfying the opposition party demands for rapid implementation of (such a system)...

Chong Chong-uk: It occurs to me that both ruling and opposition parties must abandon attitudes that excessively cling to the past if they are properly to untangle the constitutional revision talks and move forward. The opposition, for its part, holds that the present government has no legitimacy because of various unfortunate facts that occurred during the process of its establishment, and therefore in reality seems to presuppose an underlying consciousness that does not fully recognize the current government as a partner in discussion. Also, the ruling side, for its part, because of various situations connected with past incidents seems to have an implicit viewpoint that says, for example, "so-and-so must not be elected as president," or not only that, but also "such-and-such a system will not do." However, more than 6 years have gone by now, and we are in a situation that has accumulated considerable changes. Therefore, it strikes me that what is needed is for the ruling and opposition sides first to candidly grant, as a politically symbolic gesture, that for example this has gone well, or that did not go so well, to dispose of the past, as the past, once and for all, and then to establish a posture in order to go forward with planning of future political blueprints based on current reality.

Moderator: I believe the discussion over constitutional revision up to now has been prominently characterized by fabrications, shall I say, or an excessive use of pretexts, based on a political agenda. Looking at both sides, I would say the presidential responsibility system and the cabinet responsibility system have practically been like dogma. If the (opposition party) were to make a gesture of not challenging the political regime on grounds of legitimacy, and asked "would a presidential system be alright?" If they asked in that fashion, ruling party members would have no reason to jump up and down in anger. Or if the ruling party were to ask the opposition party, "Would you accept a cabinet responsibility system under which you would be able to attain power, as a framework for fair competition that would enable a change of government?" the opposition party people would probably not say they would "oppose it to the death." So we can think of the problem like

this: until now the ruling and opposition parties have just put forward moralistic principles and have not gone too far in outlining specific points for negotiations that actually could be implemented. A little while ago Professor Yi put forward the proposal of going back to a package arrangement with the constitution, election laws, and local autonomy law system of the Second Republic. This sounds like something he said out of extreme frustration. However, in my own view, when you take into account the changes in the political situation and changes in what the people are asking for during the period since the Second Republic, it seems we can say to him that the extent to which that idea would be effective in practice is a little problematic.

Now, let's go to another of the major topics for today, Korean-U.S. relations. As Secretary of State George Shultz followed Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs [William Clark] in visiting Korea, one might say the people had the feeling that U.S. exhalations were having an influence on Korea's democratization process in one form or another. Meanwhile, the position of the people was a little confused. Although they thought that such influence was a possibility, given the closeness of Korean-U.S. relations, and although they have for some time had the expectation that it would be good if the United States could play a positive role on behalf of Korean democratization, there seems to have been, on the other hand, a feeling that this perhaps was excessive interference with a strictly sovereign state. In particular, when one sees an official at the deputy assistant secretary level deliberately go to another country saying things irrespective of their propriety, and going through a process of asking questions repeatedly, and verifying whatever it is item by item, one is left wondering if this is really necessary.

When one considers problems of this kind, one thinks that the United States is deeply connected with our country's democratization. In a certain sense, the relationship with the United States can only be formulated more precisely/specifically on the basis of an attitude founded in popular self-reliance; since this is unattainable, there are many times when one has to keep chewing over bitter and stale feelings. I would like us to have some discussion of this Korean-U.S. relationship.

#### No Interest in Whether Korean Government is Democratic or Not

Much speculation was reported in the papers as to whether [George] Shultz' recent visit to Korea, in connection with Assistant Secretary of State [Gaston] Sigur's speech urging Korean democratization at the Korean-American Society, was not putting specific pressure on the government and ruling party, and thereby creating some kind of opportunity for easing the constitutional revision situation. Moreover, in general, the people also seem to have held similar expectations. However, although of course I do not have specific information, so I do not know what relation his visit may have with the discussions in progress on democratization, I believe that he visited Communist China as part of U.S. foreign policy, which seeks to strengthen the U.S. diplomatic position in Northeast Asia, and that rather than



democratization, the primary business of his visit to Korea was to come and inform the government of the results of the China trip, since the situation in Northeast Asia naturally is related to Korea. Accordingly, it seems to me that it misses the significance of his visit to Korea to link it excessively with Korean democratization, and to describe that as if it were the "key issue."

Lately there has been greatly increased interest in Korean democratization on the part of both the U.S. Government and the American public. However, looking at actual U.S. policy toward Korea over the past 40 years, their military interests have held the greatest weight. One might even say that the question of whether the Korean regime is a democratic government or not has not been an object of their interest. One might say their greatest purpose was the military balance with China and the Soviet Union and political stability in Korea (apart from questions of who was in control, or what kind of system it was). Recently, as can be seen in commercial pressures, etc., they are also turning their attention to economic interests. On the face of it, it seems that democratization is an important issue between Korea and the United States, but in reality we have reached a level where it is impossible to ignore our economic losses. Nonetheless, I am concerned that perhaps we are not thinking seriously about the real issues--the U.S. framework of self-interest--in our excessive gratitude (and negative reaction as well) over the U.S. role in the democratization issue.

Chong Chong-uk: The basic position of the United States for resolving problems in the Korean Peninsula is three-party talks. Communist China's position is also the same, three-party talks.

Originally the Communist Chinese side was very positive concerning the three-party talks proposal itself, but because of the negative attitude of our government it was set aside. The Communist Chinese and U.S. position was that they seemed to have believed that if three-party talks could not be realized, then through two sets of so-called two-party talks it would be possible gradually to move to three or four-party talks, cross contracts, and cross-recognition. Therefore, once the United States rejected three-party talks, their consistent policy was a strategy of actively promoting South-North Korean talks while at the same time continuing to open the door to talks between North Korea and the United States. This was based on the premise that at some point these might be reopened into three-party or modified three-party talks. I would consider the relaxation, shall we say, in U.S. policy toward North Korea in that context.

Next, there is Shultz' visit to Korea and the problem of U.S. interference in Korean politics. In my view, the United States currently has considerable interest in democratization of the ROK, and also has considerable interests connected with democratization. The reasons for this include, above anything else, the military significance or strategic position of Korea, and the U.S. belief that maintenance of political stability in the ROK is worthwhile. As for South Korean political stability, there is the belief that there will inevitably be repetition of the vicious circles of the past unless the country



goes through a process of democratization, and so accordingly democratization is a help to political stability, and it also corresponds to U.S. national interests; this is the position they seem to be taking. Another reason is that in the U.S. view, next year is an important year when a presidential election must be held. Now, there is a considerable possibility that the Republican Party may be placed in a very disadvantageous position in next year's election.

Should the schedule which we must implement before next February not go well, that would cast a shadow on U.S. domestic politics, and could become a considerable burden to a Republican administration. The sense is that perhaps this has been reflected in the heightened U.S. interest concerning Korean democratization over the past some months. Of course, from the standpoint of democratization, U.S. influence on our domestic politics is not a welcome matter; it also creates bad feelings. However, seen realistically it appears to be an unavoidable phenomenon, and essentially the problem is what the context of the interference is.

#### U.S. Position Supporting Cabinet System

Yi Ho-chae: What I am saying is not entirely inconsistent with the views of Professor Chong. But I would like to add a few things. Of course, South Korean democratization coincides with U.S. interests. The basic position of the United States is the idea that Korean democratization is a major presupposition of stability on the Korean peninsula, and accordingly, I would say that the U.S. certainly hopes that democratization and political development will occur. Now as respects U.S. interests on the Korean peninsula, if we were first to assume an order or precedence among them, which would be the most important--military interests, commercial interests, or the problem of democratization? I believe that the topic of democratization of South Korea is still ranked third. In the past, when Ford, Carter, or Brzezinski came to Korea they just said a word each in favor of democratization, because human rights problems and problems of democratization were major weak points for our government. In the end, they emphasized the problems of commerce, or increases in our defense budget, or military affairs. Then because our government position was weak, it gave in on everything. Of course, this is not to say that those people had no expectations concerning our democratization. However, I am pointing out that from the perspective of realistic effectiveness, there was a sense that democratization was one card in what they were trying to accomplish in the areas of commercial and military relations.

If you carefully scrutinize U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula after the 15 August [1945] liberation, it seems that lately there has been a slight change in their attitude. In general, the people of our country have excessively trusted the United States, it is true, but since 17 May [1980], with the heightening of anti-American sentiment, U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula seems to have displayed some changes. Shultz came and spoke in terms of accomplishing the fundamental aspects of their policy up to now, but lower-level officials like Sigur seem to be pursuing a dual approach, putting

the focus on democratization in order to sooth anti-American sentiment, because democratization itself is related to their interests.

Be that as it may, it is a mistake blindly to trust the United States or to rely on it excessively. That is because that is related to the problem of cutting off the certain new potentialities of our abilities, and is also simply a slander against our capabilities. I believe this is something we must avoid ourselves.

There are numerous points to be scrutinized carefully in Sigur's speech. The point that democratization means civilian politics is very strongly reflected. So he is saying that military intervention in politics is not welcome under any circumstances.

In general, the United States seems to look at military intervention in politics as having two forms. The first type is an incident in which active duty military directly intervene in politics. This is a violation of the fundamental spirit of civilian politics. The other type of intervention is when retired military enter political power in civilian clothes and exercise influence. The United States also seems to understand this as a political role for the military. As I read the U.S. position up to now, they view the first possibility--active duty military interference in the political process and a change of the agenda of democratization--as undesirable and seem to make it their primary concern. This seems to have come out in the emphasis in Sigur's speech to the Korean-American Society in the comment that "Currently there is no reason to be greatly concerned about the Korean security situation." That theme is repeated several times in the Sigur speech. Currently there is military tension between South and North Korea, but the probability is slight that it will develop into war. Thus the theme that the United States is at least taking responsibility for Korean security appears prominently as the role of U.S. forces in Korea is tremendously emphasized. So, in my view, I believe that recent U.S. approaches to North Korea and the intensification of various talks between the United States and Communist China concerning the Korean peninsula can be connected with this position of the United States--that they are acting to entice North Korea into a more moderate posture during the process of resolving various politically difficult questions that must be faced by South Korea in the future.

Another thing emphasized by Sigur and other U.S. officials is the U.S. position that when military intervention in politics is rejected, and there is no direct relationship between the security problem and the problems of domestic politics, domestic political forces should achieve democratization through dialogue. Since this is a problem of internal South Korean politics, the United States avoids specific comment on it, but the underlying stance seems to be that the cabinet responsibility system is more to be desired than the direct election system as a fundamental point of resolution for the dialogue or compromise.

Yi Ho-chae: Actually, the United States also expressed interest in South Korean democratization at the time of the Third Republic. But the Americans

did not reap any effective results. (laughter) Rather, in some respects, they extended recognition to the status quo and went on to secure their own interests with respect to other issues. The fact is that today, compared with the Third Republic or earlier, for example, South Korea has become much stronger and has considerably improved economically and militarily. Conversely, U.S. strength has decreased considerably. If I may put it somewhat extremely, lately we are giving a lot and the United States is taking a lot. Even when the United States gives, they make a lot of fine sounding phrases...but it is doubtful how much influence they have on Korean politics. The United States comes forward with all kinds of things--the issue of import liberalization, the question of the costs of U.S. forces stationed in Korea--and this also becomes a source of anti-American sentiment.

I also believe that in this kind of situation, as far as democratization is concerned, the role of the United States--well, if it is decreased, it is decreased, but it probably cannot be strengthened. One might also suppose that the fact that Americans hold out slogans of democratization is probably, is it not, due to the fact that they have to approach foreign policy with all countries from an idealistic position.

#### Our Responsibility That Democratization Has Not Taken Place

Chong Chong-uk: To add just a word, the fact that democratization did not take place at various junctures in the past is not because the United States interfered. It is our responsibility. I take that position with respect to the current situation as well. Another thing. The relative influence of the United States may have decreased compared with the past because of increasing Korean economic strength, etc., but on the other hand, there are still various channels through which the United States can apply influence on Korea. The United States has influence through pressure exerted in various areas, such as relations with neighboring countries, security issues, and so on. In particular, since the beginning of the Fifth Republic as relations between Korea and the United States became close, I believe U.S. influence increased as contrasted with the second half of the 1970's.

Moreover, I do not want to distort Professor Yi's view, but I do not think there necessarily is a precedence among commercial or other nonpolitical issues and political problems centered on democratization. To put it in extreme terms, I do not think the United States is likely to sacrifice its interests concerning South Korean democratization in order to solve the problem of the commercial relationship. The fact is that, for the most part, the United States has always, in any situation, had the tendency to recognize the status quo. In other words, their position has been to recognize vested interests and to try to solve problems on that basis, and I believe that puts a limit on what can be sought in the way of changes in the U.S. position. The United States currently is leaning toward the cabinet responsibility system, which itself reflects a realistic U.S. policy toward Korea, I believe.

Moderator: The subject of anti-American sentiment has come up as we have been talking, and I suppose that one would have to say that the level of anti-

American feeling on the part of the Korean people has greatly increased, compared with, say, that in the 1970's. Of course, there are several reasons for the rise in anti-American feeling. Looking at U.S. actions, the United States has excessively taken care of its own interests, and been intent upon short-term profit, for one thing, and as Professor Chong said, U.S. support of the status quo has also been conspicuous. So there has been disappointment, shall I say, arising from that as well.

Now basically, and especially from a perspective that thinks things are urgent of late, the question of whether relations with the United States have not become excessively dependent seems to be shaking us up emotionally, in my view. I believe this heightening of anti-American feeling is likely to have major importance in the future as well, and is likely to become linked in some form or other with U.S. policy toward Korea as well. Therefore, what we need to mull over in connection with this anti-American feeling is the question of what kind of country this country called the United States really is. One might say that doubts will continue to arise concerning the fundamental question of what is the proper understanding Koreans should have toward the United States. We should discuss this problem some before going on.

Yi Ho-chae: Lately when you go to international conferences there seem to be a lot of people worried over anti-American feeling among the Korean people. So I point out that the sources of anti-American feeling in Korea are somewhat different than in other countries, and discuss it in this way. In particular, I say that the anti-American feeling of Korean students arose because the United States has not responded at all to the demand of the students since the Third Republic [1961-79] for democratization, but has just extended its recognition to the Korean Government. Anti-American feeling is an expression of anti-government feeling, and does not arise from some problem between us and the United States.

I believe a representative example of this equivalence between "anti-government" and "anti-American" concerning the U.S. posture emerged after 17 May [1980]. Another typical case was Ambassador [Richard] Walker, who gave the feeling he was conducting himself just like a newly arrived governor general. Of course, some [U.S.] mediation for the sake of democratization would be completely acceptable, but these examples had the nature of interference in South Korean internal affairs, and when the end result is in the direction of affirming the status quo, it is likely only to end up creating anti-American feeling. On top of that, recently trade friction has been added to the menu, hasn't it? However, I do not view current anti-American feeling as something all that severe. The problem, as I see it, is this. As the Northeast Asian situation greatly changes in the future, Japan may strengthen its military preparedness or expand its role in Southeast Asia, and also there is a possibility that the improvement that we are pursuing in our relations with Communist China or the Soviet Union may stagnate because of U.S. interests. If such things occur, there perhaps is ample likelihood of a fundamental conflict of interest emerging in various areas, with anti-American feeling at a new level beyond the present level, as the new international relationships develop.

Chong Chong-uk: I do not deny the increase in anti-American feelings, but paradoxically, I wonder whether the feelings of Koreans toward the United States until now have not been excessively warm, considering the influence the United States has exercised over Korea and also the privileged position vis-a-vis Korea that the United States has held up to now. The problem is the consciousness toward the United States that is growing in force among students in particular of late. This is something that has not been present in the past. In other words, rather than seeing the United States as the country that preserved South Korean security or aided South Korea's democratic development, the idea is becoming widely spread that the United States has the attributes of an imperialistic country in the textbook sense. I believe that idea, linked with the dependency theory or neo-Marxism in theoretical terms is commonly an article of faith among the students.

Han Chong-il: I see that as a question of the generation gap. The present generation of students look at and think about the issues of the post-17 May [1980] period. This is playing a decisive role in their anti-American feeling. When the commercial issues are added in on top of that, the idea becomes universalized that, "Aha, the United States is the country that just takes care of its own interests, not the country that helps us. In particular, there are symptoms that this thinking of the students will increase still more and grow even stronger. For example, the hidden, inner aspects of past U.S. policy toward Korea are now being researched and opened up. Things are being learned that were not known before. So I believe that now we have to conduct some examination of Soviet policy toward South Korea at the same time to be able to do comparative research to grasp the true picture. But that cannot be researched, and when the relationship with the United States is constantly emphasized, the balance is lost and many mistakes are made in setting out coordinates for a true understanding, I believe.

#### Positive Aspects of Anti-American Feeling

Moderator: It is also possible, isn't it, to take the view that if we make an assessment of some positive aspects of anti-American feeling, we may arrive at a starting point for understanding our problems from a more detailed perspective. Rather than just calling it anti-American feeling, I would prefer to say that Korea has entered a stage of, shall I say, mature self-awareness or consciousness of its situation. Moreover, in the process I believe that there may be inadvertent outbursts of feelings that are not so smoothly polished.

Yi Ho-chae: One might say that students strongly believe that the United States had full responsibility for the Korean war, for the division of the country, and for arriving at the current undemocratic situation. In the past, everyone said it was the responsibility of the Soviet Union, but now, if you talk with students, you feel "these anti-American roots are really deep," and they cannot be persuaded otherwise. Now the young students, who are analyzing post-liberation U.S.-Korean relations or U.S. policy toward Korea with a new viewpoint generally take the Bruce Cumings type of approach, and you really cannot talk with them. What I say [to them] is this. Of course, the United

States bears much responsibility, but, nonetheless, compared with the Soviet Union, China, and Japan, surely the United States, geopolitically speaking, has no desire to colonize or to create dependency. Moreover, in order to restrain the continental powers geopolitically, the United States is giving us some room to maneuver, and takes efforts at least to that extent; this is what I believe. However, in the future, we must, little-by-little, get away from a view of the outside world that leans too much toward the United States. In relations with China and the Soviet Union, I believe we need to have a sense of equivalence, should I say, or equidistance. When viewed from the stance of our new foreign relations, suitable to the Northeast Asian situation, the anti-American issue is in one sense a necessary "childhood disease." [hongyok: "measles"] However, I believe there are limits to anti-Americanism, due to geopolitical conditions.

#### The Opposition Party Needs to Empty Its Mind

Moderator: You have made some excellent comments. Now, let us continue the discussion by returning to the subject of the domestic political issues. I was thinking that it would be good if we could have some discussion of what the specific possibilities might be for getting through the current difficulties. I would like to make a few comments myself, first.

At present, there seems to be a considerable confrontation within the New Korea Democratic Party over whether or not to have "democracy first." However, looking generally at the established battle lines, it might be making resolution of the problem a little more difficult, I suppose. But, on the other hand, there may be something that the ruling party can do first. First, in my view, the ruling party has reached the point where it should stop viewing measures for democratization as matters for negotiation, but instead should begin to take the lead in implementing measures for democratization. For example, it is a very conciliatory statement for the side having power to say it will take measures for democratization when the talks for agreed-upon constitutional revision make progress. As an example, the issue of releasing detainees should not be such a difficult problem, one supposes, and media freedom could be expanded a little as well. If the ruling party starts to take the lead in solving the problem of various other legal reforms, confidence building between the ruling and opposition parties will make very rapid strides forward, and the people will surely have a changed view of the ruling party as well, as I see it.

Second, recent statements from the ruling party side concerning specific negotiations over revision of the election law may be said to be a step forward compared with the past. So what I am saying is that they should quickly set out a plan for reform of the election law and the election system, working to create the idea among the opposition party that it surely is worthwhile to have more detailed negotiations if there is a fair framework for competition to that extent. I have said this repeatedly before, but an extremely important thing here is the need to propose an election law that minimizes the power advantage of the incumbent side to the greatest extent possible.

Third, because time is pressing and we have a long way to go, if the opposition party is able to relate its so-called leaders of real influence [the two Kims] with the power of the party and exhibit its efforts; a quick response by the ruling party also to conduct a dialogue based on those really in control [President Chon] surely will be of help in resolving the issues. Since actual power is, after all, the ability to coordinate differing views within the party and also to implement a particular political solution responsibly, my thought is that it would be good if the ruling party could help the opposition party to move in the direction of, as the ruling party so often says lately, "emptying its mind."

With respect to the question of principles, it is clear that many of the people in the country favor a direct presidential election system, but the opposition party needs to move away a little from the position of just doggedly stressing this excessively moralistic political issue. If they work themselves up in a confrontation over the problem to too great an extent, and later on are negotiating on (the edge of) a cliff, it could even be to the disadvantage of the opposition party. Also, agreement on constitutional revision is very important, but if it is not an agreement that people can go along with, or one that can open up the road to a fair transfer of power, partisan disputes are likely to continue to be unresolved.

Accordingly, it is necessary to formulate a plan for a solution that is historically farsighted, and as long as such a policy is not formulated, it will be impossible in the end to prepare a practical institutional device that can fundamentally resolve the social discord that is fermenting outside of the political world, and surely it will be impossible to avoid deteriorating to the point of fundamental collapse, as I see it. Could we have some specific discussion related to this?

#### Measures for Democratization Not the Subject of Negotiation

Han Chong-il: Actually, democratization measures are not the subject of negotiation. How could they be? Even putting such measures into effect and showing them off to gain the trust of the people could only result from extremely great efforts. It seems necessary to get away from thoughts of trying to get support without doing (such things), or by artificially creating support from above. In this sense, I believe the government party can, and indeed must, exert some leadership influence.

On the other hand, looking at the position of the opposition party, a minute ago Professor Yi went back historically to note problems of fractiousness among our political groups. One senses that the exposure of this pattern of factionalism or splittism makes the people largely give up on having expectations concerning the opposition party. Accordingly, the opposition party needs to coordinate the posture with which it approaches the constitutional revision situation. This would surely be a measure that would be one step toward a start at untangling the knots.



Yi Ho-chae: A good point. I said this at the beginning, but splits within the leadership of one camp--for example the right faction, or the left faction, say--actually seem to have made negotiation with their opposite number impossible. Also looking at the current political situation, it is not without its fragmented aspects. First, even the DJP is in a situation where it does not know who the next "batter" is going to be, and the opposition party, which advocates direct presidential elections, needs to come out with some vision at least to the extent of specific outline--who the presidential candidate will be, who the party head will be, who the cabinet will be. Yet this is totally absent. Moreover, the situation among the various political forces is showing signs of even greater convulsion of late, so in this situation, it will actually be difficult for political negotiations to reap any actual results.

As I said a little while ago, the proposal to go back to the constitution, election law, and local autonomy law of the Second Republic is a very concrete one. I would like to comment on that. In our country's political history, Syngman Rhee and Pak Chong-hui were both so-called heroes--whether by self-acclamation or by the acclamation of others. However, looking at things in terms of the level or our people's understanding, the situation where heroes are needed may have passed, I would suggest. Accordingly, it seems to me that we need to develop that kind of system in which an ordinary, matter-of-fact individual can emerge as our leader.

Next, the current political situation does not seem to be one in which a single political entity can monopolize power. The reality today is that on the business side there are businessmen and political forces from the old Liberal Party forces and Fifth Republic forces. Also the old opposition party has large factions, so that it is difficult actually to call it a single party. Meanwhile, from another direction reform forces are emerging, who are setting forth new concepts.

Accordingly, we have to create a system in which these various political forces can coexist, and accept voices from each of the various sectors. Otherwise the problems of legitimacy, or debates over dictatorship will continue without letup, it seems to me.

Next, another point. Since liberation we seem to have lost many leaders because of long-term political cold wars or the trend toward dictatorship, and also because of left-right confrontation, or even confrontation within the left factions. The fact is that there is no leader who is acceptable to all the people. Accordingly, I believe there needs to be established a system that can foster a certain national leader capable of representing us as we enter a period that we might term a time of developing democracy, or a period of South-North exchanges.

Han Chong-il: Anyway you look at it, the climate is more important than the system.



## Time to Stop Attacks on Legitimacy

Chong Chong-uk: I have these requests to make of ruling and opposition groups, thinking realistically.

First, there are various measures that the government must take, without respect to political issues or competition over political power. I am of the view that these "cards" will be effective the sooner they are played. As matters related to political power, there are things that must be done in a timely fashion. It would be well for the ruling party to show its cards, from the point of view of implementing bolder ideas and taking the general situation into account.

Another thing I would like to say to the ruling party is this. Within the coming year the ruling party will also have to be judged by the people as to their fitness to be appointed to rule, under whatever kind of power structure. Yet there is no democratization within the party in which the words of those active on the bottom are reflected at the top and can emerge in policy. One wonders how one can expect that a political party that has been unable to achieve democratization within the party can win the confidence of the people under the banner of democratization.

Professor An just made the proposal that the opposition party also needs quickly to get its ranks in order and to convert to leadership by those with real influence [the "two Kims"], and I also agree with that in principle. However, looking at it from another point of view, it is problematic whether this can actually be done. Even looking just at the NKDP, in fact it is not a political organization based on the same political philosophy, but rather is a political organization molded together as an opposition in a freakish political situation in the past. Therefore, there is a question whether some kind of unified position can be expressed within that kind of organization, and one can only have doubts about that. So when we speak of converting to leadership by those with real influence, I am of the opinion that what is probably needed is an actualization of some power structure for the opposition forces [as a whole], rather than simply converting the leadership structure [alone] to leadership by those with real influence. What I am saying is that because of the varied and complicated political dynamics of the opposition forces, there may be times when a statement by a party leader might not necessarily represent the opposition forces [as a whole].

So the opposition forces perhaps need to bring about a reorganization, shall I say, within the opposition that enables the opposition to speak with a single voice. If I do not say this carefully, it could be misunderstood as meaning a split in the party, but my thought is just that the realistic plans of the NKDP need to go forward in a more diversified direction.

Moderator: We are saying that the serious problem of our politics originates in a crisis of legitimacy. I believe that if in 1987 the opposition and ruling parties should be able to open up a new political history--a political history of hope--through an agreement upon constitutional revision, it will be

possible to be liberated from the crisis of legitimacy. Moreover, I believe this might become a starting point not only for the resolution of problems in the political sphere, but also for the structural resolution of various problems of social friction.

Even in connection with relations with the United States, I believe that when we are able to solve our own problems independently and democratically such matters as an excessive reliance on or interest in the United States should be resolved naturally. We conclude today's discussion believing that the year 1987 is an important time in our nation's history for deciding the fate of the nation, and hoping that ruling and opposition parties will select the kind of political figures who reflect the mind of the people. Thank you for so much of your time.

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## PREPARATION FOR FEBRUARY 1988 POWER TRANSFER LAUNCHED

Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean 17 Apr 87 p 1

[Text] The government and the DJP are said to have cautiously launched a research and inquiry into procedures for the transfer of the reins of government scheduled for February 1988 and have begun making procedural preparations.

The reason the ruling party has begun to study procedures and make preparations this early for the transfer of the reins of government is that there is no precedent to follow because the forthcoming power transfer will be the first peaceful power transfer in our history of constitutional government, and that whatever procedures will be taken will be of political significance. On 16 April a high-ranking informed source of the ruling party said: "Unlike the United States, Japan, and European countries with rich experience in the peaceful transfer of the reins of government, we have no such experience, not even once. Therefore we have no precedent for procedures to follow in handing over the reins of government, and so far there have been no research into and preparations for a peaceful transfer of government." "Accordingly," he added: "I think that in anticipation of some unexpected problems which may crop up in the process of turning over the reins of government in February 1988, some quarters in the government and its party have launched a research and inquiry into procedures for the scheduled transfer of the government and have started making procedural preparations."

The same informed source also said: "The research and inquiry will begin by collecting information on examples of government transfer in foreign countries and analyzing the collected data." He added: "A basic inquiry and research committee will work out model procedures for the transfer of the reins of government to suit the realities in our country, taking into consideration the political schedule for the future and the given conditions."

Reportedly, the subjects of this research and analysis will include:

1. When the presidential duties should be turned over and to what extent the transfer should be spelled out.
2. How consultations will be held to decide on personnel action for the [outgoing] cabinet and secretaries.

3. Whether the sworn-in and sworn-out ceremonies should be held jointly or separately. If separate ceremonies are to be held, what the lapse of time should be between the two ceremonies. These are questions concerning the protocol.

4. Matters concerning the protocol, privileges, and security for the president-elect and the outgoing president.

5. Measures to cope with the possible vacuum which may be created in the transitional period.

In this connection, the same informed source explained: "The forthcoming peaceful transfer of the government in February 1988 will mark the realization, for the first time, of a single term of office for the president, and its procedures will set the first precedent in our history of constitutional government. Therefore, all procedures, including protocol details, will be worked out after a full study." He added, "because the procedures will become a precedent for our constitutional government in the future, every detail should be examined from all angles."

Meanwhile, informed sources in political circles said that most probably, concerned departments of the government and its party will secretly carry on the research and inquiry in question, but chances are high that about the time when it becomes clear who the next president will be, a government-party apparatus will be formed to deal with the procedural aspect of power transfer.

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CSO: 4107/178

## OPPOSITION PARTIES REALIGNMENT VIEWED

Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean 30 Apr 87 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Four-Party Politics Amid Mixed Feelings of 'Placidity' and 'Perplexity'"]

[Text] Ruling Party Pushes Through Multiparty System

The Unification Democratic Party [UDP] (temporary name) has just completed the registration of its 67 assemblymen as a floor negotiating group in the National Assembly. The New Democratic Party [NDP], which has decided to merge the Popular Democratic Party [PDP], also plans to register as a parliamentary negotiating body with about 30 assemblymen including some of the independents it will recruit. Accordingly, from now on the political scene, including politics in the National Assembly, will be dominated by a four-party system, with the Democratic Justice Party [DJP], the UDP, the NDP, and the Korea National Party [KNP] as the main cast.

With its merger with the Popular Democratic Party, the NDP will secure its position as the third-ranking party in the National Assembly. These two parties are regarded as moderate conservative parties, and their emergence as the third party through a merger will be a matter of grave concern for the DJP, which is conservative in origin but has a slight reformist tint.

On the other hand, for the DJP, which in the past had to deal with a single powerful opposition party, looks happy for the moment at least, because even if it fails to obtain cooperation from the major opposition party with its 67 registered seats, it will be able to manage to deal with the political scene, including politics in the National Assembly, with the cooperation of only the second and third opposition parties and the independents.

Therefore, paradoxically speaking, there is the possibility that if the opposition is divided and fails to achieve unity, the ruling party will have its way with no one to check.

Four-party politics may rather lead to a political stalemate if opposition parties vie with each other to show a distinctive opposition color. But depending on how one looks at it, the emergence of a four-party political system may be interpreted as signifying the implementation, although in a

modified form, of the original idea of a multiparty system which was conceived in the early days of the fifth republic.

#### Views on Constitution Revision Issue To Be Adjusted Later

The NDP and the PDP have suddenly agreed to merge, but there are many things that need be settled in the future, such as the formulation of a new party line and the apportionment of important party posts. The NDP has been calling for the election of the president by popular vote whereas the PDP favors a parliamentary cabinet system.

In this connection, concerned officials of these two parties said: "Now that the ruling party has decided to shelve the debate on the constitutional amendment issue, the first thing we have to do is to wage a struggle to press for a constitutional revision." They added, "so we had better spend time adjusting our views to formulate a unified line on how to revise the constitution."

The traditional opposition party recently split itself into two and will maintain two separate negotiating bodies in the National Assembly for the first time since the Sixth National Assembly during which the major opposition force was split into the Democratic Party and the Democratic Political Party.

During the Sixth National Assembly, there were two opposition negotiating bodies in the National Assembly, one registered as the Democratic Political Party and the other as the Three-People's Society (date of registration: 17 December 1963). The latter changed its name to the Democratic Party on 28 November 1964.

#### The Word "Reinstatement" Used To Save Face

Following the split of the New Korea Democratic Party, there had been a merger move among splinter parties for about 3 weeks until 29 April, when NDP President Yi Min-u and PDP President Yu Han-yol suddenly agreed on the principle that "PDP assemblymen will be reinstated in the NDP." Thus they agreed that the merger will take the form of each PDP assemblyman rejoining the NDP "individually."

The merger move was did not proceed smoothly at first because the NDP, claiming it is the main stock of the traditional opposition force, vehemently opposed a one-to-one merger. But, on 29 April it succeeded in pushing through with its original position by using the word "reinstatement" to save the face of the PDP assemblymen.

Entrusted with full powers on the proposed merger by the meeting attended by all the PDP assemblymen on the morning of that day, President Yu persistently urged NDP President Yi not to be hasty about the merger plan. But President Yi reportedly told President Yu that "all your assemblymen should return of our party soon, except one or two executive officer who have to complete dissolution and other necessary procedures. Yi pressed for preparing a written agreement and, in the end, succeeded in having Yu make his final decision.

There are several factors presumably responsible for President Yu's speedy acceptance of the merger plan. First, the NDP, through Assemblymen Sin To-hwan and Pak Hae-yun, has engaged in a persistent drive to contact one PDP member after another to urge them to join the NDP. Second, there was the advise from some quarters that if only some of the party members were to join the NDP, this would place the PDP in an awkward position. Third, in the past, President Yu Han-yol had connections with President Yi and other NDP officials through the "Kyonji Association," an organization led by Yu Chin-san.

After reaching agreement with President Yi, President Yu had the "last dinner" with assemblymen belonging to his party at Pacific Hotel on the evening of 29 April, during which he took necessary steps for the endorsement of his decision. At the dinner party, Assemblymen Yi Tae-ku and Yim Chong-ki, who were strong opponents of the merger, gave in and agreed to go along with the rest.

Meanwhile, in order to welcome the PDP assemblymen who will join the NDP, President Yi plans to invite them to a party at the "Changwon" restaurant in Seoul on the evening of 1 May.

#### Joint Four-Party Dialogue System Is in Store

With the emergence of the NDP as a new negotiating group as a result of its absorption of the PDP through a merger, the DJP plans to put dialogue with the UDP on hold until a four-party system is established.

In this connection, on 30 April DJP Floor leader Yi Han-tong said: "A multiparty system is what we have long desired," adding that "we plan to operate the National Assembly by a four-party joint dialogue system." Thus he made it known that there is no need to hold a three-party floor leaders meeting.

This DJP stand signifies that the ruling party has already leaned toward a get-tough attitude toward the UDP. This speculation has been substantiated by a DJP official when he said, "when the leaders of the splinter parties combined have almost an equal voice as the leader of the UDP, why should we deal with the UDP leader alone in conducting politics?"

#### Tough Statement Against Hard-Line Opposition Force

Marking the first anniversary of the 30 April 1986 meeting at which President Chon Tu-hwan officially gave the green light to debate on the constitution revision issue, the DJP issued a strong statement against the hard-line opposition force, including the two Kims, reiterating why he had to issue the "13 April statement" terminating the debate on the constitution revision issue.

Before issuing the long statement, DJP spokesman Sim Myong-po had a long telephone conversation with DJP Secretary General Yi Chun-ku who was attending a party-government consultative meeting. After the conversation, Sim seemed to have changed the basic direction of the draft statement. While approving

the content of the statement shortly before it was issued, DJP Representative No opined that "the logic is fine, but the statement seems to be too long."

Hearing the news that the DJP was going to issue a surprise statement, reporters asked Spokesman Sim why he had decided to issue a long statement all of a sudden. He replied, "the main purpose is to forestall an ulterior intrigue to cause social confusion by having the debate resumed over the constitution revision issue."

When asked "Why is the DJP going out of its way to mark the first anniversary of the '30 April' statement after having terminated the debate on the constitutional revision issue?" most of the DJP officials said that "Our intention is to explain how the '30 April' talks opened the way for a constitutional amendment by agreement but the dialogue got nowhere because of the insincerity on the part of the opposition."

#### Shortened Name "Democratic Party" Can Be Used

It seems that the NDP's sudden emergence as the third-ranking party through its merger of the PDP weighs heavily on the UDP.

UDP officials are scornful of the merger saying, "the NDP line calls for the direct election of the president whereas the PDP favors a parliamentary cabinet system; and how can they merge despite this difference, and what will happen after the merger?" Nevertheless, the NDP is surprised at the speed with which the PDP has agreed to return to the NDP.

The PDP has hitherto used the shortened name the "Democratic Party" to identify itself, and UDP officials say that now that the PDP has been merged into the NDP, the UDP can use this to its benefit, if it can be called a benefit, using that same shortened name "Democratic Party" for the UDP.

UDP Parliamentary Measures Subcommittee Chairman Kim Hyon-kyu, in particular, expressed uneasiness when he said, "we wonder who is going to give us support when the floor leaders of the four parties hold talks in the future." He added, "there seems to be no other choice for us but to deal straight with the ruling party without looking to the NDP and the KNP for support."

Currently circulating within the UDP is the rumor that certain Assemblymen Kim, Yi, and Song (all elected in local constituencies) are under outside pressure to "bolt" the party and the UDP leadership is trying to keep them in the party while persuading independent Assemblymen Pak Kwan-yong and Pan Hyong-sik to join the UDP.

#### No Demonstration After Inaugural Meeting

On 30 April, the day before the UDP's inaugural meeting, the preparatory committee will make a final checkup of the schedule for the inaugural meeting and its site.

What makes the members of the preparatory committee uneasy is, above all, the structure of the Hungsadan building which does not permit a large meeting to



proceed in concerted manner, as well as the insufficient space for accommodating more than the 2,000 party members and citizens to be present.

According to the plan drawn up by the preparatory committee plan, the second floor auditorium will be used as the main hall of the meeting, in which the party leaders, all the members of the preparatory committee, and some of the regional delegates will be seated, with the remainder of the local delegates to be seated in another auditorium on the third floor and the hallway.

The preparatory committee has decided to place officials in each auditorium and hallway to check voting on matters requiring balloting. Preparations for the meeting site will be completed by the evening of 30 April, and more than 100 security personnel will keep vigil all night.

No placards bearing pictures of Messrs Kim Tae-chung and Kim Yong-sam or words with reference to their names will be used during the inaugural meeting.

The plan also calls for 1,100 members of the party's Seoul chapter to wear yellow ribbons and serve as guides and security personnel while posted outside the building.

The preparatory committee has asked the chairmen of local chapters to urge party members to attend the meeting. In addition, members of the Council for the Promotion of Democracy, as well as members of the Democratic Mountaineering Society and the Democratic Constitution Research Society, respectively affiliated to the organizations belonging to Messrs Kim Tae-chung and Kim Yong-sam, are expected to attend the meeting en masse. Participants will be urged not to stage a demonstration after the meeting, and the directorate for party inauguration will be dissolved immediately after the meeting.

For fear of violent disturbances during the party inauguration proceedings at the national level, similar to those which happened during local inaugural meetings, the preparatory committee originally had studied the possibility of using outside security personnel, but later it shelved the plan after a meeting with Home Affairs Minister Chong Ho-yong on 29 April, at which he promised to "take fool-proof security measures" for the inaugural meeting.

Instead, a vigilance body consisting of 100 or more young party members will be formed under the command of Assemblymen An Tong-son and Kim Tong-chu, both members of the Home Affairs Committee, who will be in charge of liaison with the police officer in charge of security in the areas surrounding the meeting site.

#### Landowner Suddenly Evicts the Lessee

On 25 April the UDP preparatory committee leased Building D, about 50 pyong of floor space, near (Colon) Building in [Seoul] to use as a liaison office, and on 28 April it installed telephones and other office equipment. But the landlord suddenly took a forcible action to vacate the building.

The preparatory committee signed a lease contract with the landlord on

condition that the building will be nominally used as a publishing house but, in reality, the party planned to use it as a liaison office and a secretariat building combined until a building was found somewhere for the party headquarters. Subsequently, on 29 April, Kim Yong-pae, chairman of the General Affairs Subcommittee, sent his man to the landlord to inform him that the building will be used as a secretariat building for the party inauguration.

However, the landlord claimed that the written contract has a special proviso that the building shall not be used for political activities; therefore the intended use is in violation of the contract." He told the UDP to vacate the building. When the new party did not comply, the landlord removed office fixtures from the building at about 10 pm on 29 April.

General Affairs Subcommittee Chairman Kim expressed his concern on 30 April when he said, "We have trouble finding a building for a liaison office; we wonder how we are going to find a building for the party headquarters." He half jokingly added: "It may be easier to erect a new building. Any rich man who erects a building for our headquarters will be the No 1 candidate for the national constituency on our party ticket...."

At a meeting on the morning of 30 April, party executive officers formed a unified view that "since there is no contractual flaw, the party will use the building in face of whatever difficulty, until a headquarters building is located."

In this connection, Chairman Kim Yong-sam criticized the government, saying: "This means that the present regime won't permit even a square inch of land or space to be used for our office and this stems from a conspiracy to ban not only the inauguration of our party but also our political activities."

Representative No and Chairman Kim Only Exchanged Greetings

DJP Representative No and Kim Yong-sam, chairman of the UDP inaugural committee met at a party which was held at the Sejong Cultural Center in Seoul on the afternoon of 29 April in commemoration of the 55th anniversary of the patriotic act of the martyr Yun Pong-kil with the pen name of Mae Hyon, but beyond exchanging greetings, they said nothing to each other.

Entering the hall at about 10 pm on that evening, Representative No made the round of the hall exchanging greetings with the people present. When he met Chairman Kim, who arrived at the hall 15 minutes earlier, he greeted him, "How are you? How is your health?" Chairman Kim replied, "I am in good health. Let us see each other often." But the atmosphere was anything but chummy.

Immediately after this exchange, Representative No, turning to DJP Assemblyman Yi Chong-chan, who acted as a guide for him, asked him, "how many years is it since the patriotic deed?" At that moment, Chairman Kim immediately left the party. Thus their encounter lasted only about 15 minutes.

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## PRESIDENT CHON'S 13 APRIL SPECIAL ANNOUNCEMENT ANALYZED

## Roundtable Discussion

Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean 13 Apr 87 p 5

[Roundtable Discussion by the Political Desk Reporters]

[Text] The political situation involving the constitutional revision reached a "great turning point" for the time being with President Chon's special announcement on 13 April. The totally unpredictable political situation which has been swirling now faces a situation which must be settled in some form.

The "grave decision" predicted by the president in last January's address has emerged in just 3 months. As was emphasized several times in the special announcement, we feel that the ruling party opted for the last choice considering the timing with only 10 months until the expected power transfer in February 1988.

A similar impression was given by the announcement procedure. On the evening of 12 April, President Chon invited high-ranking government officials for dinner to the Blue House to express his opinion on the announcement and subsequently he presided over a late night meeting with high-ranking members of the ruling party. At this meeting the important figures covering all of the pivotal members in power, including the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP), the military, prosecutors and the police power were present, a very rare instance.

It is known that President Chon emphasized that the decision was inevitable in order to carry out his promise to transfer power after one term, and expressed the seriousness of this by saying, "This is a final course for our nation and an attempt to save the country." The DJP staff members who came back to their office from the meeting looked more serious than ever.

In any event, it will take some time for both the ruling and the opposition parties to digest the "important 13 April decision" and prepare counter measures.

It looks like the ruling party will prepare follow-up measures while carefully assessing the public reaction, although a rough outline has been disclosed in

conjunction with the president's decision. As for the opposition parties, although they denounced the decision immediately, they might also need some time to realign their policy. Furthermore, this must be an "unexpected attack" for Kim Tae-Chung and Kim Yong-sam, who are working hard to establish a new political party.

In short, both the ruling and the opposition parties must be in a state of confusion. If we consider the political environment, with expectations of a "grave decision," to be possibly accompanied by emergency measures such as dissolving the National Assembly and a government reshuffle, it looks like they are feeling relieved. How do they feel in the DJP circle?

Of course, the mainstream reaction of the DJP cannot be anything but an "inevitable choice" or a "brave decision to save the country." As to the details, however, they seemed to be worried. Several difficulties are expected starting from an immediate task of how to persuade the people concerning the several "policy changes," to the task of eventually carrying out the presidential election under the current constitution.

The DJP, who has been insisting that they have linked the party's fate to the agreed constitutional revision for a parliamentary-type government system, is now burdened to justify the sudden change of direction. Although it is not known how they have developed their logic on the party level, there were some references made by the party staff members after the special announcement, that were difficult to follow. For example, they said, "When did we say we were going to revise the constitution? We just proposed to discuss the constitutional revision." "We are inclined toward the discussion of the constitutional revision, not to defend the current constitution." "The DJP party platform still is the parliamentary-cabinet type of political system."

In any case, the way in which the DJP handles the political situation is expected to emphasize an "emotional appeal" or "measures" that can impact on the political atmosphere rather than persuade the people in a logical manner. Such intentions were revealed at several places in the special announcement.

That is right. For example, phrases such as they will select a presidential candidate in the DJP as soon as possible, or they will implement the local self-government system during President Chon's tenure are not new, but the effect of their realization on the political situation will be enormous.

The implementation of the local self-government system will require some time for the necessary steps of discussion and approval by the National Assembly, but the selection of the presidential candidate will not. Therefore, it is the DJP's intention that they are going to finish the selection as soon as possible. Since the idea of the constitutional revision is postponed by the "13 April decision," the regional party reorganization task which has been postponed will be finished soon, and it is anticipated that the "successor" will be determined as early as the end of June by arranging the party convention and the candidate nomination at the same time.

Can the effort for early nomination of a successor be interpreted as a confirmation of President Chon's intention not to run for the second term?

Yes.

The government has explained that they have finished all the necessary preparation for the local self-government system to be implemented during second half of this year. The ruling party analyzes that the political environment will change greatly if the ruling party pushes the implementation of the local self-government system, which the opposition parties find it difficult to oppose. Therefore, the center of democratization is said to be the implementation of the local self-government system, more than anything else.

Depending on the opposition party's reaction, however, the ruling party's direction in managing the political situation would be affected substantially. How have the opposition parties' reacted in relation to the "13 April decision"?

Although the opposition party superficially denounced President Chon's announcement saying, "That was already expected," their reaction was somewhat confused. Kim Yong-sam seemed to be embarrassed and one other senior opposition party member also was surprised at the announcement and asked "Is it true?"

Most of the members who joined the new opposition party were even more surprised at the announcement, because they simply considered the weekend rumor of "reservations about the constitutional revision" as a diversionary strategy used to achieve their goal of a parliamentary-cabinet system, or to block the establishment of the new opposition party.

The general reaction, however, is that they are going to struggle more actively by denouncing the ruling party saying, "From the beginning the ruling party was not interested in constitutional revision," or "It is unfair and shameless to take advantage of the vacuum in the opposition party during the transitional period of the new party."

The general atmosphere is to sit back and watch developments. But some people seem to be discouraged, and some seem to be more optimistic since the one term for the president is guaranteed.

Some National Assemblymen, who had been preparing for the possible election during 1987 [if the constitutional revision occurred], sighed and said, "We have to close our offices now."

The remaining New Democratic Party (NDP) assemblymen who did not join the new party and the members of the other opposition parties denounced the two Kims, saying, "The two Kims themselves invited the current situation by dividing the party although they must have foreseen the outcome." They said that contrary to what the two Kims claim, they (the two Kims) themselves are the real fakes, who provided the ruling party with an excuse for the announcement.

Such complaints are coming out even from the members who joined the new opposition party. They complain that although they followed the two Kims just to remain as assemblymen they said there are a lot of problems in the two Kims' handling of the political situation and the ruling party.

The new opposition party which is being formed, and tentatively named the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP), does not seem to have a comparable alternative to the president's special announcement. While they are wondering "how to react to the announcement," they seem to be intent on establishing the new party as their highest priority, and concentrating their efforts on this.

Since they can legally function, as a political party right after the new party organizer's meeting, their efforts are concentrated on concluding this meeting. From the regional meetings, they plan to attack the ruling party. It is anticipated, however, that the major struggle against the ruling party will start after completion of all the regional meetings.

Considering the fact that the special announcement is to return to the original point of the constitutional revision, it is expected that the resistance from the opposition circle [such as religious groups, students and other dissidents] including the opposition parties, will be more severe. It is the opposition party's threat that the intensity of the struggle will be more severe than the signature campaign after the "12 February general election."

A substantial number of the new party members predict that since the special announcement helped reinforce the solidarity between the opposition party and the unofficial opposition group, the struggle outside the National Assembly will be even more violent. Other members of the new party think that they need to observe carefully the development of the situation since they should not allow another special measure.

What kind of struggles can the opposition party consider? There is a limitation to the struggle within the National Assembly, and the external struggle will be obviously blocked at the level of national security.

One strategy which is being considered by a group of the new party is that inside the National Assembly, they will focus on the ruling party's political and moral betrayal by attacking the nullification of the constitutional revision activities through announcements or printed matters. Outside the assembly, they seem to be considering large-scale mass rallies such as regional public meetings.

In the meantime, the ruling party's response will also be solidified, as emphasized in the announcement. On one hand, they [ruling party] will appeal directly to the people by means of measures aimed at democratization; but on the other hand, they plan to "block any disturbance from the beginning" at the level of national security. It is evident that they restrained Kim Tae-Chung's political activities prior to the special announcement.

We cannot exclude the possibility of resorting to the "last card" in case every effort becomes futile. The climax will be during the period of the presidential election.

The opposition party will concentrate their efforts on boycotting the election of the electoral college or the possible national referendum that the ruling party might propose in order to justify their new policy to keep the current

constitution. In the worst case, some people say that they cannot exclude the possibility of resigning from office. In that case, they might launch a full-scale attempt to topple the government and the situation may therefore decisively deteriorate.

On the contrary, they will seek to hold a dialogue. Although the two Kims insist that they will not beg for a dialogue, it seems that they may have to beg in order to avoid a collapse, since the ruling party changed their attitude to a tougher stance. The two Kims also left room for dialogue and negotiation. The Sangdo-dong [town where Kim Yong-sam resides] group especially emphasizes that Kim Yong-sam's political style is that he believes in parliamentarism.

As for the new party, they have no choice but to continue insisting on the direct presidential election system, since they consider the special announcement as a return to the original point of the constitutional revision. Since the direct presidential election was an excuse to separate from the NDP, and is the basis of the new party's existence. It is difficult to expect a "Copernican change" from the new party.

Some people regret that they did not join the Special Committee for Constitutional Revision (SCCR), while others are preparing the upcoming struggle. In retrospect, they grieve to themselves that their not joining the SCCR during last year's regular session of the National Assembly resulted in the current situation. If they had participated in the SCCR at that time, there would have been no "Yi Min-u Plan," no new party and at least they could blame the failure of the constitutional revision solely on the ruling party responsibility.

Although it may be very difficult, judging from the opposition party's logic, if they should come up with a proposal for the parliamentary-cabinet system, will the ruling party respond to it?

The ruling party is trying to avoid a definite comment by saying that it is a "useless imagination." If such a situation becomes a reality, the situation will become more complicated, but for the time being the attitude of the ruling party seems to be firm.

The RDP is the one whose position becomes awkward due to the special announcement. It is the opposition leaders' common opinion that even after the RDP functions officially there is no way for them to be able to induce the ruling party to resume the constitutional revision talks; and it may not be easy to prepare an effective counter measure due to the limitation on both internal and external struggle.

In any case, the political situation involving the constitutional revision will change to some degree because of the "13 April special announcement." In view of the fact that none of the fundamental political problems has been resolved, however, and the possibility of a vicious circle still exists, both the ruling and the opposition parties' political burden is still great.

After the special announcement was made public, the "theory of the transitional characteristics of the next government," which briefly prevailed

during the time of the "24 February meeting (1986)" at Ch'ongwa-dae (the postponement of the constitutional revision until 1989 was discussed) has resurfaced with added vigor. Since the basic intention is similar to the previous one, a similar reaction can be seen, although the current special announcement does not indicate a postponement period.

The reaction from the DJP to the remarks of the transitional government is hysterical. The DJP officials are arguing about why the next government should be a transitional one, while there exists a constitutional government. They are also arguing in view of the realistic aspect, "Why those who gain power next should run the government on the premise of transitional characteristics?"

As for the opposition party, however, they consider the next government as having transitional characteristics in view of the fact that it will start on the premise of the constitutional revision. Although there are various points at issue, this problem [transitional nature of the next government] is considered to be controversial.

There are some aspects which complicate the situation in that the DJP announced the protection of the current constitution while they insist that the party platform is still the parliamentary-cabinet type system. Although the DJP is trying to insist on the original party platform to avoid the burden of correcting it again by insisting on constitutional revision, they can impose the responsibility for the failure of the constitutional revision talk on the opposition party, although, in reality, this would not be convincing.

Correct. In view of the difficulty to predict the immediate future, it is doubtful as to how effective it will be to argue about what will happen in 2 or 3 years.

#### DJP Official Comments

Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean 14 Apr 87 p 3

[Interview With DJP Secretary General Yi Chun-Ku by reporter Kim Chung-kun; date and place not specified]

[Text] The following is taken from an interview with DJP Secretary General Yi Chun-ku, who is known to have been involved in the preparation process of the "13 April important decision" as the one responsible for it on the DJP side.

[Question] What is the ruling party's opinion concerning the people's reaction to the important decision?

[Answer] As a matter of fact, I called on the people in my district of the Ch'ungju and Chech'on areas to find out about their reaction. Everybody unanimously said that "The right thing came out at the right time." Our understanding is that intellectuals and groups critical of the government particularly have more understanding of the inevitability of the decision.



[Question] The decision made the relationship between the ruling and the opposition parties even more awkward. What is your plan for a dialogue with the opposition parties?

[Answer] The dialogue for the national administration cannot be halted even a minute. As soon as the new party [tentatively named the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP)] finishes registering as a negotiation group, such a dialogue will start immediately. However, no dialogue premised on constitutional revision can be held from now on.

[Question] Why did the ruling party, who said that they will wait until the last minute while insisting on the agreed constitutional revision, hastily make the decision without waiting for another 2 to 3 more months?

[Answer] We could not wait 2 to 3 months and waste our national power fully aware that the agreed revision is impossible. Unlike the irresponsible opposition party, we, being responsible for the national administration, could not waste any more time. In fact, we were not comfortable when we insisted on the agreed revision while the general opinion was that the possibility for the agreed revision was remote.

[Question] What if the opposition party requests a resumption of negotiations for the parliamentary-cabinet type system?

[Answer] It is too late. Furthermore, we believe that those who created the new party by eliminating even their own people who were in favor of negotiating for the parliamentary-cabinet system will not do so. If they propose negotiating for the parliamentary-cabinet system, it must be a conspiracy and a trick to prevent the ruling party from doing anything.

[Question] If the new opposition party boycotts the National Assembly and the presidential election, the image of the national administration will be hurt....

[Answer] Judging from the opposition party's previous track record, we did not eliminate such a possibility. Even if they do, it is too late. If so, we have no choice but to go our own way.

[Question] If the opposition party should launch a struggle using extreme means, to the extent that normal day-to-day administration is difficult, do you think the president will consider even tougher measures?

[Answer] I don't think so. We know that many opposition party members share the opinion that the decision is necessary. Even so, if the opposition party reacts in an extreme manner, we may not exclude the possibility of exercising every possible measure allowed in the constitution as a means of exercising governmental power. They should read the will of the ruling party that they even postponed the discussion of constitutional revision in order to achieve the two utmost important national tasks [the general election and the 1988 Olympic Games] successfully.

[Question] At this point, is it possible [for the ruling party] to propose a third option for the next presidential candidate which would define the characteristics of the next government as a transitional one?

[Answer] I think the successor cannot define the government as a transitional one. Since the 13 April decision was made to accomplish the two important national tasks successfully, how can a weak transitional government accomplish them? That contradicts the intention and logic behind their reservations in discussing constitutional revision. Furthermore, the peaceful transition of powers is a long-fostered wish of the 40-years of constitutional government, and how can a transitional government be set up as an example of this tradition?

[Question] Does the postponement of the discussion of the constitutional revision mean that "it will resume as soon as possible" after the 1988 Olympic Games?

[Answer] It will probably be clarified by the successor when he discloses his plans. Both the ruling and the opposition parties, however, should make a decision depending on the political situation at that time. For example, if the political situation is changed in such a way that the reunification of the South and the North becomes possible, and thus a new constitution suitable for such a situation is necessary, we cannot insist on the direct presidential election. Since it is difficult to predict the future change in circumstances, we cannot say anything definite in advance.

[Question] Do you not think that the postponement of the parliamentary-cabinet system imposes more burden of the political responsibility on the DJP and the party Chairman No Tae-u?

[Answer] I think we have done our best so far. Our efforts at the end of last year such as the independent or constitutional push for the constitutional revision were a strategic bluff to arrive at an agreed constitutional revision. The people will understand our efforts and thereby understand that the opposition party is solely responsible for the current situation. We are not burdened by any feeling of guilt.

#### Measures For New Situation

Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean 14 Apr 87 p 3

[Article by reporters Yi Do-song and Yi Nak-yon: "The Ruling and Opposition Parties Seeking Measures To Meet New Political Situation"]

[Text] The meaning of the "13 April important decision" can be summarized in short as establishing a "regulatory frame" to control the power transfer in February 1988. The unanimous remark by the ruling party members, "This is absolutely the last choice," makes the meaning of the decision even clearer.

Since the DJP is now given the opportunity to begin preparations for the party level power struggle according to the basis of the decision, they are in an optimistic mood at least for the time being.

The various meetings including the DJP general meeting surrounding the "13 April decision" were aimed at revitalizing the somewhat depressed party atmosphere caused by unclear party direction.

In fact, there is no doubt President Chon Tu-hwan is sincere in his desire for a single-term, since it has been emphasized several times from the beginning of his tenure. In view of the reality of the situation however, it was difficult to accept the claim.

It is to be noted that one of the major points in the announcement was that "The DJP presidential candidate will be selected as soon as possible." A well-informed source said, "The change in expression from 'at a proper time,' which has been used so far, to 'as soon as possible' indicates that the DJP's internal problems such as the selection of a successor have been more or less settled," which explains the background.

The fact that the DJP is focusing on the selection of a presidential candidate more than anything else since the announcement has been made and giving an impression that they are going to finish the selection before the end of June is presumably related to the DJP's internal situation.

Aside from the relation with the opposition party as well as with the people, it is encouraging that the DJP's position has become more definite as a result of the announcement. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the DJP's position has become comfortable.

Because the decision in some sense threw in a "new shock" rather than solved the fundamental problem, the DJP is given a new task in overcoming the political burden due to the failure of the constitutional revision. It is still in a difficult position.

No matter how they try to shuffle off the responsibility of the failure of the constitutional revision to the two Kims, there is no way that the DJP, as the ruling party, can escape from their share of the responsibility, and the DJP is also well aware of this.

The fact that the DJP has been insisting on their own democratization measures assuming the failure of the constitutional revision and that they extraordinarily emphasize that the "DJP's party platform is still a parliamentary-cabinet system" even after they came back to the original point to support the current constitution stems from the intention to alleviate their political burden.

The DJP considers the following issues as their basis for the national administration: having a party convention to select the next presidential candidate by the end of June; public relations through the regional party reorganization before the convention; carrying out the so-called democratization measures such as the local self-government system; activation of the press and the release of the political prisoners; and the announcement of various public welfare policies characterized as presidential election pledges.

Among them, the DJP is considering the candidate selection as the decisive opportunity to change the political situation. They seem to judge that the 13 April decision made it possible to surface with a candidate.

The contents of the special announcement indicate that by attributing the cause of the failure of the constitutional revision solely to the opposition party, the problem of the DJP's responsibility as well as the complicated and delicate internal party atmosphere have been resolved.

It is the ruling circle's dominant view that the DJP's next presidential candidate has been fixed more firmly as Party Chairman No Tae-u who has been considered as the front runner.

The fundamental problem has not been resolved of course, just because the ruling circle's internal atmosphere has been settled and the direction of the national administration in relation to the constitutional revision has been determined. It is because the problem of how to cope with various "resistance elements" in the future still remains unsolved.

To be more precise, the issues have been narrowed down as follows: What relationship to have with opposition political leaders including the two Kims in carrying out the presidential election, and how to deal with public disturbances caused by the decision to support the current constitution. These are closely related to the legitimacy of the next government or the direction of the political power after 1988. In view of the fact that it is possible that the current political situation can even be overturned depending on the direction of the "choice," it can be seen that the real situation will start to develop "after the decision." [by reporter Yi Do-song]

The biggest justification for Kim Tae-chung and Kim Yong-sam's departure from the NDP and their decision to establish a new party, tentatively named the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP), was clearly to develop the struggle for the constitutional revision for a presidential committee for the new party, however, President Chon Tu-hwan declared the withdrawal of the constitutional revision proposal.

On 14 April at his first press conference since being elected chairman of the preparation committee for establishing the RDP, Kim Yong-sam proposed a real dialogue between the ruling and the opposition parties and a continued promotion of the direct presidential election as a response to the presidential measure to reserve the discussion of the constitutional revision. Such a proposal is more like an indication of the dilemma rather than the expression of a determination.

The dilemma of the RDP is first of all the constitutional revision itself. The power that established the RDP is the most powerful force in promoting the direct presidential election system and because of that they separated themselves from the NDP. The current reality, however, is there is neither a direct election system nor a parliamentary-cabinet type system, but only the existing constitution.

If the RDP resumes the struggle for the direct election system now, it is questionable whether public opinion will be ignited like the time during and after the 2 February 1985 general election. This is where the agony of the RDP lies.

Even if the RDP attempts to ignite public opinion, it will inevitably take some time due to the environment surrounding the party and its future plans.

Currently, the RDP seems to be anxious to get a legal qualification as a legitimate political party.

In order to achieve this, the RDP is planning the initial meeting of the new 57 regional parties as indoor meetings rather than an outdoor mass rally.

They seem to be trying to spread the public opinion on the injustice of the government's decision for supporting the current constitution prior to promoting the direct election system.

Another dilemma is in the method of struggle. Although they plan to struggle inside and outside [the National Assembly] concurrently, they will try the inside struggle first for the time being. None of this, however, will be easy.

They plan to request a special session of the National Assembly as an intermediate step to move into the open, but they are not sure whether the ruling party will cooperate. In case they move outside the National Assembly for the struggle, they have to consider the ruling party's possible accusation as a "[communist] mass revolution."

RDP Chairman Kim Yong-sam suggested that he will unite with the unofficial opposition power as a means of trying to achieve the direct election system and democratization. Similar constraints will also be imposed on these efforts.

The third dilemma is in whether they [RDP] will participate in the "big task [general election]" in 1988.

Many RDP leaders think that they might win the 13th general election in 1988 if they maintain a pure image by continuously insisting on the direct election system. Thus they set up the "election struggle" as their first goal as to activities.

If they enter the latter half of 1987 under the current situation, they will be confronted with the issue of whether they will participate in the election of the electoral college for the presidential election. And soon after that they will be faced with the problem of cooperation for the Olympic Games.

Many people in the RDP view that they will soon be faced with the problem of how to relate these internal conflicts to the 13th general election.

In order to cope with the 13 April decision by the government including the protective measure of the current constitution, RDP Chairman Kim proposed an unprecedented wide range of "dialogues with substance" to the ruling party in which Kim Tae-chung's advice is known to be reflected.

Such a proposal does not seem to be aimed at accomplishment. It is rather a message to the people that unlike the government's claim, the two Kims are not responsible for the failure of the agreed constitutional revision or

dialogue. And the proposal also seems to aim at weakening the justification of the government's harsh measure toward the two Kims.

It is known that Kim Tae-chung insisted in his comments on 13 April that a "nationwide neutral cabinet" be established as a means of settling the tumultuous situation, and hoped to have this reflected in the press conference by Chairman Kim Yong-sam on 14 April. On the grounds of improper timing, however, his suggestions have not been reflected. This seems to indicate the differences in the viewpoint of the state of affairs or "survival method" between the two Kims.

In any event, under the current political situation the extent of the choice given to the RDP is very limited. The relationship [with the ruling party] will be stiffer in proportion to their efforts to stay pure, and furthermore, the surrounding environment is not favorable to them at all.

Furthermore, this is a tempting season for the opposition party where numerous big events happened in the past including the "19 April [student uprising in 1960]," the "17 May" and the "18 May" incidents. How to overcome such a situation might be the first test for the RDP. [Reporter Yi Nak-yon]

Political Writer

Seoul SINDONG-A in Korean May 87 pp 158-165

[By political desk reporter Kim Chol: "'The 13 April Decision to Freeze the Debate on Constitutional Revision' and the Political Direction"]

[Text] Tug of War for Constitutional Revision Ends, But It Does Not Mean an Actual End to Constitutional Strife

It is an exaggeration to say that President Chon Tu-hwan's "13 April special statement" has completely terminated the tug of war which has somehow been maintained up to now between the ruling and opposition parties, because the government and its party, through this statement, have made it clear that they will not be party to any debate on constitutional revision until way after the 1988 Olympics.

The government and its party elaborated on the presidential statement by saying that even if the opposition parties accept the ruling party-proposed constitutional plan for a cabinet form of government, the ruling party has no intention of discussing constitutional revision. In other words, as far as the government and the ruling party are concerned, the constitutional revision issue was unilaterally and completely excluded from the category of political issues as of 13 April.

However, the absence of the other party in the tug of war over constitutional revision does not necessarily mean an actual end to the political strife over the constitutional revision issue. This is because despite the ruling party's refusal to debate constitutional revision, the opposition will continue its offensive over the constitutional issue. Inasmuch as this issue in particular has been the core of the ruling-opposition controversy up to now, there is the

possibility that the ruling party's formal rejection of debate on this issue will lead to the spread of the opposition's resistance and its sense of frustration; which have hitherto been centered around the constitutional revision issue, spread to the whole spectrum of the political situation.

This possibility is easily surmised from the fact that the declaration of the ruling party' position on the constitution issue has reduced the room for constitutional revision by consensus almost to zero, as well as from the ruling party's contention that there is not much time left before the transfer of power. Accordingly, the future political scene will be similar to that existed before the 30 April 1986, when the ruling and opposition parties confronted each other, with the former holding fast to the current constitution and the latter pressing for constitutional revision. The intensity of confrontation is expected to be incomparably much more acute than before. In this connection, it seems necessary to analyze the 13 April special statement, which is the main factor precipitating a turnaround in the political scene, and which gives rise to the kind of speculation mentioned above regarding the political situation.

#### "Freeze on Constitutional Revision Debate" and Its Logic

In short, the substance of the 13 April special statement was an announcement of the suspension of the debate about constitutional revision and an intention to carry out power transfer in 1988 under the current constitution. The statement presents the rationale of the government and the ruling party in this manner:

1. If the debate about constitutional revision should be allowed to go on unchecked in the same way it has been carried out up to now, then there is the possibility that it will even endanger the peaceful transfer of power.
2. Peaceful transfer of power has remained a major goal since the republic was founded.
3. The current constitution guarantees peaceful transfer of power better than any previous constitutions.
4. The 30 April decision was intended to check the chaos and strife caused over the constitutional issue.
5. Despite the efforts and concessions on the part of the government and the ruling party, the opposition parties have made no concession at all, not even once, while persisting in direct presidential elections.
6. The direct presidential election system has long been buried in history, together with the recent unfortunate constitutional history because of its foibles and dangers.
7. The opposition has not only rejected the ruling party's proposal for a constitutional revision which provides for the introduction of a parliamentary form of government but also has extremely diminished prospects for constitutional revision through agreement by causing the recent acute internal chaos and strife.

8. In view of the approaching expiration date of his term, and on the basis of an overall assessment of the current national situation, the president wants to declare his intention to hand over the reins of government to a successor under the current constitution and to terminate the counterproductive constitutional revision debate.

9. A good formula for revision will be found only if debate on constitutional revision will be resumed and ample time spent on that debate after completing the two major national goals, namely peaceful transfer of power and a successful Olympics.

10. The DJP's candidate for the next presidency will be chosen soon.

11. If in spite of all this, anyone should be absorbed in a strife for constitutional revision and cause social chaos by lawlessness and violence, the president will take resolute countermeasures within his authority as president.

12. Further development in our country cannot be entrusted to those figures who are imbued in the old way of thinking from the old days.

The above is a synopsis of the statement.

As you see, the rationale of this special statement for freezing the debate on constitutional revision is based on the following two premises:

The first premise is that the president has maintained a neutral position on the constitutional revision issue. The second premise is that peaceful transfer of power according to the current constitutional provision limiting the presidential tenure to one term only should be pursued as the highest priority in the present stage of our political development.

Concerning the first premise, which needs elaboration, it may be said that the president's position on the constitutional revision issue was reformulated following the 30 April [Blue House] talks last year. Through the 30 April talks, the president may be said to have shifted his position from one of being a party to the tug of war over the constitutional revision issue to one of being a neutral.

Needless to say, it is a fact that before the 30 April [1986 Blue House] talks, the opposition had continued to demand that the president agree to a constitutional revision and top-level talks. However, by saying through the 30 April talks that "I will not oppose amending the constitution if the ruling and opposition parties will reach an agreement," the president, as far as formal logic goes, turned himself into a third party to the debate on the constitutional revision issue. Therefore, the 13 April special statement may be interpreted as signifying that the president has assumed a disinterested judge's role with respect to the constitutional revision issue. In his 13 April statement, the president elaborated on his position regarding the constitutional revision issue, which he had redefined at the 30 April talks, as follows:



"I want to make this clear: As much as my determination to serve only one term is firm, there can be no particular personal interest on my part with regard to constitutional revision. However, as the outgoing president, I think I am in a position to view constitutional issues disinterestedly and fairly, by looking ahead into the distant future of the nation."

In view of our constitutional history, the realization of peaceful transfer of power is the highest priority; accordingly this carries with it another major premise that whatever debate about democracy, if it causes inconvenience to peaceful transfer of power, should be boldly postponed. On the basis of these two major premises, the president refused to support the opposition contention that the current constitution has some fundamental problems. He said:

"The current constitution guarantees peaceful transfer of power more perfectly than any previous constitutions by introducing the one-term system for the first time in our constitutional history to suit the demand of the times that the vicious cycle of one long presidential term after another be terminated, so that democracy can be allowed to take hold."

Next, the president also rejected the opposition demand for direct presidential elections on the ground that such a system will endanger the peaceful transfer of power. He then contended that in view of the political schedule geared to the realization of a single term for the presidency, now is the time to make a final decision on the question of whether constitutional revision by consensus is possible or not. He then blamed the opposition camp for the failure to reach an agreement on constitutional revision.

The president strongly indicated, in particular, that he took the split of the opposition party resulting from the internal feud over negotiations as a final sign portending no chance for achieving constitutional revision by agreement. He then made it clear that any action contrary to the 13 April statement will not be tolerated in the interest of the realization of one term.

#### Opposition Logic on the Constitutional Revision Issue

However, the opposition's reasoning remains diametrically opposed to the above rationale of the ruling party.

To begin with, the opposition camp did not and still does not recognize the premises underlying the ruling party's position regarding the constitutional revision issue as well as the president's position on this issue. The opposition, despite the president's decision of 30 April [1986], still regards him as being just as much the other party to constitutional revision debate as it did before. It is in line with its own logic that the opposition is still demanding as in the past a dialogue with the president, who has real power, and a selective national referendum. In other words, the opposition in its position as a minority in the National Assembly has continued to press for the president's favorable decision, in order to push its formula for constitutional revision.

Speaking of only one term for a president, in the opinion of the opposition, the current post-Yusin period is the best time for building the general foundations of democracy, and it refuses to recognize one term for a president as the only goal that should be given the highest priority. It is the firm conviction of the opposition that not only one term for a president but also the recovery of people's right to choose their own government through direct presidential elections should be achieved without fail for the sake of

democracy. In reality, the opposition does not even conceal a shadow of distrust about the promise to realize only one term for the president.

Concerning controversial points of the current constitution, the opposition views are diametrically opposed to those of the ruling party. For instance, the opposition views the presidential decision at the 30 April Blue House talks last year as signifying the ruling party's acceptance of the fact that the constitution does have some controversial points. The opposition's reasoning is that the ruling party ought to accept the opposition's proposal for a constitutional amendment providing for indirect presidential elections because at the 30 April talks, the ruling party switched its position from one of opposing any amendment to the current constitution to one of favoring constitutional revision, and because both the ruling and opposition parties regarded the realization of free choice of government as the goal of constitutional revision. Concerning the conclusion made in the 13 April special statement as to whether constitutional revision through agreement is possible or not, the opposition maintains that this decision on the part of the government and the ruling party is premature and expresses doubt about the real intentions of the government and the ruling party.

Opposition Concludes That "the Position of Permitting No Amendment to the Current Constitution Is a Prearranged Scenario for a Long-Term Stay in Office"

On 14 April, the day after the president issued his special statement, Kim Yong-sam, chairman of the preparatory committee for the Reunification Democratic Party (a tentative name), said: "I demand that instead of arbitrarily arguing that there is not enough time left, and instead of trying to pass the buck for his own lack of will to revise the constitution to someone else, he should agree to hold substantial talks for democratic reforms." Kim added: "There are 9 months left before the year's end, and supposing 2 months are needed to prepare a national referendum and election, we still have 7 months to conduct negotiations on constitutional revision. Why does he shut his eyes to this fact?" This question is indicative of the opposition's view of the time factor.

Chairman Kim also openly asked: if he has no objection to a "constitutional amendment providing for free choice of government" agreed upon by both the ruling and opposition parties, why did he reject our proposal for a selective referendum? Kim said, "unless a convincing answer is given to this question, we cannot but conclude that the position of allowing no amendment to the current constitution is nothing but a prearranged scenario for a long-term stay in office." Thus he expressed doubt about the ruling party's real intentions. Apparently, this statement of Chairman Kim's was directed at the following passage in the president's special statement:

"The remaining time is not nearly enough to prepare for the transfer of government and to implement the political schedule. In amending the constitution, deliberations and voting in the National Assembly, and a referendum alone will take several months. Even if the constitution is revised, an additional several months will be needed to take a number of

ancillary legislative steps, including a revision of the election law, in which the ruling and opposition parties have sharply conflicting interests, and hold an election under the revised law."

The special statement holds opposition parties responsible for the failure to reach agreement on constitutional amendments, but the opposition has a different view in this regard. In brief, in the opinion of the opposition, the debate about constitutional revision has remained in a stalemate because the ruling party rejected all the opposition proposals, including those for top-level talks and for a selective referendum. Particularly with respect to the split of the major opposition party which the ruling party used as grounds for its conclusion that efforts for constitutional revision have been a failure, the RDP contends that the split was a result of the ruling party's machinations to subvert the opposition.

Last, regarding the ruling party's warning that strong measures will be taken to deal with actions contrary to the special statement, opposition parties contend that such countermeasures will not succeed in view of current public opinion.

#### "Strife-Torn Political Scene" Portends Rough Road Ahead for the Opposition

On the surface, the ruling and opposition parties remain sharply opposed to each other in their views regarding the special statement. However, now that the president expressed his determination through his 13 April statement, the debate on constitutional revision may be regarded as suspended until after the formation of a next government at least.

Needless to say, it is easily anticipated that there will be resistance on the part of the opposition. But, in a sense the decision expressed in the special statement may be viewed as a regimewide decision; accordingly, the attitude of the government and the ruling party should be regarded as firm. Therefore, it is easily surmised that the latest decision may be understood to be an initial step toward still greater measures.

Obviously, the opposition has been considerably shocked by the latest presidential decision. The reason is that the government and the ruling party, first of all, now argue that there is not enough time to revise the constitution, although they previously hinted that about 6 months is the time limit and, what is more, they have completely ruled out even the option of making what they call "constitutional revision according to law"; an option which the opposition have anticipated the ruling party would take. These two steps taken by the ruling party not only have abruptly sealed off at the source the room for maneuvers which the opposition has hitherto employed to press for constitutional revision but also have killed attempts by the opposition to stage a large-scale campaign to raise the authenticity issue in the forthcoming election late this year, should the ruling party carry out a "constitutional revision according to law" providing for a parliamentary form of government.

The shock which the opposition has received is fully manifested in Kim Yong-sam's somewhat conciliatory 14 April press conference. To cope with the

sudden change in the situation, he called upon the government and ruling party to reopen debate about constitutional revision. He said, "if President Chon really has no "selfish political motive" with regard to constitutional revision, the doors to the road to compromise through substantial talks are wide open." In this way he highlighted the opposition interest in the negotiatory side of the constitutional revision issue.

Moreover, Kim, while continuing to stress the need for top-level talks, expressed his interest in a second meeting with DJP Chairman No Tae-u, in which he had expressed no interest previously.

Needless to say, the expression of Kim's interest in a second meeting with No was based on his judgment of the situation that No is almost certain to become a successor because the presidential special statement predicted an early JDP convention to select a presidential candidate. On the other hand, the expression in question may be an indication that the opposition is more or less anxious to reinstate the political scene dominated by the constitutional revision issue.

However, the shock the opposition has received will not last too long because the latest development falls within the framework of the strategy which the hard-line force in the opposition camp conceived from the beginning with regard to constitutional revision.

It may be said that from the beginning, the hard-line force within the opposition camp assumed in its constitutional revision strategy the following contingencies in the order given: 1) pushing direct presidential elections, 2) the development of a situation which bars constitutional revision, 3) a constitutional amendment by the ruling party providing for the introduction of a parliamentary form of government. This three-stage strategy will be accompanied by a struggle for constitutional revision or a struggle for an election-related struggle under all circumstances, although the order of priority may change. Accordingly, the opposition camp is expected to continue to attempt to wage an extraparlimentary struggle for direct presidential elections and an active struggle to block the next presidential election.

However, the opposition struggle is expected to experience a considerably rough passage in the face of the government's resolute attitude. Particularly, no one can rule out the possibility that the opposition camp's cohesive ability to struggle will be considerably weakened by the the likely assumption that there will be no parliamentary election this year.

Moreover, active maneuvers by the government and the ruling party to alienate opposition leaders and opposition members are expected to make it very difficult to maintain strategic unity within the opposition camp.

At any rate, the primary reason for the failure of the ruling and opposition parties to reach an accord on constitutional revision was that the gap between their partisan motives for constitutional revision was too wide. Needless to say, it is impossible, as a matter of principle, to exclude partisan interests

from discussions of pending issues between political groups, but it may be said that the gap between the partisan interests of the ruling and opposition parties was too wide to achieve constitutional revision by agreement.

#### Cause of Failure To Achieve Constitutional Amendments by Agreement

Despite the claim of both the ruling and opposition parties that their goal in seeking constitutional revision is to choose a system for democratic development, what the ruling party has been seeking was basically a safety valve for realizing one term for the presidency, whereas what the opposition has had in mind was a system of transfer of power.

The conflicting real motives of the ruling and opposition parties led to different strategies respectively pursued by them to deal with the political scene dominated by the constitutional issue. To be specific, the ruling party stuck to the formula of reaching compromise on constitutional revision through a bipartisan agreement in the National assembly, whereas the ruling camp demanded a selective referendum while trying to force the ruling party to accept direct presidential elections on the strength of "street power."

The long-lasting state of conflict over the constitution revision formulas which arose from differences between the ground strategies of the two sides gave rise to a strife for hegemony within the opposition camp; and in the center of this strife, a faction favoring negotiations was born; and in the end, the major opposition party split into two, one a hard-line party and the other a party favoring negotiations. The formal split of the major opposition party, particularly the bolting of a majority hard-line faction, has resulted in giving the ruling party an excuse to give up constitutional revision by agreement.

We cannot but conclude that in this process, both the ruling and opposition parties, because of their mutual distrust, have deliberately evaded any move which might have provided a common ground for constitutional revision. For instance, the ruling party has been reluctant to the end to present an election bill demanded by the opposition party, whereas the latter did not hesitate to cause a long stalemate in the political debate about constitutional revision, over the single issue about the form of public hearings.

#### Is There Any Possibility for Compromise

It may be worth while to examine whether there was no chance whatsoever to reach an accord on constitutional revision.

A diagnosis as to whether there was a chance for such agreement is directly related to how we view the past political scene dominated by the constitutional revision issue as a whole. In other words, if the ruling party, as suspected now by the opposition, had no intention of revising the constitution from the beginning, it would be one scenario. Likewise, if we assume the opposition will never compromise, then it would be a different scenario.

If the answer to these suspicions and assumptions is no, then we can arrive at the conclusion--although this may sound somewhat like a unbalanced after-the-fact assumption--that it was possible to have reached a compromise on the parliamentary cabinet form of government, and this assertion lends itself to speculation as to whether there were chances of agreement.

At any rate, irrespective of whether the ruling party proposed a parliamentary cabinet form of government as a blueprint for the development of democracy or as a means of securing its power, we can find ample proof that the ruling party had a considerable interest in a constitutional amendment providing for this system. Of course, it is a fact that within the ruling party, there were some proponents of the presidential form of government, as well as proponents of no amendments to the current constitution, in the early stage, and it is also a fact that subsequently, there emerged new proponents of no amendments to the current constitution.

We would say it is a fact that up until the split of the major opposition party, the efforts of the ruling party were formally concentrated on the cabinet form of government, although discussions were reportedly carried on inside the ruling party as to whether it should "revise the constitution according to law" or return to the stand of no amendment to the current constitution, just in case constitutional revision by agreement was unattainable. Therefore, it seems to be appropriate to acknowledge that in the course of the constitutional revision debate, the ruling party converged intraparty opinion on the cabinet form of government officially at least, although it aired conflicting views from time to time.

In spite of this, the ruling party failed to achieve a cabinet form of government in the end. In our opinion, there were two reasons for this failure.

First, when the "Yi Min-u formula" was presented, the ruling party failed to take democratization measures stipulated as a precondition for the adoption of this formula and thus was unable to broaden the base of support for the pronenegotiation school within the party.

Second, it seems that as time passed, doubts about the cabinet form of government itself began to sprout within the ruling party. Presumably, this skepticism ranged from the question of how to secure a stable majority through elections to problems of national security. Needless to say, this skepticism was directly linked to the 13 April special statement. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out the possibility that it had direct and indirect effects on the process of arriving at the 13 April decision.

On the other hand, if we trace the time frame further back, the view sounds more plausible that the Yi Min-u formula failed within the opposition camp, not because the formula had any inherent flaw, but because the timing was wrong and its presentation by the wrong person caused confusion to the opposition strategy for constitutional revision.

It seems that we can not categorically brush aside the possibility that if the ruling party had made concessions and met the precondition for so-called

"democratization measures," the Yi Min-u formula would have been invoked subsequently by the two Kim's.

The problem was that the Yi Min-u formula was abruptly presented by a person who did not have any real power within the opposition camp and, at a time when the internal strife within this camp was ripe, and when there was not much visible concession to the opposition camp by the ruling party. It seems that this was the reason why the two Kim's railed at the Yi Min-u formula, branding it as a seed of confusion of the opposition's constitutional revision strategy.

There is speculation, although lacking clear substance, that probably, officials within the faction led by Kim Yong-sam were actually considering the timing for proosing a formula similar to the "Yi Min-u formula" after continuing the struggle for indirect presidential elections for a while. Within the Kim Tae-chung faction also, there was a time when irrespective of his will, the view was cautiously circulated among its officials that it would be in the best interest of the future of the opposition camp for Kim himself to boldly reconcile democratization to the question of power structure.

However, because of the wrong timing and the wrong person presenting it, it became a hot issue as time passed, the Yi Min-u formula became merely waste paper which President Yi himself and the two Kim's scrapped.

Now that through the 13 April presidential decision, the ruling party has adopted the policy of freezing debate about constitutional revision, it has become difficult to achieve constitutional amendments by means of dialogue. Nevertheless, if opposition parties continue to stick to the constitutional revision issue irrespective of prospects for success or failure, we cannot rule out the possibility that the whole political scene will get nowhere as a consequence. Therefore, with the foremost political issue now shelved, the question remains how normalcy in the management of the political situation can be achieved.

#### Business Reaction

Seoul ENTERPRISE in Korean May 87 pp 44-49

[Report from the Korea Socioeconomics Research Center: "Let Us Think About President Chon Tu-hwan's '13 April Decision'--'No Democracy Possible Without National Stability'"]

[Text] Transfer of Government Under Current Constitution

The political scene which has been dominated by the constitutional revision issue in the wake of the "30 April" Blue House talks" in 1986 has taken another turn. As result, it may be said that from now on the political scene will be dominated not by debate over constitutional revision but by the schedule for the transfer of government under the current constitution.

In a special TV-radio address on the morning of 13 April, President Chon said: "With the end of my term not too far off, and on the basis of an overall



assessment of the current national situation, I have been forced to make an important decision." He then made it clear that "Judging that it is impossible to revise the constitution during my tenure, I have decided to transfer the reins of government to a successor upon the expiration of my term on 25 February next year."

The president's "13 April decision," which put an end to the political scene dominated by the constitutional revision issue may be said to be a "political option" aimed, among other things, at forestalling a catastrophe which might be brought about by political chaos. The president has made this decision in his capacity as president to avoid a possible catastrophe, fearing that should the political strife between the ruling and opposition parties continue over the constitutional revision issue, aggravating political unrest, it might even endanger a peaceful transfer of government, a major national goal.

What lay behind this decision was, above all, his judgment that in view of the political schedule ahead, no more time should be wasted on debate over constitutional revision.

In the past, President Chon took every opportunity to reiterate his determination to serve only one term, stressing that "establishing a precedent for a peaceful transfer of government is essential for the development of democracy in our country." That being his conviction, he does not think the remaining 10 months give ample time for making preparations for the transfer of government.

It is surmised from its content that the statement was also prompted by his judgment of the current situation in which a new hard-line party has been organized in wake of the split of the NKDP, making it impossible to hope for achieving a constitutional revision by agreement between the ruling and opposition parties. In essence, the statement meant to say that "the reins of government will be handed over under the current constitution and the next president will be elected before the end of this year." Nevertheless the statement draws attention because it outlines a basic scheme for dealing with the political situation, including a political schedule for the future.

Concerning the question of his successor, President Chon said that "a man enjoying popular support will be nominated at a DJP convention as soon as possible." This remark opens the way for a "formal" discussion of the question of a successor, a subject which up to now has been taboo.

Up to now, the DJP has been expected to hold its convention in September. However, with a mechanism for selection of a successor expected to emerge at an early date, there is strong speculation circulating in political circles that the DJP will move up the schedule and hold a convention in June, if things go smoothly.

The passage that "we cannot entrust the future of our country to a person who is imbued with the old ways of thinking for the past; we need a new breed of politicians" is also bound to draw attention, for it reflects the president's strong intention to reorganize the political word. This leads to speculation that those who have been criticized for being an "obstacle" to constitutional



revision will be the target of this organization. This means that how the question of replacing the two Kims and other opposition figures by a new breed of politicians will develop is likely to be a variable in the equation of the relationship between the ruling and the opposition camps.

Although the presidential statement declares the postponement of constitutional revision until after the great event of the 1988 Olympics, it is clear that the constitutional revision plan the DJP will propose after the Olympics is over will call for a parliamentary form of government. Accordingly, replacement of old fashioned politicians by a new breed of politicians may be interpreted as part of a plan to pave the way for the introduction of a parliamentary form of government in the future.

In other words, for a parliamentary system of government to take root as a new political system in the future, the good quality of politicians is an essential requirement and, accordingly, a new breed of politicians must emerge. Seen from this point of view, we can guess the future direction.

Immediately reacting to the "13 April" special statement, it was pointed out in some political quarters that it was significant that the statement was timed to coincide with the meeting of promoters for the new party and for the formation of its preparatory committee. They speculated that the coincidence was partly intended as a refusal to recognize the new party itself and partly aimed at minimizing the potential of the new party by expressing a resolute determination of the government and the ruling party.

Attention was focused particularly on the question of what bearing the special statement had to the "serious decision" referred to in the 12 January statement. When the "serious decision" was mentioned in the 12 January statement, the atmosphere within the ruling camp leaned toward pressing ahead with an early constitutional revision, therefore speculation as to the intent of the "serious decision" was mainly focused on what "pertinent measures" would be taken to cushion the side effects of an early constitutional revision. But now the prevailing view is that the 13 April special statement has changed the substance of the "serious decision" from what it was previously speculated to be.

The special statement represents a decision related to the about-face on the part of the ruling camp from the position of favoring constitutional revision to the position of no amendment to the current constitution, raising speculation that a second and a third decision will follow. In this connection, it is necessary to scrutinize with attention the passage in the "13 April" statement that "if they should be absorbed in the constitutional revision strife and cause social chaos through lawlessness and violence and jeopardize public life, I will take resolute steps in accordance with all powers entrusted in me by the the constitution to secure the stability of public life and maintain social order."

This means that the major purpose of the presidential statement is to freeze the political controversy over constitutional revision in order to prevent a "catastrophe" in the management of state affairs, but that depending on circumstances, including moves on the part of the opposition camp, the

president may take measures within his power as president. Accordingly, the possible second and third decisions, which will probably have functional bearings on opposition moves, will be directed at the opposition camp, judging from the DJP's recent volley of criticism against the opposition and from the fact that the president's "13 April" special statement lays the blame on the opposition for the failure to reach an agreement on constitutional revision.

Referring to the opposition, the "13 April" statement said: "Is it after all possible to reach an agreement with those who, failing to settle their internal affairs through dialogue and compromise, have ended up in a catastrophe?..." This passage may be interpreted as stressing that in fact, the ruling party has given up dialogues with the present leadership of the opposition party. Therefore, in some quarters there is the view that the presidential statement amounts to declaring these opposition figures to be "incompetent." In this sense, the passage drops a hint as to who will represent the opposition when a dialogue with the opposition is to be held in the future. There is strong speculation that steps will be taken after all, in one way or other, to eliminate the two Kims from the political stage.

When the focus of the political stage has switched from "no amendment to the present constitution" to constitutional revision in the wake of the "30 April" statement last year, every citizen, in fact, believed that it would be the best if a "constitutional revision by agreement" between the ruling and opposition parties was achieved and a peaceful transfer of power was carried out under the revised constitution, in a way satisfactory to both the ruling and opposition parties.

However, to our regret, no such agreement was achieved after all, despite the ardent desire of the people. As a result, the public desire and the probe for ways to arrive at a constitutional revision by consensus have to be deferred until after a next government has emerged.

In his "13 April special statement," President Chon said, "I am confident that if we resume our thinking about the constitutional revision issue by spending ample time after we have finished the two major national events, we will be able to come up with a good idea." Accordingly, it is expected that when a "successor" emerges at some time this year, some answer will be given to the question of what will transpire after the decision to freeze constitutional revision.

The die has already been cast, and the government and the ruling party will carry out various policy measures oriented toward people in all strata while following its political schedule. Judging from the promise to introduce local autonomy during the presidential tenure and from other democratization measures mentioned in the "13 April special statement," various policy efforts for the development of democracy are expected to be the focus of the management of the political scene from now on.

There Should Be No Halt to Economic Growth

At any rate the "13 April decision" may be said to have shut the doors to debate on constitutional revision until after the two major national events the doors to debate on constitutional revision, which began in the wake of the "30 April Blue House talks" aimed at national reconciliation. From the remark by a ruling party official to the effect that "Even if the opposition party accepts a parliamentary form of government now, we will not agree [to a dialogue], it is easily surmised that there will be no more negotiations with the opposition on constitutional revision.

It is a fact that the conflicting ideas and the acute confrontation between the ruling and opposition party in the political scene over the constitutional revision issue have not only caused political instability but also have caused a considerable concern for the economic world. Many businessmen have taken every opportunity to call for a constitutional revision by agreement between the ruling and opposition parties, pointing out that a disruption of social order will be the greatest obstacle to growth in the national economy which is gathering momentum now.

It is obvious that political instability is bound to dampen investment psychology and cause a slowdown in production, dealing a blow to the export boom. Moreover, psychology of fear would drive people to hoard daily necessities, and this would have considerable adverse effects on the national economy. Particularly the rising boom which was set off by the ongoing phenomenon of three lows since 1986 is regarded as the best chance for us to join the ranks of developed nations, and this may be why the presidential statement points out that we cannot let this opportunity slip.

In fact, in his "13 April special statement," President Chon stressed that "we should no longer idle away this crucial time which will decide the destiny of our nation by indulging in counterproductive feud, confrontation, and enmity." What will be the consequences of political unrest and social chaos at this time when we should hew out our nation's's destiny? The statement answers this question by saying it is obvious that "there is the danger that even the foundations of self-reliant growth which our people up to now have built by sweat and blood will be destroyed."

The current fierce trade wars in the international community make no distinction between enemy and friend. In the past several years, we have keenly felt that we have to take whatever steps are necessary to achieve national glory. It is not so easy to cope with these circumstances even if the whole nation is united as one. The prevailing view in economic circles is that in order not to miss the best chance for economic development by squarely facing this reality, now is the time for the whole nation to make a forceful, gigantic step toward becoming a developed nation by united efforts.

Yet the political scene over the constitutional revision issue has remained in confusion for nearly a year, causing social chaos, with the ruling and opposition parties even failing to reach a compromise despite the ardent desire of the people. Particularly, the "Yi Min-u formula" shed a ray of hope for compromise, but this hope was dashed as a hard-line opposition party emerged in the wake of the split of the major opposition party. As a result,

the public was watching the political scene all the more uneasily, and economic circles were also unable to conceal uneasiness.

According to the prevailing opinion in economic circles, this state of the economy has prompted the president to issue his "13 April special statement."

In his statement, President Chon warned that with political strife, "the economy would not run smoothly and result in nothing but high prices, unemployment, recession, and poverty, and stagnation." In this statement, we see the strong determination of the president to forestall an economic disruption resulting from political unrest.

The statement was apparently prompted by the judgment, in particular, that if the political deadlock over constitutional revision were to be left unchecked, political unrest would continue and it would precipitate a national crisis, and the president could not just sit back with folded arms while all this was happening.

If we think that the next 2 to 3 years will offer the best opportunity for our country to proudly join the ranks of developed nations, it is high time for us to accelerate our forward advance. If we do so, as the statement points out, "economic and social growth will continue and a great historic transition will be achieved in our land."

Immediately after the "13 April special statement" was issued, one businessman said: "In fact, this 1 year was an immense waste of time; they even failed to find the way out of the impasse over constitutional revision. To successfully carry out the two major events--a peaceful transfer of power and the Seoul Olympics, I would say the presidential decision was inevitable." He added, "in the past, businessmen have felt a psychological atrophy because of the political confusion over constitutional revision and the social chaos. Politicians do not know what kind of anxiety political unrest will cause to businessmen. We should not miss this opportunity for economic growth. Therefore, I think the decision to freeze political debate over constitutional revision was appropriate."

The majority opinion in various circles regarding the "13 April special statement" is that it was "inevitable." In their opinion, the Olympics has precedence over constitutional revision, and they understand the government intention to make the Olympics an opportunity to build a developed nation. They expressed the unanimous view that if confrontation and enmity were to be left unchecked, it would make the public uneasy and "in the end, it would become a factor obstructive to economic growth."

From the beginning, the public watched President Chon Tu-hwan's TV-radio address, concerned about how a peaceful transfer of government would be carried out. But when he soon reiterated his determination to "serve only one term," people appeared to welcome the measures outlined in the statement as "inevitable steps for the stabilization of the people's livelihood." Commenting on the presidential statement, an executive of the H conglomerate said: "Under the circumstances when constitutional revision by agreement is impossible, I think it was the best option. Particularly the president's

reiteration of his determination to serve only one term will evoke a sympathetic response from the public."

After delivering his "13 April special statement," President Chon Tu-hwan is said to have met Blue House reporters to explain his motives and the background which had prompted his statement and feelings associated with his statement. Reportedly, the president said: "The ruling party, which has a majority, can go ahead with constitutional revision if it wants to do so, but it is my conviction that the constitution should not be handled so hastily." He stressed that "when we are in a period of national prosperity, we should not obstruct national progress by indulging in political strife."

President Chon also reportedly said that "I have made my decision not for the purpose of remaining in the office of presidency but to make democracy take hold." He urged the reporters to "stand witness to the historic moment when I leave the Blue House for my private home upon the completion of my term."

On 14 April, President Chon Tu-hwan presided over an extraordinary cabinet session, at which he issued the instruction that "in accordance with the principles outlined in the 'important decision of 13 April,' the cabinet will work out, in close cooperation with the party, measures designed to deal with, among other things, problems concerning the Basic Press Law and the introduction of local autonomy, as well as feasible measures for the development of democracy and for the promotion of national harmony, and submit a report on the actions taken."

Particularly, he stressed that "caution should be exercised in the management of economic policies so that there may be no wrinkle effects on the normal economic trends toward price stability, perked up economic activities, and favorable trade."

The foreign press made a favorable reaction to the "13 April special statement," which drew unusual attention at home and abroad, by giving prominence to its coverage.

The WASHINGTON POST ran a report on the special statement at the top of its foreign news section, saying that "by making it clear that a presidential election will be held under the current constitution, he has indicated in concrete terms his will to carry out a peaceful transfer of power." Reporting that the president has declared his intention to suspend the debate over constitutional revision, which divides public opinion and is countproductive, the WASHINGTON POST said: "the split of the opposition party was an important reason for President Chon's decision."

Such global wire serices as AP, AFP, and UPI gave instant coverage to the presidential statement by Seoul dispatches reporting in substance that he has made a decision to "freeze debate over constitutional revision until after the transfer of government and the Olympics." These news agencies had this to say in particular: "this decision had to be made because constitutional revision by consensus is no longer possible due to the split of the opposition parties and for other reasons, and this is a desirable step consistent with national interests."

At any rate, the prevailing view is that the "13 April special statement" has frozen debate over constitutional revision until after the Olympics, and that even if the opposition proposes to amend the constitution by agreement, it is too late now. Accordingly, the political scene which is at a great turning point will have no other choice but to move along the political track laid by the presidential statement. From now on, the ruling party should stop dealing only with the opposition parties, and have public interest in mind in the conduct of its politics.

It should carry out various democratization measures, such as the introduction of local autonomy, the revitalization of the press, and measures concerning those imprisoned, and conduct politics in such a way as to let air into the choked political scene.

In a way the public who desired constitutional revision through consensus has been jolted a great deal by the split of the first opposition party, the NKDP, and by the "13 April special statement." Therefore, in order to avoid giving further shocks, politicians should exercise self-restraint and be on guard against the possible reenactment of the kind of political pattern which disregards the will of the people.

Politicians are responsible for the state of affairs in which the public desire and high hopes for political development have to be frozen for the time being. From now on, they should, although belatedly, exert efforts to avoid disappointing the public any more and do their best to live up to public expectations. In addition, macroeconomic policies should be steadily implemented to lay the foundation for a high growth rate by removing all factors obstructive to economic development. From this point of view, the majority of our people hope that the "13 April special statement" will provide a momentum for achieving a greater augmentation of our national strength than ever before.

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## COLUMNIST DISCUSSES 17 JUNE CHON, NO MEETING

SK190014 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English 19 Jun 87 p 2

[From the column "Press Pocket"]

[Text] Wednesday night's meeting between President Chon Tu-hwan and DJP chairman-presidential nominee No Tae-u was arranged during secretary general Yi Chun-ku's visit to Chongwadae in the morning for briefing the President on the general party affairs.

No was originally scheduled to have a dinner with visiting General Richard G. Stilwell, retired former U.N. commander, at the 63 DLI Building on Yoi-do.

No, who was nominated as the ruling party's presidential candidate in a 10 June National Convention, cancelled the dinner with Stilwell and departed for Chongwadae at 6:15 p.m.

Before his departure for Chongwadae, No reviewed the party's plans for settlement of the current political deadlock, which he later recommended to the President.

No had an hour-long exclusive talk with President Chon to discuss a wide gamut of schemes to tackle the current political turmoil.

Their meeting was extended to dinner, which was joined by senior Presidential Secretary for Political Affairs Kim Yun-hwan, Secretary General Yi Chun-ku, and Representatives Yi Chi-ho and Hyon Kyong-tae.

The presence of Yi and Hyon in the hurriedly-arranged top-level party-administration consultation meeting drew particular attention from the political arena with regard to the possible resumption of constitutional debates.

Yi was a deputy chairman of a 45-member select-committee of the Assembly on Constitutional Revision, whose function was virtually suspended following President Chon's 13 April decision to suspend the constitutional reform debate until after the 1988 Seoul Olympics.

Hyon, a lawyer, was also a leading member of the constitutional revision panel, made up of lawmakers from the rival parties.

No returned to his home in Yonhi-dong, western Seoul, at 10:35 p.m. and hinted to reporters of a "certain change" in the ruling camp's strategy to solve the current political impasse. "To accept the views of the mass media is to accept the desire of the people," he said. He then gave the indication that he now has greater authority to steer the current politics by telling reporters that "I will lead the current political situation from now on..."

Yesterday, Secretary General Yi Chun-ku reviewed the contents of the Chon-no talks together with spokesman Kim Chong-nam and assistant Secretary General Kim Tae-ho.

Emerging from his meeting with Yi, spokesman Kim told reporters yesterday morning, "The DJP is doubling efforts to politically solve the current situation as early as possible." "This is all that I can say at this moment," Kim said.

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## MEASURES TO OVERCOME CRISIS, RESTORE ORDER URGED

## Restoration of Individual Rights

Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean 5 Jun 87 p 2

[Editorial: "The Legal Principle of Pardon and Restoration of Rights: the System Required by Law and Realities Must Be Utilized"]

[Text] Pardons and rehabilitation of rights have been discussed as political considerations for national harmony and compromise for a long period of time. Demands for these still stand today; and it cannot be denied that decisions must be made taking this into consideration. However, expected decisions have not been made, and have been no pardons or restoration of rights even in a broad sense since 15 August 1985.

Pardons and restoration of rights are often wrongly interpreted as favors bestowed from generosity or as demands based on political considerations. However, the pardon system of a democratic nation is certainly not to be characterized as amnesty as in a monarchy nor to be demanded as political considerations.

The pardon system of today is the result of the imperfections in law, fear of miscarriage of justice, conflicts among legal doctrines, and policy necessities. Thus the pardon system is even referred to as a "safety valve of the law." A system designed to deal with defects in the law and misapplications of the law is this very system of pardon and restoration of rights.

There are no perfect laws to the extent that there is never a shadow of doubt. No matter how skillful and well-intentioned law makers may be, it is impossible for them to adapt reality to conform perfectly to legal doctrines. If law makers are inexperienced and malicious, there is a fear that they might intentionally promote quarrels between the law and reality. Here lies an imperfection of law that can hardly be eliminated.

Thus fears of miscarriage of justice persistently prevail. Even if the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed and only those judicial officers of mature personality are engaged in trials, it would be impossible to expect a righteous dispensing of justice all the time. This is even more true in the reality where "the shaky judiciary" is well known.

Furthermore, all laws are a product of the values and ideology of the era and the society. However, there should not be any era or society in which only one sense of value and one ideology dominate. This is even more important when the passage of time effects changes in the sense of value and ideology. In order to adjust conflicts and tension there, too, the system of pardon and restoration of rights is necessary; and it is imperative that the system be properly utilized.

There is no doubt that the system of pardon should function to meet policy needs. For example, "signs of repentance" and rehabilitation demand pardons in the realm of criminal policy. Furthermore, a study must be made in order to utilize the pardon system for political harmony.

After all the pardon system must mean more than amnesty. One of the systems designed to be pertinent in the area of judicature and politics is pardon. Thus in the United States, which is an advanced democratic country, a yearly average of 1,700 cases of pardon are carried out; and in Japan, 300-odd cases. Is it a fact that the system of pardon is being utilized more in these countries because their judicatures are more shaky than ours and their laws are more incomplete?

We do not assert that pardons and restoration of rights should be carried out for some specified persons. And we do not expect pardons and restoration of rights only for political reasons. We do assert that pardons and restoration of rights be upheld because both legal principles and realities demand them.

Is it because of overconfidence in the perfection of the law and the judicature that there has been no utilization of the system of pardon and restoration of rights during the past 2 years? In view of the realities in which the term "crime of conscience" still exists, the answer to this question is self-evident. In the light of the fact that the slogan "Set Free Detainees" is continuously held forth, the utilization of the pardon system cannot be put off indefinitely.

The system of pardon and restoration of rights laid down in the law must not end in a scrap of paper.

#### Politics Worth Trusting

Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean 6 Jun 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Politics Worth Trusting: the Crisis of This Community Is Really in Faithlessness"]

[Text] Nothing is being done in the way it should be done which is evidence of the deplorable political situation. The so-called National Assembly opened its session but it just showed its shameful condition through absenteeism and hunger sit-ins. People have an uneasy foreboding of some serious trouble ahead.

They even fear the arrival of "10 June." And to make the matter even worse,

the weather is unseasonably muggy. People feel sick and like grumbling for some reason or other. Everyday is a day in which people cannot help "shouting all kinds of abusive things."

The chairman of the National Assembly, chieftain of the legislature, reportedly said in his opening speech, making a mockery of himself, that he would "rather lose face himself" then preside on the day when "half a National Assembly" opened its session. On the whole, nothing goes on as it should go all over the country; so that kind of deplorable remark could naturally emerge. People, too, feel the same distress. They are very sorrow stricken.

Why is it that things go this way? What in the world is driving us in this manner? Stopping to think a minute, is this not a tragedy caused by a faithlessness where "faith" in the following has been completely destroyed: respect for the government; expectations toward political parties and politics; and convictions about a bright future? The crisis which this community faces today is in these very areas. The government, political parties, and the press, everywhere, we cannot find a place where words ring true and cannot be misconstrued.

Human relations in a social community where people live together are based on promises. A basic connecting device, a guarantee, for those promises is "faith." If that "faith" is broken, the community is faced with a crisis threatening its existence. As the saying goes, when "faith" is lost, everything is lost, so when people cannot trust one another with their lives, nothing, whether it is a dialogue or agreement, can be carried out as it should be. Then the only thing available is physical "force," isn't it? It is only natural that politics erupts on the streets and fighting takes place.

It is imperative for us to ask ourselves whether this community is a society with principles, pillars, and a foundation. Who is going to be responsible for this grave tragic reality? It goes without saying that politicians and administrators must take this responsibility. Is it not a fact that the accumulation of innumerable repeated infringements, irregularities, broken promises, and discordances between words and actions at every turn in the past history of constitutional government has brought about this swamp of countless cases of faithlessness?

It has now become clearer that the very task of eliminating faithlessness is a first priority task confronting us. We even feel that it would be difficult for us to manage the nation without eliminating faithlessness. It is not bad that, following the case of covering-up fabrications for the torturing to death [incidents], those responsible people in the government and the ruling party emphasized the imperativeness of honesty and ethics in government and were determined to restore faith. However, since we have heard this before, every time an incident occurred, it is a fact that they do not attract any more attention than prefixes and suffixes. Meaning becomes alive only when actions back up words.

Someone in the government party said that "the people want a strong government." It is a correct statement in the sense that only a strong government can manage a national administration properly. However, "a tough

government" is not always "a strong government." It is imperative that the government be honest, sincere, and equipped with a firm moral foundation. Only when this is so, can the people trust it and follow it, and can words carry their own meaning. And voluntary agreement and real stability can be expected. This is the true face of "a strong government."

If the government frankly acknowledges the fact that the most essential and serious problem it faces today is lack of trust, it must take pains to get to the heart of this problem. It is imperative that it reflect on the parliamentary order, and that it listen to voices urging that changes be made in the methods of managing the nation.

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## DAILY URGES POLITICAL PARTIES TO HOLD DIALOGUE

SK190032 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English 19 Jun 87 p 8

[Editorial: "Need for Political Dialogue"]

[Text] With the political tension being aggravated by the escalating anti-government student demonstrations in recent weeks, the government camp is reported to be studying various measures to work through the protracted political impasse.

Particularly noteworthy are the indications that the options being weighed by the ruling quarters, especially by leading figures in the Democratic Justice Party, include steps to revive, with certain provisions, the political debate over constitutional amendment, which was shelved until after the Seoul Olympics in fall next year by a presidential statement issued last April.

Apparently as a prelude to the initiative to be taken by the government camp, the DJP yesterday reaffirmed its willingness to hold a political meeting between its chairman and presidential candidate No Tae-u and Kim Yong-sam, president of the main opposition Reunification Democratic Party.

These moves by the ruling camp, exhibiting conspicuous signs of flexibility, have come to light following a strike of top-level consultation between the government and its party since the past weekend, which obviously contributed to putting an end to the provocation student rally at Seoul's Myongdong Catholic Cathedral last Monday without a major mishap.

Indeed, there is no denying that the local sociopolitical situation involving the divisive task of democratization has reached a stage in which a sheer resort to force by the confronting parties can hardly settle the outstanding problems. Its result would be rather to drive the nation to the brink of chaos to the detriment of its well-being.

Such a stark reality dictates the imperative need for a political approach to defuse the current political tension and, furthermore, to tackle the impending issues, many of which derive from the sensitive constitutional question.

In this respect, much attention is being directed to the details of what is being speculated as the government camp's upcoming initiative to break the volatile political stalemate and to relieve mounting worries among the people.

Essential to a political breakthrough is, needless to say, the willingness of all parties concerned to compromise--a requirement that calls upon the contending sides to discard their intransigent positions in favor of an early resumption of dialogue.

In the process of arranging political talks, the rival parties should discontinue their adherence to preconditions they set, since the issues can be properly discussed once a meeting is open.

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POLITICAL

SOUTH KOREA

BRIEFS

NKDP TO ENTER ASSEMBLY--Lawmakers of the minor opposition New Korea Democratic Party will enter the National Assembly today unilaterally and unconditionally. In a meeting of NKDP lawmakers, they have decided to enter the House in the afternoon and stay in the chamber, Chong Chae-won, the NKDP spokesman said in a statement. The NKDP lawmakers reached a consensus that the stalled House session should be resumed to settle the current political deadlock, the spokesman said. The minor opposition party urged the other parties to enter the House, the statement said. [Text] [Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English 18 Jun 87 p 2 SK] /12913

CSO: 4100/238

## PRESSURE OF 'SUPERPOWER' PROTECTIONISM CRITICIZED

Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English 23 May 87 p 10

[Article by Yu Jin-soo]

[Text]

WASHINGTON — The export-driven Korean economy is likely to sputter under the economic pressure from the United States. The pressure could result in devastating economic damage to Korea.

For having taken a small piece of the American economic pie, the leader in the economic world is moving to choke off growth of the young Korean economy which has been growing under its shelter.

What's more, some U.S. politicians, against the backdrop of ever-rising pessimism over worldwide trade tensions, are trying to lump Korea together with Japan, labeling it Asia's "second Japan."

The world's strongest industrial power is ready to wield a dangerous economic hammer indiscriminately. The hammering will deal a killing blow to a far more fragile Korean economy.

However, Korea, depending heavily on the U.S. market, has little choice but to bow to U.S. pressure. "The arrogance of superpowers is strongly felt," commented a Korean observer.

U.S. administration officials and Congressmen are taking a "none-of-our-business" attitude toward the serious economic problems Korea is faced with.

Rather, they have demanded that Korea open its domestic market wider to provide freer access to nearly all American goods and services including advertising and farm products.

Shocking us is their demand that Korea improve the market access of U.S. goods

as soon as possible for its economic survival. The demand is seen not as a gesture of bluff but a real threat.

If they vent their spleen on their feeble trade partner, Korea will surely be labeled a second Japan and be doomed to become a scapegoat of U.S. trade retaliation, observers said.

What's more serious, members of the U.S. Congress have gone so far as to demand economic sanctions directed against the Korean economy in connection with Korean politics. They emphasized the need for political development commensurate with the vitality of the Korean economy. Their voices are becoming louder lately, a sharp departure from the erstwhile "quiet diplomacy."

Unless the demand for full democracy is met, Korea is likely to be subject to a certain type of economic punishment.

The overt threat against the Korean economy and politics in the name of greater democracy was voiced widely and strongly during my stay in U.S. cities including Washington D.C. where Ilhae Institute of Korea and the Brookings Institution arranged free-debate sessions between Korean journalists and influential American figures.

A Korean observer residing here intoned: "Some Americans are treating Korea as their virtual colony. The recent remarks led me to believe that they were intervening in Korean politics instead of offering good advices to Korea.

"Our sovereignty and national pride are trampled upon. Such arrogance of a superpower should be downplayed in the days to come in order to maintain the existing friendly ties between the two allies."



Last year, the resource-poor Korea posted its first-ever current account surplus due mainly to a \$7 billion trade surplus with the United States.

The figure last year was compared with trade surplus with the U.S. of \$58.6 billion for Japan, \$23.3 billion for Canada, \$15.6 billion for West Germany and \$15.5 billion for Taiwan. Korea's figure accounted for merely 4 percent of the U.S. trade deficit of \$170 billion last year.

What has the northeast Asia's bastion of anti-communism in high dudgeon was that the longstanding and closest ally, the United States, "blood-tied" since the 1950-53 Korean War, turned a deaf ear to Korean pleas concerning the market-opening program.

The strongest economic powerhouse has been merciless, ignorings many significant problems Korea is facing.

Korea has to repay a huge amount of foreign debt totalling \$45 billion, which ranks fourth in the world. She, under incessant military threats from the north Korean Communists, has a big security burden and is spending six percent of the GNP on national defense.

The other problems underline political unrest involving the suspension of debates on the constitutional change, ensuing general elections and preparations for the Summer Olympics next year.

Their cool response came from a lot of concerns including lagging productivity, deteriorating competitiveness, the ever-falling value of the dollar, the snowballing debt and the Third World debt problem.

They noted that trade must be a two-way deal. The two-way trading must take

precedence over the significant problems their trade partners are facing.

The United States also demanded a drastic and sudden currency revaluation in an effort to erase the red figure in trade. The appreciation of the Korean currency could go up to 10 percent this year.

Under U.S. pressure, Korea announced a sweeping plan — the first of its kind among U.S. trading partners — to freeze its trade surplus with the U.S. this year to last year's level of \$7 billion.

The tougher stand against its small trading partners like Korea illustrates that the United States is losing its dominance in the world economy. As U.S. Federal Reserve chairman Volcker put it recently, "We are rather obviously in danger of losing control over our own economic destiny."

Making things worse, the world economy seems poised to slide into a recession. Recently, business leaders warned of rising threats of a recession stemming from the weak dollar and higher inflation.

The bleak economic forecast will do great harm to the Korean economy which enjoyed the first trade surplus in its history thanks to the "three drops" in oil prices, the value of the dollar and interest rates.

Drawing great concerns is that the rising protectionist sentiment in America might add fuel to anti-American student movements, stung by the gloomy picture of economy.

Korea, Land of Morning Calm, calls for economic prosperity based on political stability.

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## NAEWAE REPORTS ON NORTH'S ANTI-SOUTH PROPAGANDA

SK190501 Seoul YONHAP in English 0452 GMT 19 Jun 87

[Text] Seoul, 19 June (YONHAP)--North Korea is intensifying its propaganda against the South, following the mass demonstrations against the Government by South Korea's anti-government students and dissident groups, the NAEWAE press reported Friday.

The press, which deals exclusively with news about the Communist bloc, including North Korea, reported that Pyongyang's NODONG SINMUN, an organ of the Workers (Communist) Party, and other media have urged South Koreans to fight against their Government "without concessions and compromise at this solemn moment."

In Korea, increasingly violent, massive street demonstrations have erupted in Seoul and major provincial cities since the national coalition for a democratic constitution staged a mass rally on 10 June to protest a police cover-up of the torture death of a dissident university student during police interrogation.

On that day, the Korean National and Democratic Front, a Pyongyang Bogus Party, instigated South Koreans to participate in the mass rally in the Anglican church compound near the Seoul City Hall, according to the press.

On 13 June, North Korea held a mass rally in Pyongyang, praising the South Korean student activists' demonstrations as "a lonely fight, a patriotic battle," and saying that the North Koreans would give active support to the protesters in the South in the name of brethren.

In an appeal to the South Koreans, the North tried to instigate the social chaos in the South by saying that "the situation in the South today is vital to the whole nation, and the southern people, including the students, should wage a more courageous fight against the imperialism of the United States."

They also called for the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from South Korea and a peace agreement with the United States, while claiming that the U.S. is attempting a nuclear war against the North, the NAEWAE press reported.

Meanwhile, tens of thousands of student protesters continued to stage demonstrations in major cities across the country, setting fire to police boxes and buses with daring acts and paralyzing traffic on downtown streets, until late at night.

DAILY URGES VIGILANCE AGAINST NORTH'S PROPAGANDA WAR

SK1800025 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD in English 18 Jun 87 p 8

[Editorial: "Vigil Against N.K. Adventure"]

[Text] North Korea is organizing mass rallies in major cities to support radical anti-government student protests here, according to recent reports. The propaganda war being waged by the Communist regime in Pyongyang is indicative of its unflagging interest in subverting our political and social order.

Being preoccupied with their immediate and myopic political gains, some oppositionists and dissidents are apparently oblivious to the serious menace their violent protests and disruption of domestic tranquility pose to the security of the nation.

This Republic is in a special situation. It is far more serious than in some Central American nations facing potential Communist takeovers aided by Cuba and Nicaragua. We are faced with an implacable adversary in the North that is more formidable and more militant.

All analysts and strategists agree that in Asia the situation on the Korean peninsula is most volatile, ready to touch off hostilities at any moment. The U.S. Defense Department observed in its budget report for 1988 that North Korea is capable of launching an all-out offensive against South Korea with arms supplies from the Soviet Union with the shortest time allowed for early warning.

The assessment is shared by the authoritative International Institute for Strategic Studies in London which said Pyongyang has acquired sufficient war potential for a surprise invasion of South Korea.

In spite of the latest policy pronouncements of the Kremlin leader Mikhail Gorbachev in favor of arms control and detente, the Soviets have built up enormous arsenals in Northeast Asia and obtained greater access to North Korean ports and air bases for increased military maneuverability. Reinforcement of the Soviet Far Eastern Naval Fleet has been remarkable.

Moscow is strengthening its links with, and presence in, such outposts as Vietnam, Afghanistan and North Korea. Moves by the Soviet Union and North

Korea constitute significant factors inimical to the security of the Western Pacific.

The change of government and the Seoul Olympic Games slated for next year make 1987 and 1988 a sensitive transition period. North Korea is bent on sabotage because the two major occasions will boost the stature of South Korea tremendously.

At this crucial juncture, our highest priority is put on secure national defense. Total defense cannot be maintained by servicemen deployed along the front line only. The whole nation, people from all walks of life, should draw together in bolstering our defense preparedness.

Our excessive internal disputes and confrontations should be restrained to preserve law and order essential to the security of the country.

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## NODONG SINMUN STRESSES INDOCTRINATION IN CHUCHE IDEA

SK230435 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 2135 GMT 20 Jun 87

[NODONG SINMUN 21 June special article: "Combination of Indoctrination of the Chuche Idea With Revolutionary Practice"]

[Text] Today, our revolution is constantly developing onto a high stage and the country's might is being strengthened with each passing day. As the revolutionary struggle and construction are deepened and the dignity of the country and the nation is enhanced we should further strengthen indoctrination in the chuche idea and, in particular, we should carry out this indoctrination work in close combination with revolutionary practice.

Comrade Kim Chong-il, member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau, and secretary, of the party Central Committee, has indicated: Indoctrination in the chuche idea should be carried out in relation with revolutionary practice. Inculcating the chuche idea in principle does not mean studying the chuche idea only with its theory, apart from reality.

Carrying out indoctrination in the chuche idea in close relation with revolutionary practice is an important work of helping people not only understand and master the theories of the chuche idea in principle but also thoroughly embody the theories in their work and lives, taking them as a guideline of conduct. Vigorously carrying out the indoctrination in the chuche idea in relation with revolutionary practice is the principle that our party has constantly adhered to. The chuche idea is not a theory for the sake of theory but a weapon of practice and a guideline of conduct for creation and reform.

The objective of the ideological indoctrination work of the party of the working class is essentially to inspire and encourage the masses of people to vigorously carry out the revolution and construction. Therefore, the ideological indoctrination work of the party of the working class should be thoroughly carried out in combination with revolutionary practice.

In our country today, all functionaries, party members, and working people are carrying out all tasks according to the demands of the chuche idea and with the attitude of being the master while taking the great chuche idea as their firm faith.

Our people are displaying matchless mass heroism and devotedness on the road of the revolution led by the party and the leader while firmly grasping the principle of *chuche* that the center of the revolutionary body of the society is the leader. This is the lofty trait of our people. This is also a precious fruit produced by the wise leadership of our party which has carried out its ideological indoctrination in close relation with practical struggle.

Based on this success, we should continuously and thoroughly carry out the party's intent to combine indoctrination in the *chuche* idea in close combination with revolutionary practice.

Combining indoctrination in the *chuche* idea with revolutionary practice is an important demand to see to it that all members of the society first of all faithfully uphold the leadership of the party and the leader by achieving success in their practical struggle. Loyalty to the party and the leader finds expression not in words but in practical acts. Those who carry out, without fail, tasks assigned by the party silently and in a timely manner and those who faithfully work for the party, the revolution, the country, and the people are precisely the revolutionaries who are infinitely loyal to the party and the leader.

To prepare all members of the society to become such genuine revolutionaries, it is important to carry out indoctrination in the *chuche* idea in combination with revolutionary practice. The practice of the revolution is a mighty means for ideological reform. The ability, talent, and character of revolutionaries are developed and enhanced in the course of revolutionary practice, including complicated class struggle and economic construction struggle.

Apart from revolutionary practice, the people cannot be tempered ideologically and volitionally, they cannot enhance the spirit of the working class, and they cannot contribute themselves to the party and the revolution with practical success in their work.

Of course, in fostering the people to become genuine revolutionaries with firm revolutionary outlooks of *chuche*, it is very important to lead them to deeply grasp and understand the principles of the *chuche* idea theoretically by strengthening study on the *chuche* idea among them.

Only when people firmly understand the principles of the *chuche* idea, such as the inevitability of guidance of and mingling with the masses and the decisive role of the leader in the revolutionary movement, theoretically can they have not only a correct stand and viewpoint toward the revolution, but also the revolutionary determination to struggle, devoting all for the party and the leader. However, their understanding of the principles of the revolution will become most firm only through practical struggle.

Today, we are carrying out the revolutionary struggle, the objective and degree of depth of which have reached a unprecedentedly high stage. In other words, we are carrying out the cause of modelling society after the *chuche* idea. The course of this rewarding struggle is precisely the course of revolutionary practice in which we can temper ourselves in a revolutionary manner and enhance our loyalty to the party and the leader.

When party organizations closely combine indoctrination in the principles of the chuche idea with their practical struggle of today and when all party members and working people actively carry out the practical struggle to realize the party's cause, everyone can become enthusiastic supporters of the chuche idea and outstanding revolutionaries who share their destiny with that of the party.

Vigorously pushing ahead with the indoctrination of the chuche idea in relations with revolutionary practice at present is also an important work to effect revolutionary upsurges in socialist construction. An important secret in accelerating socialist construction lies in firmly grasping the people's ideology and in spurring the boundless strength of the masses to the maximum. In other words, an important secret in accelerating socialist construction lies in thoroughly embodying the principles of the chuche idea in socialist construction. Therefore, it can be resolved only when indoctrination in the chuche idea among party members and working people is carried out in relation with revolutionary practice.

The chuche idea elucidates the scientific principle that man, the masses of people, play a decisive role in the revolution and construction. The chuche idea, therefore, demands that the masses of people carry out the revolution of their country in a responsible manner and with the attitude befitting the master.

Also, the chuche idea elucidates that the independent ideology and consciousness of man play a decisive role in the revolutionary movement and demands that work with man be firmly grasped in carrying out the revolutionary tasks as its basis.

The course of combining indoctrination in the chuche idea with revolutionary practice is precisely the course of not only inculcating among man these principles elucidated by the chuche idea in a theoretical manner but also letting them thoroughly embody these principles in their revolutionary practice. Therefore, when indoctrination in the chuche idea is carried out in close combination with revolutionary practice, party members and working people not only can carry out their revolutionary tasks in a responsible manner, devoting all their energies and wisdom, and with the lofty awareness of being the master of the revolution and the country, but can also display matchless devotion in the struggle for the propriety of the fatherland and the nation. At the same time, when indoctrination in the chuche idea is carried out in close combination with revolutionary practice, functionaries can deeply mingle with the masses as demanded by the chuche idea and spur them to display their lofty awareness and positiveness to the maximum and, thus, a revolutionary habit of boldly pushing ahead with all tasks can be established in the revolution and construction.

In particular, closely combining the indoctrination in the chuche idea with revolutionary practice constitutes a mighty means that make it possible for functionaries and the working people to highly demonstrate the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance and fortitude in carrying out their revolutionary tasks.

In inculcating among man the revolutionary spirit of surmounting all difficulties and in encouraging them to have firm faith in and dignity of their strength, revolutionary practice is the best way. In view of the present reality in which functionaries and working people are carrying out such revolutionary tasks as construction of the Kwangbok Street, construction of the Sunchon Vinalon Complex, and construction of the Taechon Power Plant, including this year's vast battle tasks to open the breakthrough of the Third 7-Year Plan, when we implant among functionaries and the working people the truth that if they struggle with the spirit of self-reliance there will be no fortress that cannot be occupied, they can perform any difficult revolutionary duty to the end with clear objective and indomitable fighting spirit.

The course of combining indoctrination in the chuche idea with revolutionary practice is precisely the course of seeing to it that party members and the working people cherish in their hearts the infinite dignity and honor of carrying out the revolution with the great chuche idea.

There is no stronger and mightier means than success of our revolution, namely, revolutionary practice in demonstrating the greatness of the chuche idea. By advancing along the banner of the great chuche idea, our people have been able to overcome all sorts of difficulties and trials and to create epochal miracles and exploits in the revolution and construction. Even today, they are registering amazing successes.

All miraculous events and successes and huge creative edifices, including the Sohae lockgate, that have taken place in this land are the precious fruit of the great chuche idea. Only when, together with such a proud reality, we further deepen and strengthen indoctrination in the chuche idea can we see to it that all party members and working people cherish deep in their hearts the boundless dignity of advancing under the banner of the great chuche idea and the boundless dignity of carrying out the revolution under the leadership of the glorious revolutionary chuche-type party and struggle to firmly safeguard and defend the revolutionary cause of chuche, devoting their all.

The chuche idea is the thorough revolutionary ideology of the working class. The work to enhance class consciousness among party members and the working people is resolved when it is closely combined with the present situation in which complicated and acute class struggle is waged. More closely combining indoctrination in the chuche idea with revolutionary practice is an earnest demand of our revolution today.

The profound principles and theories of the chuche idea have been extensively elucidated in the classical works of the respected and beloved leader Comrade Kim Il-song and the documents of our party. The problem lies in how thoroughly these precious principles and theories can be embodied.

When they conduct explanation and dialogue work and propaganda and agitation work, functionaries should see to it that they are combined with revolutionary practice without fail and that they actually contribute to strengthening the might of the party and the ranks of the revolution and to accelerating socialist construction.



Our revolutionary struggle, namely our practical struggle, is precisely the struggle to implement the teachings of the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song and the decision and instructions of the party. Therefore, we have no other indoctrination or practical struggle other than this.

All party organizations should first of all thoroughly carry out indoctrination in the chuche idea in a substantial manner with the urgent problems that arise in implementing the teachings of the great leader and the line and policy set forth by the party at every period and every stage. At the same time, even when they inculcate one principle of the chuche idea among the working people, all party organizations should see to it that this principle of the chuche idea finds expression in their acts and work result.

Revolutionary practice varies according to workers, farmers, and working intellectuals. The ability and level of carrying out revolutionary tasks are also different according to workers, farmers, and working intellectuals. Therefore, to closely combine the indoctrination in the chuche idea with the revolutionary task of each man and a specific reality for the implementation of the party's policy, we should not use such a uniform way as to conduct the indoctrination with the same textbook but should conduct the indoctrination in various ways and in a substantial manner after deeply studying the characteristics and preparedness of those receiving the indoctrination.

Along with this, in carrying out indoctrination in the chuche idea by combining it with revolutionary practice, it is important to inculcate party members and the working people so as to lead them not only to think and act according to the chuche idea and the ideology and intent of our party but also to resolve all problems that arise in the practical life in conformity with the specific reality of our country.

In closely combining indoctrination in the chuche idea with revolutionary practice it is important to resolutely safeguard and defend the immortal achievements that our party has registered in its ideological work and to infinitely glorify them.

Our party has indeed registered great achievements and gained precious experiences in the course of carrying out its ideological work, namely, indoctrination in the chuche idea in close combination with revolutionary practice. When we advance forward, firmly grasping these great achievements and experiences, we can thoroughly embody all profound principles and theories of the chuche idea and can effect constant upsurges in the revolution and construction as in the past.

All sectors and units should vigorously expedite the complete victory of socialism by deeply studying and mastering the revolutionary ideological work method of our party and by carrying out the indoctrination in the chuche idea in close combination with revolutionary practice.

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CSO: 4110/185

## DPRK MEETING MARKS ANTI-U.S. STRUGGLE DAY

SK240533 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0515 GMT 24 Jun 87

[Text] Pyongyang 24 June (KCNA)--Thousands of working people held an indignation meeting Tuesday at the Pamnamu valley in Sinchon county, South Hwanghae Province, on behalf of the working people of Korea on the occasion of the "Day of Struggle Against U.S. Imperialism, 25 June" and denounced the new war provocation moves and bestial atrocities of the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppet clique.

Seen at the meeting place were slogans reading "Down With the Chon Tu-hwan Military Fascist Clique!," "Let Us Drive Out the U.S. Imperialists and Reunify the Country!," "Let Us Extend Positive Support and Encouragement to the South Korean People in Their Struggle for the Democratization of Society and National Reunification!," "Let Us Accelerate Production and Construction in the Spirit of Helping the Brothers and Sisters in South Korea Who Are Fighting a Bloody Fight!," and so on.

The U.S. imperialist aggressors who crawled into Sinchon in the period of strategic retreat during the past Fatherland Liberation War, locked up mothers and children separately in two storehouses at the valley and poured gasoline and set fire on them, burning 400 mothers and 102 children to death. They ruthlessly murdered more than 35,000 guiltless people, or one fourth of the country's population.

In their speeches representatives of different circles vehemently denounced the U.S. imperialists, the sworn enemy, with surging national indignation and curse of the entire Korean people, in the name of the parents, brothers and sisters who were killed in cold blood by the U.S. imperialist murderers.

Our people who have suffered to the marrow from the 40 odd year long national division and still remember the scourge of the past three year war will never allow the criminal moves of the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets to turn the homeland into a theatre of nuclear war and make our nation a scapegoat of nuclear war, they said, and declared:

The entire people in the North and South of Korea should decisively smash the new war provocation moves of the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppet clique and wage a more vigorous anti-U.S., anti-war, anti-nuclear struggle

nationwide and thereby turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone without aggressors or nuclear weapons.

In particular, the South Korean people and students should hold higher the banner of anti-U.S. struggle for independence, anti-fascist struggle for democracy they raised and crush the criminal scheme of the U.S. imperialists and the puppet clique to prolong the colonial military fascist dictatorship and oust the Chon Tu-hwan military dictatorship, they emphasized.

The attendants staged a street demonstration.

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CSO: 4100/244

## INTENSITY OF MILITARY TRAINING, INFILTRATION EXERCISES REVEALED

Seoul NAEWOE TONGSIN in Korean No 532, 10 Apr 87 pp 1A-8A

[Article: "Recent Military Exercises and Readiness for Special Warfare"]

[Text] North Korea is strengthening fabricated and slanderous propaganda concerning the annual Korean-U.S. "Team Spirit '87" military exercises while distortedly portraying them as "nuclear war, preparatory war, and attack war directed against the northern half of the Republic."

However, it is universally known that North Korea has in fact been boldly carrying out military exercises that far surpass the Team Spirit exercises, which are defensive in nature. A recent example is the first large-scale North Korean-Soviet joint naval exercise in history, carried out together with the Soviet Pacific Fleet in late October 1986. The scale of this military exercise is unprecedented, it has become known, and in connection with the recent closing of military ties between North Korea and the Soviet Union, it may be seen as the most epochal and serious turn of events in the increasingly substantial military alliance relationship between the two sides. These are different in nature and of a different order from a series of military assistance or reciprocal arrangements such as Soviet provision of advanced weaponry, transit of Soviet reconnaissance aircraft through North Korean air space, and port call rights for Soviet naval vessels at Wonsan or Nampo.

The emphasis in these joint naval exercises, together with the numerical increases in submarines, missile-carrying attack boats, and landing craft as a part of North Korean military strengthening is on the goal of infiltrating into rear coastal areas of the Republic of Korea in time of war. Thus, they start with purely technical matters--estimates and analysis of such things as the influence of currents and differences between high and low tides to be taken into account for mine warfare; practical knowledge of topography at invasion points and security or lack of security of navigation in rear coastal areas. In the domain of tactics and strategy they are known to have investigated threatening the scope of South Korean naval operations and interdicting emergency sea supply lines as well as the North Korean role in Pacific (Ocean) deployment of the Soviet Far Eastern fleet, and blocking the scope of activities of U.S. naval power in the Far East region.

This state of affairs was verified again in 1986 in the statement of Soviet Far Eastern Fleet Commander Sidorov when the fleet, including the flagship of the Far Eastern fleet, the aircraft carrier Minsk and other ships called at a North Korean port on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the conclusion of the so-called "Soviet-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance": "Should the situation on the Korean peninsula require, we are prepared to conduct joint operations with North Korea." At the time the commander of the Soviet Far East Air Force, Bulankin (phonetic), announced that combined operations were already being carried out between Soviet and North Korean Air forces, thereby indirectly hinting that Soviet-North Korean joint naval and air exercises had been carried out to that time. As stated above, it is known from reports that the North Korean-Soviet joint signalling exercise and other exercises conducted in July 1986, when the North Korean fleet visited Vladivostok, the Far Eastern base of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, were the "first true joint exercises," and were seen as different from "opportunity exercises" [conducted prior to that time].

Looking at ground forces exercises keeping pace with these joint naval and air exercises between North Korea and the Soviet Union, North Korea built in front and rear areas a model of central Seoul streets including the Blue House and government office buildings of the Kwanghwamun area and has been staging many kinds of battalion-level attack exercises including surprise attacks and demolition of core government facilities, and covert infiltration of major facilities through sewer pipes, airborne infiltration via rooftops of buildings, and attacks against missile bases and air force airfields. Together with these exercises, they have constructed obstacles in the middle region of the cease-fire line similar to the land forms leading from the cease-fire line to Seoul and repeatedly carry out exercises that break through these, as well as urban guerrilla warfare exercises. Lately they are placing an emphasis on long-range covert infiltration using submarines and small submersibles.

Moreover, all special operations forces members are becoming proficient at covert overland infiltration; air infiltration using AN-2 transports and Hi-4 and Hi-8 helicopters; and infiltration by sea using minisubmarines and small high-speed boats; and are also concurrently carrying out infiltration exercises against our army's rear areas using large gliders and submersible equipment.

This may be seen as nothing other than a North Korean intent to make it possible to use crack special forces as a basis for simultaneous infiltration of numerous small special forces units in our forces' rear areas according to how the (South) Korean situation develops, weakening the frontal region and throwing it into confusion; and to carry out commando warfare after attacking major national organs, military facilities, and industrial targets.

Together with these kinds of exercises, each year between January and February North Korea conducts, at the order of the military affairs committee of the Korean Workers' Party, exercises carried out by Worker/Peasant Red Guards in each region throughout the country, and in March and April has been

strengthening the power of tactical exercises using paramilitary forces against reserve troops, including attacks on various enterprises throughout the country and field exercises by the college instructional units, of course, as well as carrying out unprecedented sea-mobile exercises.

Moreover, they have established civil defense organizations in the capital and in each region throughout the country under the name of "anti-aircraft countermeasures committees." Once or twice a month at the village unit level they carry out blackouts, taking shelter, and evacuation, and air defense exercises using emergency orders. They conduct large-scale civil defense exercises at the city and county level two to three times each year.

The linked large-scale military exercises mentioned above have as their context the so-called "four great military lines" announced in December 1962 at the Fifth Plenum of the Fourth Central Committee--"every soldier a cadre," "modernization of the armed forces," "fortification of the whole country," and "arming the whole people"--and also North Korean military policies that put full efforts into maintaining a military power superior to that of the south, concentrating investment of more than 30 percent of the annual budget each year in military strengthening.

North Korean military policy vigorously promotes domestic campaigns to maintain the army as an organization that is fully loyal to the Kim Il-song/Kim Chong-il system, such as the "struggle for the Red Banner of the Three Revolutions," the "five major military policies," and the 10 major measures for strengthening military work. While equipping each individual soldier with the so-called *chuche* thought of Kim Il-song, North Korea is making soldiers into all-competent troops capable of carrying out combat duties in any kind of weather or terrain.

At the Fourth Plenum of the Fourth Congress of the North Korean Workers' Party in January 1969, Kim Il-song emphasized that "the decisive guarantor of victory in war is the combined use of regular and commando warfare." As a means effectively to develop this kind of strategy and tactic, these North Korean military policies are becoming concretely implemented through emphasis on the following points. These are: strengthening of political and ideological education within the military; the carrying out of combat exercises that fit the actual conditions on the Korean Peninsula, taking into account the Korean war experience rather than imitating Soviet military operations as they did in the Korean war; ceaseless study of night combat and mountain warfare in order to conduct attacks on the enemy's (our army's) real lines; the creation of numerous additional light infantry units capable of conducting regular and irregular warfare; and making weapons light and easily transported. Through these methods they have been strengthening military unit exercises based on emphasis on a military policy planning that has the perspective of having a posture of mobilization and being always prepared to go out at any time and fight whenever the people of South Korea make such a request.

This point was reconfirmed in Kim Il-song's 1970 report to the Fifth Party Congress. In his report, Kim Il-song stressed that "the subject which presents itself as most important for the strengthening of the combat power of the People's Army is the ceaseless study and mastery perfection of tactics that correspond to the situation within the country, based on a foundation that is firmly equipped politically and ideologically, and then the use of this as the framework for achieving modernization." And he emphasized the fact that "our country's topography is characterized by many mountains and rivers, and a long coastline; if we use these conditions well, and skillfully carry out mountain warfare and night combat operations, correctly combining large and small unit operations, and regular warfare and commando warfare operations, then we will be able to wipe out even an enemy armed to the fingertips with the latest military technology. He stressed the point that "this is attested by combat experience from 1933 to 1939, by the experiences of the 1950 war for the liberation of the fatherland, and by the experiences of the Vietnam war."

The North Korean puppet army has carried out military exercises on the basis of these kinds of military policies and concepts of military strategy and tactics. Namely, the place an emphasis on the strengthening of combat capability that places the highest emphasis on speed, deception, and shock power, that enables them to boldly carry out all-out warfare, localized and limited warfare, or commando warfare, should the country's internal or external situation develop in ways that are to their advantage, and to do so unilaterally, without consultation with China or the Soviet Union. They place emphasis on military exercises in which this kind of buildup of combat capability can be applied to actual conditions.

North Korea propagandizes that the annual Team Spirit exercises are a nuclear testing, a preparatory war to attack North Korea. But the military exercises that they have been conducting, when seen from a military perspective, are more attack-oriented in content. The fact that North Korea rejected the invitation to observe Team Spirit may be interpreted as their eliminating, in advance, the dilemma of having to invite the South Korean and U.S. sides to observe their military exercises.

12837/9599

CSO: 4107/175

## NODONG SINMUN ON KOREAN NUCLEAR-FREE, PEACE ZONE

SK231018 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1008 GMT 23 Jun 87

["It is Urgent Demand of Times to Establish Nuclear-Free Peace Zone on the Korean Peninsula"]

[Text] Pyongyang 23 June (KCNA)--Our people will strive more energetically to convert the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone, says NODONG SINMUN today in an article on the lapse of one year since a statement was published by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea calling for creating a nuclear-free peace zone on the Korean peninsula (23 June 1986).

The author of the article says:

The great leader Comrade Kim Il-song taught us as follows:

"If the U.S. troops are compelled to withdraw from South Korea and a nuclear-free, peace zone is established on the Korean peninsula by the joint struggle of our people and the progressive people throughout the world, one of the most dangerous sources of nuclear war in the world will be removed and great progress will be made in preserving peace in Asia and the world."

The proposal for establishing a nuclear-free, peace zone on the Korean peninsula is of weighty significance in removing one of the most dangerous hotbeds of nuclear war in the world and preserving peace on the Korean peninsula and in Asia and other parts of the world.

As an embodiment of the consistent peaceloving stand of our party and the DPRK Government opposing war and valuing peace and their foreign policy line of independence, friendship and peace based on this stand and the policy of the independent and peaceful reunification of the country, the proposal has made important contributions to developing the sacred struggle of the world's people for independence against imperialism and for denuclearization against war.

If the Korean peninsula is converted into a nuclear-free, peace zone, it will be a heavy blow at the plot for aggression, war and division of the U.S. imperialists to realise a reactionary world strategy with Korea as a foremost nuclear offensive base in the East.



The article goes on:

The Korean people will further strengthen the just struggle to convert the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone, ease tensions, remove the danger of nuclear war there and achieve peace and the independent and peaceful reunification of the country and continuously express sincere support to and firm solidarity with the world's people in their movement for denuclearisation and peace against war.

We believe that the world's peaceloving countries and peoples, progressive and peace forces will, in the future, too, express firm support to our people's struggle for converting the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, achieving peace and peaceful reunification of the country.

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CSO: 4100/244

## PLANS TO HIKE EXPORTS 3.2 TIMES IN NEW PLAN PERIOD

SK201515 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1510 GMT 20 Jun 87

[Text] Pyongyang 20 June (KCNA)--Korea plans to lift the volume of trade turnover 3.2 times in the new long-term plan period (1987-1993) by developing trade in reliance upon her own sturdy economic foundation. A decisive increase will be registered especially in the export of manufactured goods such as machinery.

Massive export will be made of modern machine tools, heavy-duty wagons, ships, farm machines and other machines, nonferrous metals, magnesia clinker, cement, and other heavy industrial products.

The export of nonferrous metal will show a gain of more than five times and that of magnesia clinker will roughly double.

Export will be expanded in such light industrial goods as garments, porcelain and glass products and in other economic areas.

Korea is now extensively developing trade and economic and technological interchange with more than 100 countries. The inventory of export items is gaining in scope.

Two decades ago, only a few kinds of machines found their way to foreign markets. But now not only large, special and simple-purpose machine tools, but also complete sets of modern plants are exported.

Trucks, tractors, compressors and other kinds of machinery, cement, magnesia clinker, nonferrous metals, and rolled steel are also delivered to many countries.

The nation's trade turnover is on the yearly increase. It leapfrogged 2.2 times during the Second 7-Year Plan period (1978-1984).

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CSO: 4100/245

## DEVELOPMENT OF SEA CULTURE, PRODUCTS REPORTED

SK221512 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1500 GMT 22 Jun 87

[Text] Pyongyang 22 June (KCNA)--Korea directs efforts to the development of sea culture.

This year, too, a bumper harvest of tangle has visited the vast culture grounds of the East and West Seas. Tangle is a foodstuff for health and raw material of medicines.

According to data available from the Fishery Commission, the General Bureau for the Guidance of the Cooperative Fisheries increased the tangle production 1.2 times as against the same period of last year.

In particular, Nakwon and Yiwon counties of South Hamgyong province took care of the ropes for sea culture on a scientific and technological basis to chalk a new high in the per rope tangle and seaweed production.

The production of shellfish and sea-cucumber has increased in these counties.

In Ongjin County of South Hwanghae province, 1,500 more tons of laver than in the same period of last year has been reportedly produced at a modern laver production base which has made its appearance under the care of the Workers' Party of Korea.

The sea culture workers of Wonsan and Songdowon in Kangwon province have built hundreds of hectares of seaweed and tangle fields and sowed hundreds of thousands of ear-shells and other shellfish and oysters.

As a result, the area of culture grounds doubled and the amount of sea culture grew six times as compared with 1961 at the Songdowon Sea Culture Station alone.

There are a large quantity of tangle, lever, seaweed and other sea plants and fixative seafood resources including sea-cucumber and shellfish and vast culture grounds and tideland on the East and West Coasts of Korea.

According to even initial data, the East and West Coasts have one million hectares of ground suited to cultivation of tangle.

Korea envisages the expansion of sea culture grounds to 100,000 hectares and 8 million tons of sea culture production in the Third 7-Year Plan period (1987-1993).

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CSO: 4100/245

## ANJU COALFIELD REBUILT, EXPANDED

SK231524 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1507 GMT 23 Jun 87

[Text] Pyongyang 23 June (KCNA)--The Anju District Coal Mining Complex, situated in western Korea, is being reconstructed and expanded on a vast scale.

More than 10 pits of a large scale are under construction. To take the Taehyang shaft for instance, its tunneling length is thousands of metres, the amount of earth excavated more than 74,000 cubic metres and the amount of concrete tamping some 10,000 cubic metres.

The Korean People's Army soldiers and workers who are undertaking the development of the complex are devotedly striving to finish five pits within the year.

The Anju District Coal Mining Complex is a leading high-caloric coal producer of Korea.

According to initial evident data, the district has a deposit of 15,000 million tons.

The State has appropriated a large amount of fund for the development of the coalfield which is of weighty significance in the nation's economic development and the betterment of people's living.

Over the past seven years or more, four large coal mines, including the Sosa and Soho Coal Mines, have been developed and ten shafts and slope pits hundreds of, thousands of metres deep, have been built.

Now the Ripsok Coal Mine alone turns out as much coal as was produced by the complex some ten years ago.

Coalcutting faces have been expanded by an average of 10-20 times in scale.

Coal production at this complex grew three times or more during the Second 7-Year Plan (1978-1984). In this period, coal output per head of the employees increased 2.7 times. Production scale increased scores of times more than in the preliberation days.

## FOREIGN OFFICIALS PRAISE KIM CHONG-IL

OW131438 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1005 GMT 13 Jun 87

[Text] Pyongyang June 13. (KCNA)--The greatness of dear Comrade Kim Chong-il was highly lauded by the visitors of DPRK book, photo and handiworks exhibitions held in various countries.

The minister of state for the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports of Sierra Leone said:

The dear leader His Excellency Kim Chong-il is a great statesman who has performed brilliant feats for the Korean revolution and the world revolution by his outstanding ideological and theoretical activities.

Today, he enjoys deep respect among the world people as an outstanding thinker and theoretician, a great leader and a man with burning love for the people.

The dean of a faculty of Cairo University, Egypt, and curator of its library stressed that "On the Chuche Idea", "On Correctly Understanding the Originality of Kimilsongism", "On Some Questions in Understanding the Chuche Philosophy" and other works of His Excellency Kim Chong-il consummate gem-like propositions and reflect his gifted wisdom.

After going round the exhibition hall together with his family, the chairman of the Michoacan Association of Mexico noted that Comrade Kim Chong-il is a distinguished leader without an equal and said he is leading the revolution and construction to victory.

The chairman of the Peru-Korea Institute of Culture and Friendship said:

Dear Comrade Kim Chong-il is a great man possessed of remarkable intelligence, outstanding leadership ability and noble virtues.

No one can be a match for him in everything he possesses, all his passion and thinking devoted to the people.

The chief of a section of the Ministry of Information, Tourism and Culture of Equatorial Guinea said after visiting the exhibition hall:

Under the wise guidance of the dear leader Comrade Kim Chong-il the Korean people have achieved shining successes in the revolution and construction. This is a model for the peoples of the Third World countries.

I wholeheartedly wish the dear leader Comrade Kim Chong-il good health and a long life.

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CSO: 4100/235

## U.S. MANEUVERS OF CHON GOVERNMENT ALLEGED

## Commentary on Shultz Remarks on South

SK200318 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 1150 GMT 18 Jun 87

[Commentary by station commentator Kim Myong-nam: "A Behind-the-Scene Manipulator Who Has Revealed His Real Intention"]

[Text] According to a news report, while participating in a meeting of foreign ministers of Asian countries being held in Singapore, U.S. Secretary of State Shultz made brazen and absurd remarks at a press conference on 17 June. Referring to the south Korean situation, he prattled that he desires the discontinuation of violent demonstrations and the resumption of dialogue and that if the development of the situation toward democracy is not realized smoothly, those concerned would be severely punished. He then raved that he believes his policy for South Korea is right and that he will continuously espouse this policy. This shows the U.S. ruling circles' feeling of uneasiness about the expansion and strengthening of the anti-U.S. and anti-dictatorial struggle in South Korea in an unprecedented manner and their vicious real intention of harboring enmity against the South Korean people and of not desiring the democratization of south Korean society.

The demonstration struggle, in which more than 500,000 people from all walks of life have risen throughout South Korea, including Seoul, using the pan-national meeting held on 10 June as the momentum; the sit-in demonstration staged in the Myongdong cathedral in Seoul for six days with support and encouragement from tens of thousands of Seoul citizens; and the strong anti-U.S. and anti-government struggle staged in Pusan by more than 5,000 students, which blocked the U.S. consulate, were the greatest in scale, the most fierce, and the most tenacious mass struggles since the concoction of the Chon Tu-hwan puppet regime. These struggles were not only mass struggles against the Chon Tu-hwan, No Tae-u ring, which is trying to prolong its dictatorial region, but also the explosion of the people's rancor and resentment against the U.S. imperialists, who, having given the script on this attempt to the puppets, have manipulated them.

The U.S. imperialists are greatly perplexed by the present South Korean situation. This has been exemplified by the fact that since 10 June, spokespersons for the U.S. Department of State and the White House issued statements on five occasions and that Shultz has clamorously made remarks. k



It is by no means an accident that foreign news reports described Shultz' remarks as the confirmation of the U.S. foreign policy, which has been driven into a corner due to the South Korean situation.

The U.S. imperialists are completely responsible for the development of the catastrophic situation in South Korea we see today. Having led an oppressed life for more than 40 years under the U.S. imperialists; fascist colonial rule, the South Korean people ardently desire the democratization and independence of society; they have profusely shed blood in the struggle to achieve this end. However, whenever they have faced crises in colonial rule, the U.S. imperialists have maintained dictatorial regimes by replacing their stooges. The U.S. imperialists are now trying to maintain and prolong their colonial rule by replacing the Chon Tu-hwan dictatorial regime, which has been isolated and rejected by the people, with a No Tae-u dictatorial regime. How can the South Korean people, who desire independence and democracy, tolerate the puppets' maneuvers to prolong the dictatorial regime? How can they overlook the U.S. imperialists' maneuvers to manipulate them?

The responsibility for developing the South Korean situation into a catastrophic crisis rests with the U.S. imperialists, who are trying to force a much more cruel destiny of colonial slaves upon the people by using No Tae-u. Nevertheless, just like a thief shouting "Stop thief!" Shultz has threatened the opposition party and off-stage forces by shifting this responsibility onto them, saying that they will be severely punished.

The rascal's babbling about dialogue and compromise was a ludicrous preach designed to patronize and support the Chon Tu-hwan, No Tae-u ring and to strongly urge the off-stage forces and opposition parties to be submissive to dictatorial rule.

Now that, while staging the farce of nominating their presidential candidate to usurp power, the South Korean puppets have embarked on the road of brazenly and coercively implementing the unilateral political schedule, which they have formulated by themselves, how can we hold dialogue and compromise with them?

While telling a lie that they are greatly interested in democratic development, the U.S. imperialists are not interested at all in the people's cause of democratic development; they are only interested in indefinitely prolonging fascist colonial rule. This has been proven by the fact that while giving a script to traitors Chon Tu-hwan and No Tae-u to have them stage the farce of replacing the regime and while manipulating them in this regard, the U.S. imperialists stated that their policy for South Korea is right and that they will continuously espouse it.

Shultz' clamorous remarks directly revealed their real intention to continuously maintain the fascist colonial rule by remedying the crisis by threatening, pacifying, and deceiving the people and by reviving the puppets. However, no matter what trick they may use, the U.S. imperialists will not be able to thwart the South Korean people's aspirations for independence and democracy. The South Korean people will banish the U.S. imperialists, who have violated the people's freedom and rights by manipulating the dictator, from South Korea and will surely achieve their rights to independence.

VNS Criticizes U.S. Officials' Remarks

SK221125 (Clandestine) Voice of National Salvation in Korean to South Korea  
0200 GMT 21 Jun 87

[Station commentary]

[Text] In this hour of station commentary, I will talk about cunning double-dealing tactics.

During a press conference in Singapore, where he stopped on his Southeast Asian tour, U.S. Secretary of State Shultz made contradictory remarks about the current South Korean situation. On this occasion, while calling on the South Korean Government authorities to resume dialogue with the opposition party, he stated that the United States would not intervene, even if the South Korean Government declares martial law to suppress demonstrations.

Meanwhile, that same day, U.S. President Reagan sent a personal letter to Chon Tu-hwan urging him to not excessively deal with the anti-government protest movement and to begin a new dialogue with the opposition forces. William Clark, deputy assistant U.S. Secretary of State, babbled that he supports a resolution that calls for democracy in South Korea presented in the U.S. House of Representatives. These busy moves by persons in authority in the United States are unprecedented. At first glance, they look as if they do not want the Chon Tu-hwan, No Tae-u ring's dictatorship, as if they were interested in democracy in South Korea. These words and deeds by those in authority in the United States are part of their shameless double-dealing tactics, vivid evidence that they are very uneasy about the current critical situation that prevails in South Korea.

As you know, using the 13 April measure and the DJP's selection of its presidential candidate as an opportunity, the masses of all walks of life are waging anti-U.S. and anti-dictatorial struggles throughout the country. While shouting such slogans as "Overthrow dictatorship!", "Remove the United States!", and "Attain a democratic constitution!" the students and other masses of all walks of life are waging vigorous struggles to resist the crimes of murder of the United States and the Chon Tu-hwan regime. Embarrassed at this, the United States is using every cunning trick to prevent another Philippines situation and to alter the unstable political situation, thereby maintaining and strengthening their crumbling colonial ruling system.

While saying at every opportunity that they deplore the important decision and demand further measures for democracy, the persons in government authority and relevant congressmen in the United States have pretended to be apostles of democracy. The persons in authority in the United States uttered these words to soothe public sentiment against the United States and conceal their aggressive nature by making the people believe that they oppose dictatorship and hope for democracy in South Korea.

The United States is not interested in democracy in South Korea and has not had the will to allow democracy in South Korean society. The U.S. rulers are truly interested in the maintenance and strengthening of the fascist

dictatorship, not democratic development. They are truly worried about the escalation of anti-U.S. sentiment in this land, not the brutal suppression of the Chon Tu-hwan dictatorial group. They are truly pressuring the democratic forces and the masses who have vigorously risen in the anti-U.S. and anti-fascist struggle for democracy, while opposing the 13 April measure to protect the Constitution and the DJP's selection of its presidential candidate, not the Chon Tu-hwan, No Tae-u ring. In other words, the United States is instigating the Chon Tu-hwan, No Tae-u ring to bloodily suppress our people's anti-U.S. and anti-government struggle by even declaring martial law. This is graphically evidenced by Shultz' absurd remarks.

Because of its aggressive nature and the call of its Asian strategy, the United States does not want democracy in South Korean society and, therefore, it will not present the gift of democracy [to our people]. For this reason, while pretending to oppose dictatorship and human rights violations, the United States is, behind the scenes, continuously asking the Chon Tu-hwan, No Tae-u ring to wield fascist clubs and calling on the opposition forces to compromise with the dictatorial forces.

No matter what threats, blackmail, and deceptive tricks the United States may adhere to, it will not be able to frighten or deceive our masses. Our masses must not have any illusions or expectations about the United States and must more vigorously wage the struggle against the U.S. aggressors.

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CSO: 4110/183

## CPRF DENOUNCES NAKASONE REGIME FOR 'TWO KOREAS' PLOT

SK121550 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1535 GMT 12 Jun 87

[Text] Pyongyang June 12 (KCNA)--The Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland issued a statement Friday expressing the hope that the world peaceloving people and the political and public circles of all countries which love justice and treasure peace will sternly denounce the schemings of the Nakasone government of Japan to create "two Koreas" and lift up louder voices of solidarity for the Korean people's struggle for peace in the country and its peaceful reunification.

Recalling that the Nakasone government took the Korean question to the summit of seven Western industrial nations, preached there the so-called "three principles on Korea" and called upon the Western countries to "take a joint action" for the "preservation of peace" on the Korean peninsula and "successful opening of the Seoul Olympic Games," the statement says that this can never be tolerated.

It notes:

Overreaching itself, as if it were the master and the party concerned in the solution of the Korean question, the Nakasone government of Japan argues pro and con about the Korean question at international conferences and bilateral talks. It is an obtrusive and ridiculous act, we should say.

Nakasone's impudence in talking this or that about the Korean question everywhere he goes is a high-handed interference in the internal affairs of Korea and an insolent act insulting our people, the master of the Korean question.

If the Japanese authorities have anything to do as regards the Korean question, it is to redeem and apologize to the Korean people for the monstrous crimes of the Japanese imperialists in the past days in ruthlessly exploiting and suppressing the Korean people, carrying away the wealth of Korea like a robber during their barbaric colonial rule over Korea and causing the division of Korea.

When Nakasone drivelled about "preservation of peace" he only indicated that he was supporting the policy of confrontation and division pursued by

the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets on the Korean peninsula and, furthermore, his group itself was zealously taking a hand in it.

The Nakasone government sought a permanent division of Korea when it took the Korean question to the Venice summit.

The statement notes that the Japanese Government has down through history sought the permanent division of Korea, joining the U.S. imperialists in the "two Koreas" policy, and this was pursued more feverishly especially in the days of the Nakasone cabinet.

The statement stresses:

The Japanese Government should act with discretion, looking squarely at the will of our nation to win the reunification of the country and at the trend of the times towards sovereignty and independence.

The Japanese reactionaries should renounce their haughty attitude of approaching the Korean nation from the position of the old colonial ruler and not mistake our Korean people for the colonial nation in the past days.

If the Nakasone government is truly interested in the relaxation of tensions on the Korean peninsula and its peaceful reunification, it should give up before it is too late its wrong policy of helping the South Korean puppets and its hostile policy towards us and do things beneficial to Korea's reunification, instead of things obstructive to it.

/6662

CSO: 4100/235

## LEADERS' STATEMENTS DENOUNCE SUPPRESSION OF SOUTH PROTESTS

SK240311 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 2300 GMT 20 Jun 87

[Text] Kim Pong-chu, chairman of the GFTUK Central Committee, and Pak Su-tong, chairman of the UAWPK Central Committee, respectively issued statements condemning the South Korean puppet clique's criminal maneuvers of brutally suppressing the struggle of the South Korean people against the nomination of a puppet presidential candidate.

In his statement, the chairman of the GFTUK Central Committee, exposing the DJP rabbles' farce of nominating a presidential candidate on 10 June as another political coup d'etat by the military fascist clique to prolong the present colonial and military fascist rule under the manipulation of the U.S. Imperialists, referred to the fact that the South Korean people of all strata are now strongly struggling against this, and continued:

This struggle is not only a mass resistance in which workers and citizens of all strata, together with youths and students, are participating in major cities in South Korea, including Seoul, Pusan, Masan, Tacheu, Kwangju, Chonju, Inchon, and Taejon, but is also a vehement anti-U.S. and anti-fascist struggle in which the South Korean citizens are fighting against the puppet army's commando units and the puppet police through rallies, demonstrations, sit-in struggle, and stone-hurling battles.

Regarding this struggle as an expression of the resolute fighting spirit and aspiration of the South Korean workers and people of all strata to struggle for independence and democracy to the end, I extend fervent support and encouragement to the struggle as a fellow countryman.

Exposing that the South Korean workers have been the target of exploitation and oppression while their primary labor rights were divested in the land barren of democracy and human rights, he said that if the maneuvers to establish the No Tae-u military fascist regime are allowed the South Korean workers will surely meet a gloomier situation than stressed today and that it is natural for the South Korean workers to struggle against the maneuvers to prolong the fascist dictatorship.

Saying that success in the South Korean people's struggle for independence, democracy, and reunification depends largely on how courageously the South Korean workers struggle, he indicated that the October popular resistance, the

September general strike, the 19 April popular uprising, and the Kwangju popular uprising in the past were recorded in the history of the nation as brilliant and proud struggles because the South Korean workers actively participated in these struggles.

He expressed hope that the South Korean workers will stubbornly and continuously wage the struggle to the end to smash the Chon Tu-hwan, No Tae-u ring's maneuvers to prolong the military fascist dictatorship and to achieve independence and democratization of the South Korean society and will bring about brilliant victory without fail.

In his statement, the chairman of the UAWPK Central Committee said that if the robbery of power by the U.S. imperialists and the Chon Tu-hwan, No Tae-u ring to prolong the colonial and fascist dictatorship is allowed intact, the South Korean farmers will undergo more misfortune and disaster than today. He continued: The U.S. imperialists have destroyed farmland and devastated rural villages everywhere in South Korea in a bid to make it a market for their surplus agricultural products. The Chon Tu-hwan clique has driven the South Korean agriculture to a catastrophe by opening markets to U.S. agricultural products, including cigarettes, submitting to the U.S. imperialists' pressure on South Korea to open its markets.

Viciously scheming to prolong such a treacherous regime the U.S. imperialists are trying to bring to Chongwadae No Tae-u, a pro-U.S. stooge and military gangster like Chon Tu-hwan.

Noting that the struggle of the South Korean farmers against the maneuvers to prolong the colonial and fascist dictatorship is a just struggle for national sovereignty, democracy, and their rights to existence, he said that he extends active support and encouragement to this.

Saying that the South Korean farmers still cherish in their hearts the patriotic vigor and fighting spirit that they demonstrated in the Kapo Farmers' War [in 1894], the [word indistinct] farmers' riot, the April popular uprising, and the Kwangju popular uprising, he expressed firm belief that if the South Korean farmers continuously struggle, together with the youths, students, and the people of all strata, against the maneuvers of the U.S. imperialists and, their stooge, the Chon Tu-hwan, No Tae-u ring to prolong the colonial and fascist dictatorship, a new society of independence and democracy will come to South Korea without fail.

/12913

CSO: 4110/183

## DPRK RALLY ADOPTS LETTER OF APPEAL ON SOUTH

SK190910 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 1100 GMT 13 Jun 87

[A letter of appeal to all political parties, factions, and the people of all strata in South Korea adopted at mass rally held at the Central Workers' Hall in Pyongyang on the afternoon of 13 June to condemn "the criminal maneuvers of the U.S. imperialists and the puppet clique to prolong the colonial and military fascist dictatorship in South Korea"]

[Text] To each party, each faction, and the people of all strata in South Korea:

Today, South Korea is placed in an important situation in which it should decide whether to achieve democracy through struggle or to allow the prolonging of the fascist dictatorship through submission. In a democratic rank in which you cannot endure any longer and in which you cannot retreat any further, you, who have been troubled with the fascist dictatorial tyranny for a long 50 years, are struggling day and night shouting constitutional revision providing for a direct presidential election system and democratic development. The entire Korean people and the progressive people of the world are expressing their profound sympathy and firm solidarity with this just struggle of yours.

However, the Chon Tu-hwan clique has responded to your patriotic aspirations and demands by conducting a farce designed to prolong the military dictatorship. On 10 June, after binding the people's hands and legs by mobilizing more than 120,000 police forces, the fascist clique brought about a situation in which it nominated No Tae-u as so-called presidential candidate. We ask: In the history of any country of the world, has there been such a precedent in which a ruler was nominated through dogmatism and tyranny, brutally repressing the people's aspirations and demand?

Moreover, the reason why the entire nation resents this vehemently and the world increase its voice of denunciation lies in the fact that on that day, the Chon Tu-hwan, No Tae-u ring indiscriminately and violently suppressed the people in a mean manner. Look: By wielding swords from the outset of its scheme to prolong the military fascist dictatorship, the Chon Tu-hwan, No Tae-u ring has committed such barbarous acts of arresting and confining thousands of people, knocking youths and students down with teargas canisters, and even blinding them in various places in South Korea, including Seoul.



The world people once again witnessed the fascist dictators' murderous, outrageous, and vicious fascist brutality which reminds us of the Kwangju incident seven years ago. If the South Korean dictators truly listened to the people's opinion and intended to achieve a peaceful transfer of power, there was no need for them to conduct the drama of nominating their candidate by depending on such a brutal violence.

A ruler should not be selected or nominated by dictators, but should be chosen and elected by the popular masses, who are the supreme rulers. As this democratic way has been eliminated historically and the despotism of dictators has dominated in South Korea, the dictatorship of Syngman Rhee has been transformed into the dictatorship of Syngman Pak and the dictatorship of Syngman Pak has been changed into the dictatorship of Syngman Chon [as heard]. Now, the trend in which the Chon Tu-hwan regime is going to be turned into a No Tae-u regime [as heard] is nothing but a deceptive drama designed to continue their rule in South Korea through heredity of fascist dictatorship.

Nothing but poisonous mushrooms of an even more cruel dictatorship will be produced from the root of the fascist dictatorship. In the root of the fascist dictatorship, there is no truth, justice, or ideology that the South Korean people aspire for. Furthermore, from this root, national sovereignty and democracy cannot grow and peace and peaceful reunification cannot be expected.

Those who fell in the 19 April uprising and the brave warriors of the 18 May uprising in Kwangju have never sacrificed their precious lives to witness this type of situation in South Korea, and today, you are not struggling for it, shedding blood, either.

To all parties, factions, and the people from all walks of life in South Korea: The South Korean reality, where a drama of transfer from a dictatorship to a dictatorship is taking place, demands that everyone tenaciously continue their grand march of struggle for constitutional revision providing for a direct presidential election system and for democratic development.

If you stopped fighting with the fascist dictatorship, making one-step concession today, you would have to retreat two steps back tomorrow; and if you fell down now, you would never be able to stand up tomorrow. Now is the time for you to fight and fight with courage and determination as the United States, backing the fascist dictators, is sacred out of its wits and the dictators themselves are in extreme anxiety, anticipating the final hour of their destiny.

All parties, factions, and the people from all walks of life in South Korea should continue an even more courageous struggle, with firm faith, to put an end to the Chon Tu-hwan, No Tae-u regime's military dictatorship and to greet the birth of a genuine democratic regime that they have earnestly yearned for as a dream for more than 40 years.

Thousands of youths, students, and people from all walks of life, who are groaning in prison after having been arrested while fighting on the frontlines

of the struggle, are unanimously waiting for helping hands. You should actively struggle to release youths, students, intellectuals, religious people, and democratic figures who have become victims of the fascist dictatorship after having been illegally put in jail.

It is the very U.S. imperialists who are the behind-the-scenes manipulators that support the prolonging of the military fascist dictatorship in South Korea. The deceptive farce of the transfer of power being conducted by the fascist dictators before you is an outcome of the policy of aggression toward South Korea by the United States, which is attempting to seize South Korea as their permanent colonial and military base.

It is only because of the U.S. interests that military fascist dictatorship is created, exists, and is maintained in South Korea. How can we allow such foreign aggressors, who sacrifice others for the sake of their own interests, to remain in South Korea?

The people from all walks of life in South Korea should never be deceived by the crafty artifice of the U.S. imperialists who babble about democratic development outwardly and who play the role of midwife for the military dictatorship behind the scenes; instead you should struggle arduously to oppose and reject their interference into the internal affairs and colonial rule and to have the U.S. troops and their nuclear weapons be withdrawn from South Korea.

Unity is power. Only united power of all parties, factions, and the people of all walks of life can eliminate the military dictatorship, achieve democracy, and establish a new independent society in South Korea. Each party, each faction, and the people of all walks of life in South Korea should resist aggression and treachery with one firmly united strength.

Victory is on the side of those who are struggling for independence, democracy, and reunification. The entire people in the northern half of the Republic, as the same nation with the same ancestors, will always give active support and encouragement to your patriotic struggle.

[Dated] 13 June 1987.

[Signed] The Pyongyang mass rally held to condemn the criminal maneuvers of the U.S. imperialists and the puppet clique to prolong the colonial and military fascist dictatorship in South Korea. [applause]

/12913

CSO: 4110/183

## ANTIGOVERNMENT MASS RALLIES REPORTED

## Hanminjon Demands End to Dictatorship

SK151036 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1028 GMT 15 Jun 87

[Text] Pyongyang June 15 (KCNA)--The propaganda department of the Central Committee of the South Korean National Democratic Front (Hanminjon) on June 10 issued an appeal calling upon broad segments of people to rise as one in the resistance struggle to liquidate the fascist military dictatorial system of the Chon Tu-hwan-No Tae-u group, according to radio "Voice of National Salvation".

The appeal said: More than 500,000 people rose in the protest struggle to liquidate "defence of the present constitution" with the "June 10 presidential convention of the Democratic Justice Party" as an occasion this was an explosion of the indignation of people trodden down under fascism and a determined answer of the democratic forces to the offensive of the "Democratic Justice Party" to prolong its power.

No Tae-u who emerged as a "presidential candidate" to succeed Chon Tu-hwan the murderer at the "convention of the Democratic Justice Party" started a sanguinary war against the people from the outset, the appeal noted.

Saying that at this critical moment when people should choose fascism or democracy, there can be no hesitation or retreat for them, it called as follows:

When the entire people rise and storm the citadel of the military dictatorship, the dictators will be unable to escape a miserable end like that of Syngman Rhee or Pak Chung-hui.

Today when an implacable war was declared against the military dictatorial forces, we patriotic people should raise the flame of the all-people resistance struggle in all parts and turn this land into a crucible of fire to overthrow the military dictatorship.

The United States should bear responsibility for the situation of the South turning into a theatre of bloodbath and withdraw.

All people should liquidate the Chon Tu-hwan-No Tae-u military dictatorship with their participation and resistance struggle.

#### South Students Continue Struggle

SK171030 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1022 GMT 17 Jun 87

[Text] Pyongyang June 17 (KCNA)--South Korean students and citizens on June 16, too, fought a massive anti-"government" struggle to smash the long-term office scheme of the Chon Tu-hwan-No Tae-u group, according to reports.

The struggle Tuesday was taken part in by more than 42,000 students from 57 universities in Seoul, Pusan, Kwangju, Chinju, Chonan, Chonju, Wonju and other areas of South Korea.

The Chon Tu-hwan fascist clique posted police units armed with armored cars and tear gas grenade launchers and set up multiple tear gas canister launchers on the streets in Seoul to suppress the demonstrators.

Thousands of students from 24 universities in Seoul battled the police with rocks, chanting "Down with the military dictatorship" to the applause of citizens.

When puppet special martial arts attack squads stormed into the campus, firing tear gas canisters, more than 2,000 students of Sogang University hurdled bricks and rocks at them. A large number of citizens encouraged the demonstrators.

Other university students waving flags and banners bearing anti-"government" slogans battled riot police Tuesday in the streets.

Hundreds of crowds demonstrated in front of the Myongdong Cathedral, chanting anti-"government" slogans. The shouts "Down with Chon Tu-hwan" burst forth without letup from among them.

In local areas, students of 33 universities rose in anti-"Government" demonstrations Tuesday.

In Chinju, about 2,000 students of Kyongsang University staged a demonstration for several hours, rocking the whole city with anti-"government" shouts. They attacked four police boxes.

More than 1,500 students of 3 universities in Chonan resisted with rocks the riot police firing tear gas.

#### Students Battle Riot Police

SK180501 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0444 GMT 18 Jun 87

[Text] Pyongyang June 18 (KCNA)--The fierce struggle of South Korean students and people against the long-term office scheme of the Chon Tu-hwan-No Tae-u group swept through South Korea on June 17, too, according to reports.

Thousands of students battled riot police, yelling "Drive out the dictator." Protesters burned police buses and attacked police stations, and one group blocked an expressway and hijacked two liquid gas tankers that they threatened to blow up.

A foreign press report said tens of thousands of students that day attended campus meetings to prepare for a greater protest action.

Thousands of students battled riot police in the streets around several major universities in Seoul. They erected barricades in the streets and fought hit-and-run demonstrations with the police.

More than 1,000 students of Hanyang University and above 2,000 students of Yonsei University staged demonstrations, hurling rocks at the tear gas firing riot police.

Thousands of students in Seoul took part in marches, including some 2,500 from Rihwa Women's University who chanted slogans. Two thousand students of Hongik, Kukmin and Tanguk universities respectively battled the riot police shouting "Revise the constitution" and "Down with dictatorship".

Students staged a sit-down strike in front of Koryo University.

In Pusan, more than 2,000 students swarmed around the U.S. Consulate and staged a strong anti-U.S., anti-"government" demonstration. Marching to support their fellow students who occupied the local Catholic Centre, they forced the U.S. Consulate to close with American officials inside.

"Right now there is no comfortable way to leave the area," said the U.S. official who was locked in the fortified building of the consulate.

Driven to a blind alley, the fascist clique sent nearly 1,000-men riot police to seal off the roads to the consulate and surround the demonstrators who blockaded the consulate. The protesters unyieldingly continued their protest.

Thousands of your protesters brought major sections of South Korea's second largest city to a standstill with hit-and-run demonstrations throughout the downtown.

Almost as quickly as helmeted riot police could disperse them with barrages of tear gas, the protesters regrouped elsewhere in the city centre, sitting down in main streets to form human barricades or erecting metal barricades to disrupt traffic.

About 300 students of Kyongsang University in Chinju occupied the main south coast expressway and held a sit-down strike.

Meanwhile, members of the Council for the Promotion of Democracy went into a sit-in calling for the release of those arrested for the June 10 all-people rally and for the lifting of the house arrest of Kim Tae-chung.

Some 200 women held a demonstration in front of the puppet Seoul Criminal District Court, shouting "Bring Pak Chong-chol to life."

Meanwhile, the fascist clique on June 17 closed 28 universities in an attempt to keep the demonstrations of students from gaining further momentum.

#### Seoul Students Protest Tear Gas Firing

SK190511 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0506 GMT 19 Jun 87

[Text] Pyongyang June 18 (KCNA)--More than 27,000 students of 24 colleges and universities in Seoul held demonstrations at different places on the afternoon of June 18 in protest against the outrages of the military hooligans in having frustrated by force a public hearing organised by 18 women's organisations against tear gas, according to a report.

The fascist clique positioned 2,400 police of 16 companies around the Yong-dong Church in block 5, Chongno Street, where the public hearing was planned and blocked the entry of intending participants in the hearing into the church.

More than 2,000 students who gathered near the church occupied the road and staged a demonstration against the fascist clique's suppression, chanting anti-"government" slogans.

At the same hour, more than 1,000 students staged a fierce demonstration in block 3, Chongno Street, in protest against the suppression.

Upwards of 2,500 students of Koryo, Kyonghui and other colleges and universities in the eastern district of Seoul occupied the road in block 6, Chonggyechon, and held a demonstration, shouting "Don't fire tear gas shells".

Meanwhile, members of women's organisations and families of detainees, over 200 in all, staged a sit-in at the entrance to the hall of the Christians Association in Chongno District, shouting "Expel tear gas shells".

About 500 students nearby expressed solidarity for their struggle.

#### Students, Citizens Stage Protests

SK190609 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0558 GMT 19 Jun 87

[Text] Pyongyang June 19 (KCNA)--Tens of thousands of students and citizens staged powerful anti-"government" demonstrations Thursday in such major South Korean cities as Seoul, Pusan, Inchon, Kwangju, Taegu, Masan, Taejon, Chinju and Wonju in protest against the violent blocking by the Chon Tu-hwan military hooligans of a public hearing for the expulsion of tear gas sponsored by 18 women's groups, according to reports.

The number of the students participating in the anti-"government" rallies and demonstrations ran into 28,000 from 25 universities and colleges in Seoul and 19,000 from 29 in the local cities.

In Seoul, when the public hearing at the Yongdong Church in block 5, Chongno Street, ended abortive under police repression, many students and citizens held an outdoor rally in front of the building of the Council of Christian Churches in Chongno District against the use of tear gas by the fascist clique.

The fascist clique made an indiscriminate tear gas attack on the citizens and students swarming to the Yongdong Church from all parts of the city to attend the public hearing.

The enraged students and citizens went over to a demonstration, crying "It is a tear gas republic," "Down with military dictatorship" and "We want democracy."

The number of the students and citizens participating in the demonstrations swelled to tens of thousands.

Many thousand students, after a hit-and-run battle, drove back the police and temporarily took control of a large square in the city centre and the roads around it and overpowered the riot police. After seizing the "Hanguk Bank" Square, the students shouted "Down with military dictatorship."

Two riot police units surrendered to the student demonstrators. The students disarmed 80 odd police. Kneeling police begged the students to stop beating them as they were stripped of their tear gas guns, helmets and shields. Police officer clasped their hands in supplication and beseeched the attackers to leave them alone. The students piled the captured police equipment and burnt it. Five thousand protesters took control of the road leading to Seoul railway station for two hours and set one police van on fire.

In Pusan the number of the demonstrators snowballed to 80,000 at one stage. The protesters denounced the long-term office scheme of the fascist clique, yelling "Down with the dictator", "Down with No Tae-u."

In Taegu 6,000 protesters started a demonstration after holding an anti-tear gas rally.

A group of demonstrators drove a fire engine they captured toward the police line.

In Chinju 1,000 students of Chinju Education College and 2,000 students of Kyongsang University staged demonstrations. In Taejon hundreds of students too over the railway station building and waged a sit-in.

The U.S. imperialists and the Chon Tu-hwan-No Tae-u traitor clique are trembling with fear in face of the anti-U.S., anti-"government" struggle of the South Korean students and people which is growing fiercer each day.

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CSO: 4100/235

## VNS URGES SOLDIERS TO SUPPORT MASSES STRUGGLE

SK240520 (Clandestine) Voice of National Salvation in Korean to South Korea  
0200 GMT 20 Jun 87

[Unattributed talk: "The Present Political Situation and the Soldiers' Attitude"]

[Text] Men and officers: As you know well, our masses are continuing the struggle to smash the maneuvers of the murderous Chon Tu-hwan, No Tae-u group that is seeking long-term office. In Seoul, Pusan, Inchon, Taejon, Taegu, Kwangju, and all other major urban areas across the country, youths, students, and citizens, in waging the anti-U.S. and anti-dictatorial struggle, are shouting "Let us overthrow the military dictatorship!," "Liquidate the decision to maintain the current Constitution!," "Let us expel the U.S. imperialists supporting dictatorship!," and "Yankee, go home!"

Everywhere, effigies of Reagan, Chon Tu-hwan, and No Tae-u are burned, the Stars and Stripes torn down and trampled, police substations attacked, and the rock-throwing struggle is continued against the fascist riot police mobilized for suppression. Thus, the masses' struggle expands with every passing day.

In Seoul alone, thousands of students from 30 universities and hundreds of thousands of citizens continue to struggle by holding gatherings day after day and shouting anti-U.S. and anti-fascist slogans for democratization.

Frightened by the anti-U.S. and antifascist struggle waged by the masses of all strata, the fascist police of the Chon Tu-hwan, No Tae-u group fire teargas canisters at demonstrators and wield clubs. It commits the atrocity of indiscriminately arresting and detaining citizens.

To establish a foothold for long-term office, the murderous Chon Tu-hwan group, employing all kinds of appeasing and deceiving tactics, has indefinitely extended the Class A emergency order issued for the 120,000 policemen across the country. In Seoul alone, it has put tens of thousands of riot police on round-the-clock alert. Every day, it unhesitatingly commits the fascist act of arresting and detaining thousands of innocent citizens.

What particularly makes it hard to repress indignation, as is seen in the case of Yi Han-yol, sophomore of the Industrial Management Department of Yonsei University, on 9 June and in the case of Kim Chong-pil, sophomore of the news



media department of the Hanguk University of Foreign Studies, on 10 June, is the fact that the fascist police cripple student demonstrators by firing directly at them according to the order of the Chon Tu-hwan, No Tae-u group.

Today, the acts of the fascist police are exactly the same as that of former Home Minister Choe In-kyu and his stooges who ordered police to fire at demonstrators at the time of the 19 April popular uprising in 1960. At the same time, the present political situation is reminiscent of that on the eve of 19 April 1960.

Before the grave question of whether we will die for independence and democracy or will suffer subjugation and humiliation forever, we must adopt the road to independence and democracy.

Men and officers: Before the present political situation, we cannot but recall the attitude which our men and officers adopted at the time of the 19 April popular uprising. When they were mobilized to bring students under control at the time of the 19 April uprising, soldiers drew the students gathered around up on their tanks. They hugged one another and even burst into tears together.

A soldier, in answer to a revolutionary warrior who shouted "Fire at me and kill me!," said "I will die with you!"

Today, however, the fascist police of the murderous Chon Tu-hwan group directly fire at demonstrators who shout "Kill us!" in expressing their indignation.

While committing such atrocity, the Chon Tu-hwan, No Tae-u group still babbles about dialogue and negotiations. This is indeed a fascist outrage.

Under these circumstances, it is entirely natural that our masses further expand their struggle for the independence of the nation and the democratization of the society.

The absolute majority of you were workers, peasants, and students or their sons or brothers. Accordingly, you must support the just struggle of your parents, brothers and sisters, and friends.

At this juncture, if you do not stand on the side of the people, your parents, brothers and sisters, and the majority of the people will suffer even greater ordeals and misfortunes, and the murderous group and the U.S. aggressors will become even more rampagous.

Thus, as the patriotic men and officers fought on the side of the nation and masses in the past, you must never be mobilized in suppressing the people. Instead, with determination to share destiny with your parents and your brothers and sisters, you must glorify your life in the anti-U.S. and anti-dictatorial struggle for independence, democracy, and peaceful reunification.

If the patriotic men and officers unite as one and join the anti-U.S. and anti-dictatorial struggle of our masses, nothing can challenge their might.

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